ATC-Wake - Integrated Wake Vortex Safety and Capacity System by Speijker, L.J.P. et al.
  
<ATC-Wake> 
<IST–2001-34729> 
< D6_2: ATC-Wake – Integrated Wake Vortex Safety 
and Capacity system> 
 
ATC-Wake: Integrated Wake Vortex  
Safety and Capacity System 
(ATC Wake D6_2) 
 
L.J.P. Speijker (NLR) 
A. Vidal (EUROCONTROL) 
F. Barbaresco (Thales AD) 
T. Gerz (DLR) 
H. Barny (Thales Avionics) 
G. Winckelmans (UCL) 
 
Report Version: Final 
Report Preparation Date: 31/12/2005 
Classification: Public 
Contract Start Date: 01.07.2002 
Duration:  31.12.2005 
Project Co-ordinator:  National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
Partners Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- & Raumfahrt DLR 
 EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre (EEC) 
 Thales Air Defence (TAD) 
 Thales Avionics (TAV) 
 Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) 
 
Project funded by the European Community under 
the “Information Society Technology” Programme 
(1998-2002) 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
II 
 
 
DELIVERABLES SUMMARY SHEET 
 
Project Number: IST-2001-34729 
Project Acronym: ATC-Wake 
Title: Integrated ATC Wake Vortex Safety and Capacity System 
Deliverable N°:  D6_2 
Due date: 31/12/2005 
Delivery Date: 31/12/2005 (Final Version) 
 
Short Description: 
The IST project ATC-Wake aims to develop an integrated system for ATC (Air Traffic 
Control) that would allow variable aircraft separation distances, as opposed to the fixed 
distances presently applied at airports. A variety of existing subsystems has been integrated 
within the ATC-Wake Integrated Platform, which was used in a test bed environment role: 
• To evaluate the interoperability of the ATC-Wake system with existing ATC systems 
currently used at various European airports; 
• To assess the safety and capacity improvements that can be obtained by local 
installation of the ATC-Wake system at various European airports; 
• To evaluate operational usability and acceptability of the ATC-Wake system; 
• To make a plan and to assess the costs for further implementation and exploitation of 
the ATC-Wake IP platform into the system that can be installed at European airports). 
 
The ATC-Wake Integrated Platform is an essential step that will lead to installation of an 
integrated ATC decision support system at airports, enabling air traffic controllers to apply 
new optimised weather based aircraft separation. The ATC-Wake system will integrate 
weather and Wake sensors, weather forecasting and now-casting systems, Wake vortex 
prediction system, separation mode planner, and air traffic controller interface. Used with 
new harmonised safety regulation, this system will provide tactical and strategic benefits, 
while maintaining safety.  
 
This Final Report provides an overview of all the activities performed, including conclusions 
and recommendations in order to continue the exploitation towards installation of the ATC-
Wake system at European airports. 
 
Partners owning: ATC-Wake Consortium 
Partners contributed: ATC-Wake Consortium 
Made available to: European Commission, IST Programme 
 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
III 
 
 
Contract No.  IST–2001-34729 
 
ATC-Wake  WP6000 
Task Title Integrated ATC Wake Vortex Safety and Capacity System 
Deliverable D6_2 
 
Prepared by:  Lennaert Speijker (NLR) 
 Antoine Vidal (EUROCONTROL) 
 Frederic Barbaresco (Thales AD) 
 Thomas Gerz (DLR) 
 Hervé Barny (Thales Avionics) 
 Gregoire Winckelmans (UCL) 
 
Document control sheet NLR-TP-2006-254  
Work Package:  WP 6000 Released by:  L.J.P. Speijker (NLR) 
Version: Final Approved by : L.J.P. Speijker (NLR) 
Issued by: NLR Reviewed by : ATC-Wake consortium 
Date of issue: 31/12/2005  
 
This report is Public, and has been produced by the ATC-Wake consortium: 
 
National Aerospace Laboratory NLR 
Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- & Raumfahrt DLR 
EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre (EEC) 
Thales Air Defence (TAD) 
Thales Avionics (TAV) 
Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
IV 
 
 
List of Acronyms 
ACC Air traffic Control Centre (en route) 
AGL Altitude above Ground Level 
AMAN Arrival Manager 
APP Approach ATC Unit 
ARS Airport Radar System 
ATCO Air Traffic Control Officer 
ATIS Air Traffic Information Service 
ATSU Air Traffic Service Unit 
AVOL Aerodrome Visibility Operational Level 
CSPR Closely Spaced Parallel Runways 
DMAN Departure MANAGER 
DME Distance Measuring Equipment 
EAT Expected Approach Time 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival 
FAP Final Approach Point 
FDPS Flight Data Processing System 
FIR Flight Information Region 
GND Ground Controller 
HMI Human Man Interface 
IAF Initial Approach Fix 
IAS Indicated Air Speed  
ILS Instrument Landing System 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
INI Initial Approach Controller 
ITM Intermediate Approach Controller 
LDA Localizer Directional Aid  
ILS  Instrument Landing System 
LVP Low Visibility Procedure 
MAP Missed Approach Point 
MLS Micro Wave Landing System 
MTOW Maximum Take-Off Weight 
NDB Non-Directional Beacon 
NM Nautical Mile 
NTZ Non Transgression Zone 
PRM Precision Radar Monitor 
ROT Runway Occupancy Time 
SART Situation Awareness Rating Technique 
SMR Surface Movement Radar 
SOIA Simultaneous Offset Instrument Approaches 
STAR Standard Arrival Route 
SUS System Usability Scale 
THR Runway Threshold 
TLX Task Load Index 
TMA Terminal Manoeuvring Area 
TWR Tower Controller 
UAC Upper Airspace Centre 
VFS Vortex Forecast System 
VHF Very High Frequency 
WP Work Package 
WV Wake Vortex 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
V 
 
 
Executive Summary 
The IST project ATC-Wake aims to develop an integrated system for ATC (Air Traffic 
Control) that would allow variable aircraft separation distances, as opposed to the fixed 
distances presently applied at airports. A variety of existing subsystems have been 
integrated within the ATC-Wake Integrated Platform (IP), which was used: 
• To evaluate the interoperability of the ATC-Wake system with existing ATC systems 
currently used at various European airports; 
• To assess the safety and capacity improvements that can be obtained by local 
installation of the ATC-Wake system at various European airports; 
• To evaluate operational usability and acceptability of the ATC-Wake system; 
• To make a plan and to assess the costs for further implementation and exploitation of the 
ATC-Wake IP platform into the system that can be installed at European airports). 
 
This platform is an essential step that will lead to installation of an integrated ATC decision 
support system at airports, enabling air traffic controllers to apply new optimised weather 
based aircraft separation. The ATC-Wake system integrates weather and Wake sensors, 
weather forecasting and now-casting systems, Wake vortex prediction system, separation 
mode planner, and air traffic controller interfaces.  
WP1: ATC-WAKE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
As a first step towards use of an ATC-Wake system at airports, the operational concept and 
requirements for the application of reduced aircraft separation under favourable weather 
conditions have been established. During the development and evaluation of the 
requirements, a number of key issues have been identified for further analysis: 
• Transitions between ATC-Wake and ICAO separation modes; 
• Aircraft separation and sector loading; 
• Missed approaches when ATC-Wake is applied; 
• Evaluation of safety requirements; 
• Evaluation of capacity benefits; 
• Evaluation of operational feasibility; 
• Assessment of the ATC-Wake system performance requirements; 
• Potential use of WV instrumentation on-board aircraft (and down-linking of WV data). 
 
During the remainder of ATC-Wake, these issues have been further investigated, and it 
appears that there are no major show-stoppers for continuation. However, it has to be 
mentioned that sufficiently stable and reliable meteorological forecast/now-cast data and WV 
detection information is a prerequisite for safe implementation of ATC-Wake. 
 
The reduced Wake Vortex separation, targeted under crosswind conditions, is: 
• 2.5 Nm separation between all aircraft on the same final approach path 
• 90 seconds between all aircraft departing on the same runway. 
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WP2: ATC-WAKE SYSTEM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 
Following the definition of the Operational Concept and System Requirements, WP2 on 
System Design and Evaluation has established an Integrated Platform as key intermediate 
step before the ATC-Wake system can be installed locally at an airport.  
 
The ATC-Wake Operational System comprises four new components, which interface with 
several existing and/or enhanced ATC systems. New ATC-Wake components, together 
constituting the Separation Advisory System (SAS), are: 
• ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner 
• ATC-Wake Predictor 
• ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting 
• ATC-Wake Detector. 
 
These components have been integrated successfully in the Integrated Platform, and it has 
been shown that the functional data flow defined in WP1 on System Requirements for all 
ATC-Wake Use Cases (Separation Mode Planning, Transition Phase, Approach Phase, and 
Departure Phase) can be realized in an Operational ATC System. 
 
The technical feasibility of the ATC-Wake system has been evaluated by experimental 
simulations with the Integrated Platform. It has been shown that the functional integration of 
the components is successful and it is technically feasible to integrate wake vortex 
prediction/detection information into existing ATC systems.  
 
Air Traffic Controller Human Machine Interfaces have been designed, specified, and 
tested successfully through two real-time simulation experiments with nine active controllers 
from five European countries. It has been shown that these HMIs are compliant with the 
HMIs currently used at key European airports (CdG and Schiphol). 
 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the Software Integration itself was much more 
difficult than anticipated. Furthermore, there are still some key issues that will need to be 
addressed in more detail before the ATC-Wake system can be installed locally at an 
airport: 
• The ATC-Wake Integrated Platform has been established using SPINEware middle-ware 
technology, enabling distributed use of the ATC-Wake components prepared by the 
consortium partners and running remotely at different sites. Next step will be to install all 
systems together at a single site, and to demonstrate its use in real-time. 
• The systems available for use as part of the ATC-Wake Detector (e.g. LiDAR and 
SODAR systems) meet certain performance requirements. It is not completely clear 
whether their accuracy, integrity, and reliability will be sufficient in all weather conditions. 
Their complementary use should be better understood (see Section 7). 
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• The quality of the meteorological forecast (and now-casting) systems might need to be 
enhanced allowing frequent updates of the information provided to the ATC-Wake 
Separation Mode Planner and the ATC-Wake Predictor.  
WP3: POTENTIAL SAFETY AND CAPACITY IMPROVEMENTS 
As motivation for the use of ATC-Wake, the WP3 on Safety and Capacity Analysis has 
evaluated the potential safety and capacity improvements. It has been shown that runway 
throughput and delay improves noticeably when the ATC-Wake system is used. 
Depending on the occurrence of favourable crosswind conditions, the increase in runway 
throughput is about 2% for the ATC-Wake SRD operation and 5% for the ATC-Wake SRA 
operation (at a generic airport with average wind conditions).  
 
Introduction of a new ATC system cannot be done without showing that minimum safety 
requirements are met. ATC-Wake risk assessments intend to be compliant with ESARR4 
requirements posed by EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulation Unit (SRU). Guidelines for the 
development of new wake vortex safety regulation have been given (using a WV risk 
management framework developed in S-Wake). 
 
The safety assessment of the ATC-Wake operation has been performed in three steps. 
First, as part of the qualitative safety assessment, potential hazards and conflict scenarios 
related to use of ATC-Wake have been evaluated. Second, through use of the ‘classical’ 
WAVIR tool, indicative separation minima dependent on crosswind conditions have been 
determined. As these indicative separation minima do not yet account for crosswind 
uncertainty, as part of the third step, the setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system 
components was further investigated. It appears that the especially the Monitoring and 
Alerting system and Meteorological Forecast and Now-casting systems are crucial and 
sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed.  
 
WAVIR simulations for the SRA operation indicate that reduced separation of 2.5 Nm 
might be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode provided that crosswind is forecasted to be 
above a certain limit. During ATC-Wake arrivals, the Monitoring and Alerting component will 
anticipate potential wake encounters in time (and generate an alert); nevertheless if the 
meteorological forecast information is not accurate and stable enough, this might be 
achieved at the cost of a relatively large number of missed approaches. The simulations 
indicate that, provided that certain requirements are met, about 30% of the approaches might 
be performed with 2.5 Nm aircraft separation in case ATC-Wake is used. 
 
WAVIR simulations for the SRD operation also indicate that reduced separation of 90 
seconds can be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode, provided that crosswind is forecasted 
to be above a certain limit. If the accuracy of the wind forecast information is too low, the 
Monitoring and Alerting component could provide a relatively large number of alerts. A 
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potential issue is that immediately after take off, i.e. at relatively low altitude, it will not be 
feasible for the pilot to turn away from the wake vortex of a preceding aircraft. Provision and 
use of meteorological now-casting information by the controller will be very beneficial during 
the second departure phase, in order to support the pilot to prepare for a potential encounter 
in case of a sudden change of the wind conditions. 
 
Various activities have been performed to validate the safety assessment (including 
verification and validation of the wake evolution models, wake encounter models, and aircraft 
performance models). Nevertheless, it has become clear that the wake vortex phenomena 
during departures is still not fully understood, i.e. further research would be needed before 
the outcome of the departure safety assessment would be ready for approval by regulatory 
authorities. The full Safety Case will need to take into account local wind conditions of the 
airport envisaged for introduction of ATC-Wake as well. 
WP4: ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY 
The assessment of operational feasibility for the implementation of ATC-WAKE operational 
concept within Europe has been performed along several axis: 
• Correctness, usability and acceptability of the operational concept by ATC 
Controllers: the operational concept is not a ‘revolution’ for ATC, it represents a sound 
evolution from existing procedures (runway configuration and transition). 
The real-time simulations performed by NLR indicates that the ATC-WAKE concept of 
operations has been easily adopted by a team of ATC Controllers and positive feed-back 
for its use in operations has been received.  
In addition the size of the changes from operational perspective (airport infrastructure, 
training) fits with the existing evolutions observed at European airports to cope with the 
increasing traffic demand. 
• Operational benefits: the fast-time simulations have allowed to assess the potential 
gains for runway throughput and flight times considering a number of potential scenarios 
for the reduction of minimum separation (distance or time) and the runway usage (arrivals 
only, departures only, mixed mode). The potential gains following the application of 
reduced separation are significant, varying between 10% and 30% increase of runway 
throughput and between 10% and 40% reduction of the average delay per flight. 
However the actual gains will be dependent on a number of factors: 
– Favourable meteorological conditions: the transport of Wake vortex out of the arrival 
or departure corridors is observed when a significant and persistent cross-wind exists 
and to take benefit out of such situation a minimum 20min reliable wind forecast is 
necessary to plan traffic. In addition good visibility conditions are required for reduced 
separation operations; 
– Traffic pressure: the application of reduced separation operations will deliver benefits 
only when a high level of traffic exists and sufficient notice is made to ATC to plan 
aircraft movements accordingly;  
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– Traffic distribution: potential benefits of the application of reduced separations are 
highly dependent on the traffic distribution; 
– Airport layout: the general behaviour of departing and landing aircraft is highly related 
to the selected airport layout (e.g. existence of a central taxiway avoiding arrivals to 
cross the departure runway) 
• Impact on existing ATC systems: the analysis of interoperability issues has confirmed 
that the main changes to systems concern the implementation of specific atmospheric 
sensing systems (e.g. weather radar or LIDAR), the introduction of ATC-WAKE tools for 
ATC (separation mode planning, Wake vortex prediction, detection and monitoring tools). 
The impact on existing systems is low, mainly the arrival management tool (AMAN) 
requires modification to support the fluent transitioning between ATC-WAKE reduced 
separations and standard ICAO separations (depending on meteorological conditions). 
 
As main conclusion the ATC-Wake technical and operational feasibility analyses and the 
safety and capacity studies have build sufficient confidence in the operational concept and 
system design for the application of reduced separations to represent a sound evolution from 
existing ATC procedures & working practices, to deliver significant benefits for runway 
throughput and average delay per flight without major rework to the current ATC systems, 
while maintaining safety.  
 
Next step will be to complete the validation through production of a Safety Case, Human 
Factors Case, Benefits Case, and a Technology Case towards installation of the ATC-Wake 
at one or more European airports. The best would be to continue with airport shadow mode 
field trials, i.e. with direct involvement of airports and Air Traffic Control centres. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
With the steady increase in air traffic, civil aviation authorities are 
under continuous pressure to increase aircraft handling capacity. 
One potential approach is to reduce the separation distance between 
aircraft at take-off and landing without compromising safety.  
 
One major limiting factor is that aircraft always give each other a 
wide berth to avoid each another's Wake turbulence. With the aid of 
smart planning techniques, however these distances can be safely 
reduced, significantly increasing airport capacity.  
 
Aircraft create Wake vortices when taking off and landing, restricting runway capacity. These 
vortices usually dissipate quickly, but most airports opt for the safest scenario, which means 
the interval between aircraft taking off or landing often amounts to several minutes. However, 
with the aid of accurate meteorological data and precise measurements of Wake turbulence, 
more efficient intervals can be set, particularly when weather conditions are stable. 
Depending on traffic volume, these adjustments can generate capacity gains of up to 10%, 
which has major commercial benefits. 
 
The IST project ATC-Wake aims to develop and build an integrated system for ATC (Air 
Traffic Control) that would allow variable aircraft separation distances, as opposed to the 
fixed distances presently applied at airports. The present minimum separation of six nautical 
miles for small aircraft (coming in behind a larger one), and three nautical miles for larger 
aircraft is designed to counter the problems aircraft can encounter in the Wake of larger 
types. If these fixed distances can be reduced in favourable weather conditions without 
compromising safety, then an airport’s aircraft-handling capacity increases accordingly. For 
approaches, the aim is to manage separation distances down to 2.5 nautical miles, in perfect 
weather conditions, for all aircraft types regardless of size. For departures, the aim is to 
reduce the time separation between departing aircraft to 90 seconds (in favourable wind 
conditions). 
 
The ATC-Wake system integrates weather and Wake sensors, weather forecasting and now-
casting systems, a Wake vortex predictor, a separation mode planner, and Air Traffic 
Controller interfaces. When used with new European Wake vortex safety regulation, it should 
be able to provide airports and aircraft handling organisations a significant increase in 
punctuality and capacity, while maintaining safety.  
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The ATC-Wake decision-support system and procedures will help air traffic controllers 
decide how long the intervals should be. These procedures are based on laser technology 
called Lidar, which monitors the movement of dust particles through the air. This system is 
used to continually monitor Wake turbulence on runways. Wake turbulence data is combined 
with meteorological data to generate recommendations for intervals, which are displayed on 
the air traffic controller's screen. These recommendations are also used in planning systems 
at air traffic management.  
1.2 Objectives 
The main objective of ATC-Wake is to develop and build an integrated ATC Wake Vortex 
Safety and Capacity platform. A variety of existing subsystems is integrated such that this 
platform is used within a test bed environment role: 
• To evaluate the interoperability of the ATC-Wake system with existing ATC systems 
currently used at various European airports; 
• To assess the safety and capacity improvements that can be obtained by local 
installation of the ATC-Wake system at various European airports; 
• To evaluate operational usability and acceptability of the ATC-Wake system; 
• To make a plan and to assess the costs for further implementation and exploitation of the 
ATC-Wake IP platform into the system that can be installed at European airports). 
 
This platform is an essential step that will lead to installation of an integrated ATC decision 
support system at airports, enabling air traffic controllers to apply new optimised weather 
based aircraft spacing. The ATC system will integrate weather and Wake sensors, weather 
forecasting and now-casting systems, Wake vortex prediction system, separation mode 
planner, and air traffic controller interface. Used with new harmonised safety regulation, this 
system will provide tactical and strategic benefits, while maintaining safety. The project will 
focus on the following aspects: 
1. Runway configurations: Single runways, closely spaced parallel runways. 
2. Aircraft operations: Landing, take-off, and mixed mode operations. 
3. Weather conditions: Wind condtions favourable for reduced aircraft separation. 
 
A further aim is to analyse both tactical and strategic benefits of using this integrated system 
at various European airports. Tactical benefits in terms of temporary capacity increases, to 
improve the management of arrival flows while reducing holding. Strategic benefits in terms 
of long-term runway capacity for airline schedule planning. 
The proposed time frame for local installation of the integrated system at European airports 
is 2010, which implies that the baseline – with the exception of the Wake vortex systems 
evolving from this project – is today’s airport environment with current infrastructure systems. 
The integrated platform will be extendable, such that evaluation of future systems and 
concepts will be feasible after completion of ATC-Wake. 
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The impact of weather on Wake vortex safety is a crucial aspect, and the uncertainty in 
predicting the behaviour of Wake vortices in different weather conditions implies that 
continuous monitoring of both Wake vortices and weather will be necessary. This will enable 
continuous verification – and possibly update – of safe predictions of required aircraft 
separation minima. The ATC Wake system will therefore integrate: 
• Weather and Wake Sensors; 
• Weather Forecasting and Nowcasting Systems; 
• Wake Vortex Prediction Systems; 
• Aircraft Separation (Mode) Planner; 
• Air Traffic Controller Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs). 
 
Integration of the heterogeneous subsystems (provided by different partners) requires state-
of-the-art middleware facilities, including a variety of methods for integration (e.g., 
static/dynamic interaction, tool chaining, workflow chains). Design of the integrated platform 
comprises the design of system architecture, interfaces, common database, scenario 
manager, and human-machine interfaces (including air traffic controller HMIs, and Wake and 
weather monitoring interfaces). 
 
Emphasis is placed on validation and calibration aspects for the integrated platform and the 
subsystems. ATS providers (as end-users), an aircraft manufacturer, and regulatory 
authorities (responsible for safety) have been consulted regularly throughout the project to 
support exploitation of the platform.  
 
The local installation of the integrated system at European airports will require new safety 
regulation, since the present Wake vortex safety recommendations and best practices do not 
take new modified ATC systems into account. Specific attention has been given to the issue 
of development of new Wake vortex safety regulation. To enhance acceptability of the 
integrated system (and other new technologies, including high capacity aircraft and on-board 
Wake detection and warning instrumentation), the project has built on discussions with the 
FAA/EUROCONTROL Action Plan 14 on Wake Vortex and the Thematic Networks 
WakeNet2 Europe and WakeNet USA. 
1.3 Description of work 
The main work has been to develop and build an integrated ATC Wake vortex safety and 
capacity platform. The work is based on six work packages: 
 
• WP1: System Requirements  
The main work is to define the requirements for the system. This includes the operational 
requirements, the operational concept and procedures, the users requirements, and the 
system requirements. 
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• WP2: Integrated System Design and Evaluation 
The main work is to develop and build the platform, integrating all subsystems. This 
includes a Wake vortex prediction and monitoring system, weather forecasting and 
monitoring systems, aircraft spacing predictor, and human machine interface for air traffic 
controllers. A task is to evaluate technical feasibility of building the system. 
 
• WP3: Safety and Capacity Analysis  
The main work is to quantify and evaluate possible safety and capacity improvements 
(tactical and strategic benefits) when using the system. Safe and appropriate separation 
distances will be determined for single runways (arrivals and departures) and closely 
spaced parallel runway arrivals. 
 
• WP4: Evaluation of Operational Feasibility 
The main work is to evaluate operational feasibility of the system, including analysing the 
interoperability with existing ATC systems, and the usability and acceptability by air traffic 
controllers. 
 
• WP5: Technological Implementation Plan (TIP) 
The main work is to provide the TIP, in accordance with the guidelines from the EC. This 
will be done in co-ordination with the User Group members, and representatives of the 
aerospace and ATM community 
 
• WP6: Management and Final Synthesis 
The main work is to maintain an efficient communication with the EC, other related 
projects, and to disseminate findings through workshops, conferences, and an Internet 
Site. A further task is the final synthesis, resulting in a publishable final report with 
conclusions and recommendations. 
1.4 Contribution to EC IST Programme 
The work contributes directly to several objectives of the EC Information Society 
Technologies (IST) Programme for creating a User Friendly Information Society. For Key 
Action I – Systems and services for the Citizen, the project addresses objective I.5 Transport 
and Tourism by developing and building an integrated ATC Wake vortex safety and capacity 
platform with the aim to improve safety. This allows more efficient and comfortable transport, 
resulting in airport capacity increase. Research is focused on sub-task I.5.2 Integrated 
vehicle infrastructure systems which aims to improve safety, security, comfort and efficiency 
in all modes of passenger and freight transport and to improve mobility management, 
through more interaction between in-vehicle systems and infrastructure systems (transport, 
navigation, communication, etc.). 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
5 
 
 
 
The ATC Wake vortex safety and capacity platform contains: 
• Weather and Wake sensors (including coverage): 
• Ground based: C band weather radar, Wake detection / wind LIDAR; 
• Aircraft based: Wake detection / wind LIDAR; 
• Wind / temperature profilers and radiosondes. 
• Weather forecasting and nowcasting systems; 
• Wake vortex prediction systems; 
• Aircraft Separation Mode Planner; 
• Air Traffic Controller Human Machine Interface (HMI). 
 
The ICT based application platform will integrate various infrastructures with advanced co-
operation of aircraft and ground-based systems and processes. Navigation and surveillance 
systems, communication between controllers and pilots, observation and monitoring of 
weather and Wake vortex behaviour are all required to be taken into account in order to 
provide controllers with reliable and realistic decision support with respect to aircraft spacing. 
Interoperability, inter-working, openness and integration of subsystems will be achieved 
through the use of a middleware system that provides an integrated view on a 
heterogeneous network of different computer platforms enabling access to different 
subsystems. The operational usability and acceptability of the integrated system will be given 
particular emphasis, through realisation of an advanced controller HMI, which will be tested 
by different controller teams. This will be supported by simulations proving that risk 
requirements and capacity aims can be realised. 
 
The main expected exploitable project output is the integrated ATC Wake vortex safety and 
capacity platform, which contains as further exploitable elements: 
• ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner; 
• ATC-Wake Predictors; 
• ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting; 
• ATC-Wake Detectors; 
• Air Traffic Controller Human Machine Interface (HMI). 
 
All the project outputs will be directly exploitable (i.e., short-term timing), to support the 
design of new airports (with additional (closely spaced) parallel runways) and to support the 
assessment of safety and capacity impacts to aircraft flying within the vicinity of the new 
Airbus A380. Timing for local installation of the integrated system at European airports will be 
medium/long term, since this will depend on follow-up actions by industry and on new 
harmonised Wake vortex safety regulation, building on recommendations evolving from ATC-
Wake project. 
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1.5 Overview of project actual outcome 
The ATC-Wake platform enables European ATS providers, airport authorities, and ATM 
research and development centres to join their efforts (and plan their investments) to 
adequately adapt their airport systems and enhance the efficient use of airports restricted by 
the Wake vortex problem. In this sense ATC-Wake is a key enabler of the European ATM 
strategy for the years 2000+. Wake Vortex is included in the Single European Sky ATM 
Masterplan activities (joint Eurocontrol/EC SESAME project). ATC-Wake is also included in 
the Eurocontrol Wake Vortex Separations Management Plan. The main project results are: 
• ATC-Wake Integrated Platform (with interfaces between existing subsystems and tools 
and new ATC-Wake components; implemented using SPINEware); 
• Connection with an on-board Wake detection, warning, and avoidance system for Wake 
vortex and other atmospheric hazards; 
• ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner; 
• ATC-Wake Predictors; 
• ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerts; 
• ATC-Wake Detectors; 
• Probabilistic simulation tool for assessment of Wake vortex safety of new ATM 
operational concepts and procedures for Wake vortex avoidance; 
• Wake vortex safety assessment results (arrivals and departures); 
• Proposed new Wake vortex safety regulation; 
• Fast-time simulation tool for the assessment of capacity related to new ATM operational 
concepts and procedures for Wake vortex avoidance; 
• Capacity assessment results (for a generic airport); 
• ATC-Wake Human Machine Interfaces for controllers (and the associated ATC real time 
simulation software); 
• Operational requirements, operational concepts, user requirements, working methods for 
air traffic controllers and the ATC supervisors. 
 
Existing subsystems and tools (weather and Wake sensors, weather forecasting and 
nowcasting systems, Wake vortex prediction systems, Wake vortex safety assessment tools 
and capacity assessment tools) have been upgraded following definition of the ATC-Wake 
system requirements, operational concept, and working methods. 
1.6 Document structure 
Section 2 provides an overview/state-of-the-art describing the innovative aspects of this 
project. The ATC-Wake operational concept and system requirements are described in 
Section 3. The ATC-Wake system design and development is contained in Section 4, 
together with a detailed description of the Integrated Platform, including the four new 
components: Separation Mode Planner, Predictor, Detector, and Monitoring and Alerting.  
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Section 5 describes the safety and capacity improvements that can be obtained by local 
installation of the ATC-Wake system at European airports. The results from technical and 
operational feasibility analysis are described in Sections 6, together with a plan for 
exploitation of the project results by end-users. Section 7 provides the conclusions and 
recommendations. The appendices give some further details on the work performed. 
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2 Overview / state-of-the-art / innovation 
2.1 Wake Vortex Phenomena and Implications for Airport Operations 
Before 1970, aircraft of similar weights and low traffic density mitigated the risk of Wake 
vortex encounters. In 1970 and during the following years some Wake vortex related 
incidents occurred due to the introduction of the Boeing 747 and the constant traffic growth. 
Between 1969 and 1976, extensive collection of data led to the definition of the ICAO 
separation standards (see Figure 2-1 for single runway approaches) based on aircraft 
maximum take off weigh classes. Since 1993, several European Union research and 
development programmes have been launched to get better knowledge of the physical and 
safety aspects of the Wake vortex phenomena. Wake vortices are potentially dangerous to 
follower aircraft, therefore strict aircraft separation is required. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 – Wake vortex phenomena 
The Wake vortex problem influences different aircraft operations (landings, take-offs, and 
mixed mode operations) for various runway configurations (single runway, closely spaced 
parallel runway, and some specific converging runway layouts) (see Figure 2-2). Thus this 
phenomenon is restricting a possible future increase in airport capacity. 
 
 Arrival Departures 
4-6 NM or 2-3 
minutes 
• All times 
• Applied behind Heavy 
or Medium aircraft 
Parallel runway 
4-6 NM 
• Treated as a single 
runway when separated 
by less than 2,500 ft. 
• IFR only 
• Applied behind 
Heavy, Medium 
aircraft 
4-6 NM 
 
Figure 2-2 – Runway operations influenced by the Wake vortex phenomena 
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2.2 State-of-the-Art in Existing Systems 
To deal with the Wake vortex problem, several research activities have been made to 
(temporary) increase capacity without the loss of safety. An overview is given below: 
• I-Wake: focuses mainly on detection of Wake vortices from the aircraft to avoid 
encounters. The systems used have a similar function as TCAS: a last-minute avoidance 
of a Wake turbulence encounter. I-Wake is the follow-up project of MFLAME where lidar 
ground-based detection has been successfully tested. Because I-Wake is important in 
view of potentialities of datalink for on-board/ ground exchange of Wake data, and the 
integration of an on-board system with ATM in support of reduced separation, it is 
addressed in more detail in Section 2.3. 
• S-Wake: aims to develop and apply tools for assessing appropriate (safe) Wake vortex 
separation distances. Operational concepts could be used as a baseline for ATC Wake 
operational concepts. 
• AVOSS: The Aircraft Vortex Spacing System has been developed by NASA to produce 
weather dependent Wake vortex spacing criteria in IMC for single runway approach. 
AVOSS provides current and predicted weather conditions and predicted Wake vortex 
transport and decay. There is however no link to ATC. 
• Canadian Wake vortex project, in particular the VFS (Vortex Forecast System): it 
provides the predicted Wake vortex transport and decay, given the weather and aircraft 
conditions. 
• German Wake vortex project “WIRBELSCHLEPPE”: amongst others develops and tests 
a Wake vortex prediction & monitoring system and studies the possible impact on ATC 
(DWA cycle).  
• Wake Vortex Warning System (WVWS) developed for DFS at Frankfurt airport: aims at 
using two closely spaced parallel runways independently. The current WVWS uses data 
from a wind line, a statistical wind forecast, and a vortex decay and transport model to 
predict minimum non-hazard times for the two runways at appropriate winds in 
instrumented meteorological conditions (IMC) for the lowest 80 m above ground level. 
Work is in progress to extend WVWS to the whole glide path. 
• High Altitude Landing System (HALS) / Dual Threshold Operations (DTOP) from 
DFS/Fraport for Frankfurt airport.  HALS/DTOP also aims at using two closely spaced 
parallel runways independently: two aircraft, staggered by radar separation, approach the 
parallel runways along two glide paths which are separated 80 m vertically and 518 m 
laterally. The aircraft approaching along the higher path lands at a new runway threshold 
which is installed 1500 m behind the original threshold. The system is operational as trial 
phase 2 since 23 June 2001 and works in Cat-1 with IMC conditions. 
• SOIA (Simultaneous Offset Instrumented Approach) by FAA for San Francisco Int’l 
Airport also aims at simultaneous operations of two closely spaced runways under IMC. 
When the cloud ceiling is not lower than 1600 feet, two aircraft approach non-staggered 
but safely separated by 3000 feet laterally until they reach the “missed approach point” at 
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about 1000 feet height and 3.3 nautical miles before the threshold. The final approach is 
then flown under VMC (S-shape flight pattern).  
• SYAGE developed in France for Toulouse-Blagnac airport): The SYsteme Anticipatif de 
Gestion des Espacements aims at reduced separations for single runway departures; 
uses ground-based wind measurements and Wake vortex model VORTEX.  
 
Time Based Separation: developed by EUROCONTROL for investigation of the possibilities 
of preventing loss of runway capacity against strong headwind conditions while maintaining the 
required level of safety. Today, distance based separation criteria are generally used at major 
airports. However, they are used in all weather conditions and do not take into account the 
impact of the wind on the aircraft speed. Under strong headwind conditions, aircraft need 
significant more time to fly the same distance. When applying distance based separations, this 
could result in a loss of capacity. If the standard separation were replaced by time-based 
interval, this could avoid losing the airport capacity under certain weather conditions. 
 
A summary of Wake-vortex issues with a view of research and air-transportation industry can 
be found in the “Position Papers” elaborated within the Thematic Network WakeNet2 Europe 
and the associated dissemination and presentation material. 
 
The above systems and associated procedures enhancing a (temporary) reduction of 
separation were all developed for specific airports (such as Frankfurt). Up to now, of these 
systems only HALS / DTOP is operational. An innovative aspect of the present ATC-Wake 
project is to enhance the development of ONE integrated system that can handle VARIOUS 
runway configurations (closely spaced parallel runways, single runways). An integrated ATC-
Wake platform is an essential intermediate step towards realisation and installation of a 
future ATC-Wake system at European airports.  
2.3 On-board Wake detection 
Wake vortex remote detection with onboard sensors focused primarily on the potential use of 
LiDAR in 1993 with the EC funded FLAME project, leading to successful ground tests in 
2000 during MFLAME and the world premiere flight tests in I-Wake in 2004. The know-how 
gained with these projects concerns the available technology through: 
• the manufacturing of lightweight mirror-based scanner, 
• the building and integrating of a LiDAR demonstrator,  
• its ruggedisation to go from laboratory to shelter to finally aircraft installation 
• its integration with aircraft systems (Air Data and Inertial System). 
 
MFLAME allowed to develop signal processing techniques that revealed efficient in detecting 
Wake vortices from the ground down to the level of Fokker 100 Wakes. I-Wake took the 
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challenge further to adapt the signal processing algorithms to a moving platform with an 
'almost' forward looking sensor geometry, a platform flying at higher altitudes thus yielding 
poorer signal to noise ratios and range-dependent noise spectra. In parallel to the flight tests, 
flight simulator tests allowed to propose to pilots Human Machine Interface (HMI) concepts 
for the Navigation Display (ND), the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and the Vertical Situation 
Display (VSD). Strategic and tactical information on Wake vortex 3D position, including 
tactical alerts (caution and warning) with estimated time to encounter were reviewed until 
accepted by pilots. 
 
The technology part of I-Wake had the objectives (1) to promote the IR laser for atmospheric 
hazard detection as a first brick to a European LiDAR system and (2) to develop and assess 
automatic pattern recognition techniques. At the end of the project, a laboratory mock-up of 
2µm laser was tested with satisfactory performances and pattern recognition techniques 
showed encouraging results on the ground based MFLAME data. As a background task 
started in MFLAME, I-Wake contributed to the system definition in terms of a end-user 
requirements, functional architecture with selected sensors and detection methods, use of 
Wake vortex model in support of LiDAR including datalink requirements, potentialities of 
datalink for ground/board exchange of Wake data, integration of onboard system with ATM in 
support of reduced separation distances (including result sharing with ATC-Wake). The 
overall system is functionally represented in Figure 2-3. 
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Figure 2-3 – Atmospheric Hazard Detection, Warning and Avoidance (DWA) System 
2.4 Weather Nowcasting and Wake Vortex Prediction 
Several of the required components of the ATC-Wake system have already been partially 
combined and tested in an actual airport environment during two weather and Wake 
measurement campaigns. Weather now-casting, weather monitoring by a Doppler C-band 
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radar (in both mono-static and bi-static modes), a wind/temperature profiler, radiosondes, 
wind LiDAR; Wake predictors (P-VFS, P2P), Wake detectors and characterisers by wind and 
Wake LiDARs have been used together in an airport Wake Vortex Prediction and Monitoring 
environment during the measurement campaign WakeOP (in Oberpfaffenhofen) and 
WakeToul (in Toulouse). The full combination and automation of (emulators of) all 
components with new ATC-Wake components, as part of the ATC-Wake Integrated Platform, 
is an essential innovative step showing the technical feasibility of building the ATC-Wake 
system and enabling access of ATC providers to Wake Vortex information.  
 
One of the real-time Wake vortex predictors is the Vortex Forecast System (VFS), an 
operational Wake vortex predictor, developed under contract with Transport Canada (TC) 
and its Transportation Development Center (TDC) during 6 Phases (1993 to 2000), by an 
international team, including Russian, Belgian, and Canadian collaboration. The 
development and validation was done in further close collaboration with the Aircraft VOrtex 
Spacing System (AVOSS) program (NASA LaRC). Some specific VFS capabilities were 
identified and recognised as preferable to other predictors: modelling of ground effects and of 
non-uniform wind shear effects. The VFS is run in multiple gates along the flight track and 
handles modelling of:  
1. the initial near Wake using the Near Wake DataBase (NWDB), or using the Universal 
Near Wake (UNW) shortly after rollup;  
2. Wake transport, using the Wake-induced velocities and the wind velocity profile; 
3. Wake slow decay, using the atmospheric turbulence profile (EDR or TKE decay models), 
and Wake abrupt decay, with critical time function of EDR; 
4. ground effects, using injection of secondary vortices from the ground; 
5. non-uniform wind shear effects, using additional velocities applied to the vortices; 
6. stratification effects, using the atmospheric stratification profile.  
2.5 Weather and Wake Monitoring 
A building block necessary to build sufficient confidence in the model predictions for Wake 
vortices evolution in relation to weather will be to use data from a C-Band Doppler weather 
radar for weather monitoring but also Wake-vortex monitoring. Several US references in 
scientific literature put forward the idea that a Doppler radar can detect Wake vortices, and 
the ATC-Wake project is the first to explore the use of C-band Doppler radar data in the 
context of Wake vortex prediction and monitoring. The interest of radar for weather analysis 
is its complementarity to the lidar system: 
• it can provide additional meteorological parameters besides performing turbulence 
detection (especially for mapping of precipitations areas where lidar is not efficient : this 
information could be used in fusion process to choose the best sensor); 
• the potential detection range on Wake vortex is at least the same as for lidar in clear air, 
but is larger in humid air and in rain. 
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Principles and algorithms (for atmospheric turbulence detection and weather forecasting) 
previously developed within three European studies of the 4th RTD Framework Programme: 
4DMIDaBLE for DG7, DOLPHINS for DG12, and PRESTO for DG13 will be used. These 
algorithms improve significantly the Doppler radar analysis performances and are well 
adapted for Wake-Vortex monitoring. Some principles have already been validated on low 
altitude wind-shears detection. A new algorithm for rain cloud tracking and wind field 
estimation for Weather forecasting will be established. The aim of this algorithm is to perform 
short term forecasting of dynamic radar clutter evolution. 
2.6 Wake Vortex Safety and Capacity Analysis 
One of the innovative building blocks for the ATC-Wake system will be the Separation Mode 
Planner, a tool that will provide the required separation distances between aircraft under 
different operational and weather and wind conditions. This tool will be established on the 
basis of one of the main exploitable outputs from the S-Wake project: a probabilistic Wake 
vortex induced risk assessment methodology and tool-set. WAVIR has been applied in S-
Wake to evaluate single runway approaches, but will be extended – in ATC-Wake – to cover 
the whole airport environment, with different aircraft operations (landings and take-offs) to 
various runway configurations. It should be noted that the risk assessment methodology from 
S-Wake is based on an assessment of incident/accident risk probabilities, in accordance with 
common safety regulation in other industries.  
 
Safe and appropriate aircraft spacing distances are determined through a comparison with 
risk requirements (e.g. Target Level of Safety values), which can be set by regulatory 
authorities. Usually these risk requirements are determined on the basis of historical 
incident/accident data, gathered through incident reporting activities such as being 
undertaken in the United Kingdom. Two members of the ATC-Wake User Group are highly 
experienced with the assessment of safety requirements and the validation of the safety 
assessment. This will limit the risk of non-acceptance of the safety assessment results wake 
vortex safety regulation, and will stimulate that the Separation Mode Planner results are in 
line with wake vortex safety requirements. 
 
Possible capacity improvements (tactical and strategic) after installation of the integrated 
system at European airports will be analysed using a series of tools and simulation platforms 
developed and used by EUROCONTROL for providing performance predictions for the future 
ATM system. 
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2.7 ATC Wake Vortex Decision Support Facilities 
One further innovative output of ATC-Wake will be the controller Human Machine Interfaces 
(HMI), which will be developed and optimised for tower and Terminal Area (TMA) / en-route 
controllers, under the commitment to the principles of human centred automation. That 
means, with priority to providing optimal decision support to the controllers, who will keep the 
ultimate responsibility for their decisions, HMIs will have to reflect a synthesis between: 
• specific controller needs for information and decision support; 
• usability and acceptability of the HMIs; 
• airport operational requirements and constraints (e.g. runway availability); 
• traffic demands (e.g. amount of inbound/outbound traffic); and  
• technical functionality provided by the integrated system, particularly for Wake vortex 
prediction and monitoring, and aircraft spacing prediction. 
 
A further issue is merging those functionalities with other functions at the controller working 
positions (e.g. approach planning, departure planning). This issue will be addressed through 
an analysis of the interoperability with existing ATC systems and the usability and 
acceptability of the system. 
2.8 Integrated Platform and ICT Infrastructure 
The ATC-Wake integrated platform will establish and facilitate the collaboration between the 
partners and their subsystems. This collaboration will be conducted in a heterogeneous, 
multi-disciplinary and distributed network, for the subsystems have very distinct 
characteristics and are located at different companies. Typically, the subsystems require 
different hardware and operating systems, range from real-time and fast-time simulators to 
analysis tools, reflect different disciplines, and operate in different companies' computer 
networks.  
 
To establish collaboration in heterogeneous and distributed networks, state-of-the-art ICT 
technology is applied to set up the required communication infrastructure and to provide user 
support. The resulting integrated platform will be presented to users (including ATS 
providers, airport authorities, ATM industry, and ATM research and development centres) as 
a user-centred working environment. This platform will give easy access to the subsystems 
in the network and takes care of an efficient use of them. Moreover, the platform is presented 
to the user as a single, virtual machine, providing him a transparent view of the network, 
improving interactions with the subsystems, and enabling an efficient and effective use of the 
platform. The platform will also enable quality control and cost reduction, because it allows 
for an efficient exchange, conservation, and maintenance of documents, subsystems, and 
expertise. Further, its modularity will allow for easy extension of the platform by new, 
alternative, or enhanced subsystems in the future, and the setting-up of new collaborations 
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between subsystems. Network connections will be set up within local area networks, as well 
as over the boundaries of local area networks, possibly secured by firewalls. This facilitates 
the necessary setting up of a multi-site collaborative engineering environment, a process 
illustrated in the Figure 2-4 below. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 – Multi-site Integrated Platform 
This way of working – use of a middleware system that provides an integrated view on a 
heterogeneous network of different computer platforms enabling access to different 
subsystems – strongly supports the interoperability, inter-working, openness and integration. 
It will also enhance the operational usability and acceptability of the integrated platform since 
this way of working naturally incorporates the possibility of feedback at an early stage (during 
the specification, design, development and implementation phases). 
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3 Operational Concept and System Requirements 
3.1 Objectives 
The main objective of WP1 was to define the requirements for the integrated ATC system. 
This included the definition of operational concepts and procedures in support of the 
development and actual use of the integrated system. At present, in low visibility conditions, 
the currently applied Wake vortex constraints are not weather dependent and the separation 
between aircraft is therefore based on a worst-case scenario. The spacing is determined by 
considering the leader/follower aircraft weight categories and Wake persistence observed 
during atmospheric conditions favourable to long vortex life. These separations are 
conservative; they do not completely avoid the effect of Wake vortices, but they are sufficient 
to be safe in most meteorological conditions.  
 
Several technologies to detect and predict Wake-vortex have been developed during the last 
years. These technologies are now quite mature and weather conditions in which Wake 
vortices decay quickly can be identified and used reliably as "Wake vortex predictors"; there 
is potential for making the separation distances dependent on these predictors as well as 
aircraft weight. This could increase the capacity of airports in certain weather conditions. 
Nevertheless, today, there is no link to ATC and subsequently no system integrating all the 
sources of information together at a single source, accessible by all ATC providers (en-route, 
approach, tower and arrival/ departure managers). Hence, the derivation of the system 
requirements is: 
• To define operational requirements; 
• To define operational concepts and procedures, to update and refine the selected 
operational concepts and procedures; 
• To define users requirements; 
• To define the system requirement based on operational concepts and users 
requirements. 
 
To meet the objectives, the following issues were addressed: 
• Operational issues: need and use of WV information in the context of ATC operations, 
constraints and required support systems 
• Technical issues: high level interface to existing (legacy) ATC systems of WV targeted 
system. 
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3.2 Current System and Situation 
 
3.2.1 Operational Policies and constraints 
Current operational policies and constraints are built upon the ICAO recommendations for 
the provision of Air Traffic Services (see PANS-ATM) and national regulation. 
ICAO safety provision for aircraft separation criteria has been defined in the early 70’s and 
has, since then, served to maintain acceptable standards of Wake vortex safety. Such 
standard is based on fixed distance or time separation between aircraft according to their 
respective category. Current safe Wake vortex separations are achieved with a set of rules 
for air traffic control and procedures for the pilots. At major European airports most traffic 
perform instrument approach arrival and departures (IFR flights), where ATC Controllers are 
responsible for applying Wake vortex standard separation. 
3.2.2 Description of current system and situation 
Current ATC systems supporting operations in APP or Aerodrome units have to be 
considered in the ATC-Wake context. Current control practices are based on ICAO 
recommendations (PANS-ATM) or national regulation. Aircraft are classified into different 
categories according to the Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW). ICAO defined standard 
categories and separation between aircraft is based on the preceding aircraft category (fixed 
distance or time). The USA and the UK have brought some changes in the weight and the 
categories definitions. In current operations, no information concerning Wake vortex 
behaviour is provided to ATC Controllers or Flight Crews. 
3.2.3 Operational environment 
The expedition of arrival and departure traffic on an airport and corresponding performance 
key indicators (capacity, efficiency) are strongly related to the operational environment in 
which ATC operations are conducted. The operational environment for airport operations 
may be presented by considering a number of key elements that have direct and mutual 
influence on the arrivals and departures. 
 
 
Table 3-1 – Meteorological conditions 
Op. Environment Element Impact / Role on Airport Operations 
Wind speed and direction Selection of runway in use 
Visibility : RVR, cloud ceiling Selection of flight rules : VMC / IMC 
Runway Brake Efficiency  Runway Occupancy Time 
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Airport layout is a key element for establishing landing or departure procedures. In the 
context of Wake vortex influence, runways are treated individually (single runway) or by pairs 
(parallel or intersecting runways). 
 
Table 3-2 – Airport layout and infrastructure 
Op. Environment Element Impact / Role on Airport Operations 
Runway Layout : single runways / parallel 
runways / intersecting runways 
Balance between  arrivals / departures 
Taxiway Layout Runway Occupancy Time decreased in case of 
rapid exit taxiways 
 
Table 3-3 – Ground and aircraft equipment 
Op. Environment Element Impact / Role on Airport Operations 
Navigation Aids: VOR DME, GNSS,.. Guidance to pilot (or FMS) for approach and 
departure 
Landing aids : ILS / MLS Guidance to pilot for final approach and landing 
phase 
Depending on flight rules, impose minimum aircraft 
separation (protection area) 
Approach Radar Surveillance of arrival, departure traffic, monitoring 
of aircraft trajectory and separation with preceding 
or following aircraft 
Minimum radar separation to be applied depends 
on surveillance method and equipment  
A-SMGCS Equipment:  
Surface Movement Radar, Mode S 
Multilateration systems 
Surveillance of ground movements and prevention 
of runway incursions (risk of collision) 
 
Table 3-4 – ATC organisation 
Op. Environment Element Impact / Role on Airport Operations 
Sectorisation Grouping or splitting of TMA sectors is planned in 
advance in order to balance airport capacity with 
traffic demand 
3.2.4 System components 
In the context of ATC-Wake, several existing components of ATC systems require particular 
attention for the presentation of traffic information to controllers and to provide automated 
support for the planning of operations.  
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3.2.5 Procedures involved 
In the context of ATC, the term “Procedure” designates the set of recommendations or 
instructions issued for the navigation through a defined airspace or airport area, i.e. terminal 
or en-route airspace structure, airport runways and taxiways. In order to monitor the 
application of such procedures, “working methods” have been developed for controllers as 
well as for pilots. These may be associated to automated tools (e.g. ATCO tools for arrival 
management) or rely on information sources (e.g. traffic situation display, weather forecast) 
and taught through training. 
3.3 Arrival Operations 
Inbound traffic to an airport flies through Upper and Lower Airspace before entering the TMA 
at points as defined in the STARs (standard arrival routes) procedures. An Approach Control 
Centre generally controls any holding stacks located at the boundary of the radar vectoring 
area. The Approach Centre is divided into 3 sectors to manage arrivals: 
• Initial approach: management of the holding stacks near to the airport (entries, exits, FLs) 
• Intermediate approach:  ILS sequencing and interception  
• Tower sector : final approach and RWY utilisation 
 
Arrival
Route
MAPT
FAFIFIAF
Hold
ing
M.A.S
Initial
approach
segment
Intermediate 
approach
segment
Final
approach
segment
 
Figure 3-1 – Aircraft Approach Segments 
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Figure 3-2 – Schematic view of Terminal Airspace and Arrival Procedure 
 
The runway landing rate is defined according to e.g. local meteorological conditions, 
configuration and the use of the runways. The landing rate is defined as an average value, 
which does not take into account the weight categories of the traffic. This rate is transmitted 
to the initial ATCO co-ordinator in charge of managing the flow of traffic entering the 
approach area. During the co-ordination phase between ACC and APP, the ATCO: 
• selects the first available landing slot (i.e. the landing time of the last aircraft that entered  
the approach area + runway rate) 
• calculates  the Expected Approach Time (EAT) at which the aircraft should leave the 
arrival stack and assesses the delay 
 
EAT information is passed to the ACC Terminal sector during the hand over co-ordination 
and transmitted to the crew at the first radio contact with the APP ATCO. The EAT is updated 
regularly based on radar data. All this is carried out in order to respect the declared capacity 
and to avoid traffic overload or underload in the approach area. 
 
Information on delay is transmitted, only, by the approach centre to the ACC terminal 
sectors. No absorption of delay is performed up stream in other ACC sectors. Nevertheless 
radar separations according to weight categories must be applied. This task is allocated to 
the Intermediate APP ATCO who will radar vector aircraft to intercept the ILS at a specified 
altitude. 
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3.3.1.1 Departure Operations 
On runways dedicated to take-offs, the basic rules for separation are based on time if air 
traffic control is provided in a non-radar environment. If the first aircraft taking-off is a 
“heavy”, then take-off clearance for the following aircraft is issued after a delay of 2 minutes 
irrespective of its weight category. The same time separation is applied in the case of a 
“light” aircraft taking-off behind a “medium” aircraft. If an intermediate taxiway take-off is 
used, the time separation between a “heavy” aircraft and other categories and between 
“medium” aircraft and “light” aircraft is increased up to 3 minutes. 
 
Pilots are well aware of the danger of Wake turbulence effects and are reluctant to shorten 
this time separation even if there is a crosswind above 15 Kt. 
3.3.1.2 Application of Reduced Wake vortex Separation 
Reduction of separation minima is authorised in certain cases to cope with the increasing 
traffic and to enable airports to make the best use of possible capacity while maintaining the 
same level of safety. Examples of reduced separation working methods are “land-after” and 
“anticipated-landing”. They are applied under specific conditions, where the authorisation is 
given to an aircraft to land while the preceding aircraft has still not vacated the runway. As 
specified by ICAO PANS-ATM, such working methods are only applied when visual contact 
between aircraft is established (and are dependent on flight crew agreement). 
3.4 Users or involved actors 
At present, different roles of the Air Traffic Controllers exist depending on responsibilities and 
assigned airspace. The involved actors are: 
• ATC Supervisor 
• Planning Operations ATCOs : Arrival Sequence Manager 
• Tactical Operations ATCOs  
• Approach Controller : Initial / Intermediate / Final 
• Tower Controller 
• Ground Controller 
These users may be supported by automated systems, including Arrival Managers (AMAN) 
or Departure Managers (DMAN). 
3.5 Justification for and Nature of Changes 
 
3.5.1 Justification for Changes 
Before 1970, aircraft of similar weights and low traffic density mitigated the risk of Wake 
vortex encounters. In 1970 and during the following years some Wake vortex related 
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incidents occurred due to the introduction of the Boeing 747 and the constant traffic growth. 
Between 1969 and 1976, extensive collection of data led to the definition of the ICAO 
separation standards based on aircraft maximum takeoff weight classes. As recognised by 
Aviation Stakeholders and investigated during intensive flight trials (AVOSS trials performed 
by NASA), the main issues affecting ICAO Wake Vortex standard separations are: 
• Over-conservative standard separation is applied in a majority of cases  
• Insufficient standard separation is applied in a minority of cases  
• Inappropriate regulation for closely spaced parallel runways : which results in inefficient 
use of some runway configurations 
 
In current ATC operations, no exchange of information concerning Wake vortex is provided 
between ATC and Aircrews, specific procedures exist only for the heaviest freight aircraft 
(Beluga, AN-22). As a consequence there is no system integrating all the sources of WV 
related information together at a single source, accessible by all ATC service providers (en-
route, approach, tower and arrival/departure managers). 
 
Since new high capacity aircraft will be heavier and larger, and air traffic grows continuously 
at a rate of 5 % per year, today’s aircraft separation rules are considered to be increasingly 
inefficient, and may result in unnecessary delays. New weather based rules used in 
combination with a suitable ATC decision support system are expected to provide the means 
to significantly enhance airport capacity. Since 1993, several European Union research and 
development programmes have been launched to get better knowledge of the physical and 
safety aspects of the Wake vortex phenomena and to develop technologies for Wake vortex 
detection and prediction. Taking benefit of such technologies, an objective of ATC-Wake was 
to develop and validate operational concepts for approach and departure phases of aircraft, 
while maintaining and ensuring an appropriate and required level of safety. 
3.5.2 Priority Among Changes 
As shown by recent surveys of Wake Vortex accidents, a majority of wake vortex encounters 
happen during the final approach or the initial climb and flight crews agree that during these 
flight phases near the ground, WV encounter is the most hazardous. 
Wake Vortex behaviour is characterised by transport and decay, both are highly dependent 
on atmospheric conditions. In the context of ATC-Wake both effects have been considered 
but the preferred situation is when WV is transported out of the concerned airspace area. 
The main changes introduced by ATC-Wake operations are: 
• In planning operations: determination of safe aircraft separation minima using Wake 
vortex prediction information (enhanced with present detection information). 
• In tactical operations: application of and transition between pre-determined separation 
minima. 
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3.5.3 Changes Considered but not Included 
Alternatives for approach operations using Wake Vortex information have been identified, in 
particular in the case of closely spaced parallel runways (CSPR): 
• simultaneous parallel approaches : SOIA concept developed by FAA 
• displacement of threshold : HALS – DTOP developed by DFS. 
 
In addition, the application of dynamic or individual aircraft separations according to aircraft 
type and Meteorological conditions has not been retained. In ATC-Wake operations, a pre-
determined aircraft separation is to be applied to the whole traffic during a specified 
timeframe. 
3.5.4 Assumptions and Constraints 
The prediction of Wake vortex behaviour in ATC-Wake will be performed by combining met 
forecast and now-cast and real-time Wake vortex measurements on airport arrivals and 
departures. The quality of Wake Vortex prediction is directly related to the quality of input 
data (e.g. meteorological data, radar data). A safety buffer has to be applied to satisfy 
accuracy and stability requirements of ATC users. 
• Accuracy : covers the properties of the predicted Wake Vortex behaviour, especially 
within the critical arrival / departure areas 
• Stability : covers the associated timeframe to prediction, i.e. sudden changes to start / 
end time(s) for application of reduced separations shall be avoided in order not to create 
hazardous situations (e.g. re-organisation of arrival sequence) or constraints (flight 
holding) 
 
Quantified values for accuracy and stability attributes will need to be evaluated during the 
ATC-Wake operational feasibility evaluation. The main principles followed for the calculation 
of the Wake vortex behaviour in the context of ATC-Wake are the following : 
• The aircraft weight and speed define the strength of the produced vortices (expressed as 
the circulation m²/s). 
• The turbulence (measured as the Turbulent Kinetic Energy (TKE) or Eddy Dissipation 
Rate (EDR) level of the atmosphere at the vortex location) and temperature stratification 
control vortex decay. Constant background shear may prolong vortex lifetimes slightly. 
• The aircraft span defines the initial vortex spacing 
• The vortex circulation and the spacing determine the self-induced velocity and thus the 
sink rate. 
• The atmosphere stratification (function of the temperature profile) can obstruct or slow 
down the sinking of Wake 
• The (cross and head) wind profile induce the vortex transport 
• The wind shear can induce a vortex tilting.  One of the two vortices may stall or rebound 
and the other continues to descend . 
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• The ground proximity can induce a rebound of both vortices or an increasing of their 
spacing (or both effects simultaneously) 
3.6 Concept for the ATC-Wake System 
 
3.6.1 Background & Objective 
The definition of ATC-Wake operational concepts has been made using ATC expert 
judgement for safety and capacity issues, as well as using experimental data to assess 
Wake vortex transport and decay in particular weather conditions. 
 
From the current situation where ICAO standard minimum separations are applied, the 
objective is to integrate Wake Vortex detection and prediction information in order to: 
• Determine and implement safe separation between aircraft during approach or take-off 
phases. 
• Sequence approach and runway operations in a seamless way. 
 
ATC-Wake operations are associated to the following flight phases: en-route (descent / end 
of cruise), initial / intermediate / final approach and departure. 
3.6.2 Users or Involved Actors 
 
Table 3-5 – ATC-Wake Users or Involved Actors 
Actor Current Responsibility Specific/additional Role in ATC - WAKE 
Airport ATC 
Supervisor 
Monitors ATC tower and ground 
operations 
Decides on arrival and departure 
separation mode and in case of ATC-Wake 
separation decides on the rate to be 
applied 
Arrival Sequence 
Manager 
In charge of arrival planning 
management for one or several 
runways, in co-ordination with 
adjacent ATC Units (sequencing 
and spacing of aircraft can be 
assisted by an arrival manager 
tool (AMAN) 
Uses WV prediction information for 
determination of aircraft sequencing and 
spacing in the final approach corridor 
(according to the separation mode decided 
by the ATC Supervisor) 
Co-ordinates forecast sequence upstream 
to en-route and / or approach ATSUs 
Initial Approach 
Controller (INI) 
In charge of inbound traffic from 
initial approach fix (IAF).  
Responsible for holding stacks 
management. 
Establishes arrival sequence based on 
WV.   
Intermediate 
Approach Controller 
(ITM) 
In charge of intermediate 
approach, ILS interception 
Establishes sequence for final 
approach and landing 
Establishes final approach sequence 
based on WV prediction and informs about 
deviations 
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Actor Current Responsibility Specific/additional Role in ATC - WAKE 
Tower Controller 
(TWR) 
In charge of final approach, 
landing, and take-off phases 
Monitors safe and optimal separations 
using WV detection and short term 
forecasting of the WV displacement. 
Instructs aircrew on any necessary evasive 
action. 
Ground Controller 
(GND) 
Organises and monitors aircraft 
and vehicles ground movements 
Sequences departures according 
to landings 
Uses WV detection and short term 
forecasting of the WV displacement to 
optimise departure sequencing 
Aircrew Navigates aircraft safely Complies with Controller’s instructions to 
meet arrival sequence constraints based 
on WV prediction information 
Takes necessary evasive actions to avoid 
WV encounter if instructed by ATC or 
alerted by on-board equipment (I-WAKE). 
 
In addition to human actors, an automated system for arrival management has been 
considered as an actor of ATC-WAKE, i.e. a user of WV prediction information for arrival 
sequencing and spacing. 
 
Table 3-6 – Automated systems as actors for ATC-Wake 
Tool Current Functionality Specific/additional Function in ATC - 
WAKE 
AMAN Assists Arrival Sequence 
Manager in arrival sequencing 
and spacing for one or several 
runways 
Uses WV prediction information for 
determination of aircraft sequencing and 
spacing in the final approach corridor  
Communicates forecasted sequence 
upstream to en-route and / or approach 
ATSUs 
3.6.3 Operational Policies and Constraints 
For the definition of the ATC-Wake operational concept and procedures, the principle of 
“evolution not revolution” has been retained. As far as possible, existing concepts and 
procedures for arrivals and departures have been considered, use of WV information 
analysed in order to allow a smooth transition from current ICAO aircraft separation rules to 
ATC-Wake aircraft separation rules. In this context, the proposed evolution of policies in 
ATC-Wake impact mainly on working methods, in order to allow: 
• Safe and efficient use of Wake vortex detection and prediction information. 
• Determination of appropriate separation between aircraft based on Wake vortex 
information. 
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During the definition of ATC-Wake operations, three notions and critical issues have been 
identified : 
• Wake vortex critical areas: part of the airspace where the risk of a Wake Vortex 
encounter is clearly identified and where detection and prediction of WV will contribute to 
ATC operations. 
• Application and transition between different aircraft separation modes (and minima): 
potentially inferior aircraft separation distance to ICAO standard. 
• Representation of Wake vortex information for ATC Controllers. 
3.6.4 Wake Vortex Critical Areas 
Amongst the different phases of flight, the final approach and the departure path are the 
most critical with respect to the risk and consequences of Wake vortex encounter. 
The final approach path starts indeed at the geographical point reached by all aircraft (FAF) 
and from it they will follow almost identical trajectories (bounded by the ILS tolerances) until 
the touchdown zone. The Wake Vortex develops behind the aircraft in approach aircraft 
(leader) and may potentially hit the follower aircraft.  
10 - 20 NM
ILS Glide Path
3000 – 4000 ft
 
Figure 3-3 – WV Critical Area for Arrivals 
 
The departure path and in particular the initial climb is also a geographical area where 
separation between aircraft is low and where Wake Vortex encounter risk exists. Contrarily to 
arrivals, strong variations between departure paths are observed, aircraft rotation point and 
initial climb rate depending highly on aircraft type and weight. This complicates the definition 
and the forecasting of a safe take-off rate. 
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Figure 3-4 – WV Critical Areas for Departures 
3.6.5 Application of Reduced Wake Vortex Separation 
The minimum applicable aircraft separation for landing traffic is related to the runway 
acceptance rate and to the performance of surveillance equipment. Under favourable Wake 
vortex situations (transport out of arrival path), a separation of 2.5 NM for aircraft flying on 
the same final approach path (in particular at runway threshold) is targeted. 
 
In case of closely spaced parallel runways, a separation of 2.5 NM between aircraft on 
parallel approach path is targeted (staggered approaches).  
 
For departures a separation of 90 s between aircraft on the same runway is targeted, 
provided that WV transport out of runway area is confirmed by detection. 
 
This minimum is applicable only if it complies with the safety requirements associated to the 
equipment used for IMC approach (e.g. radar, ILS). 
 
As an example, an average runway occupancy time is 50 s to reach the exit taxiway, plus a 
10 s buffer as a safety margin gives a minimum of 60s between two consecutive landing 
aircraft. With a landing speed of about 120 Kt, this gives a separation of 2 NM at the runway 
threshold.  
 
Airport local working methods exist to authorise landing that is conditional to the runway exit 
of the preceding aircraft (also called “land after” procedure). The application of such 
procedures is allowed by ICAO provided that visual contact of aircraft on the runway is made 
by aircrew in approach. 
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3.6.6 Representation of Wake Vortex Information for ATC Controllers 
The Wake vortex information provided to ATC Controllers in charge of tactical operations is 
aimed at confirming that safe separation is applied (pre-determined during planning of 
operations) and is not intended to be used as a mean to visualise minimum separation. 
 
The concept of the Vortex Vector has been defined : a straight line behind an aircraft 
corresponding to the predicted maximum length of the Wake vortex contained into the critical 
area (arrival or departure) and that takes into account transport and decay effects is 
displayed on a radar display. 
 
The vortex vector will be kept up-to-date all along the flight path, an initial value is calculated 
before aircraft entry in the critical area and updated with WV measurements or 
recalculations. When deviation between prediction and actual measurement may lead to a 
hazardous situation, notification is distributed to the ATC Controller. 
 
• For arrivals : starting at the alignment with ILS axis 
In case of Closely Spaced Parallel Runways (CSPR), the vortex vector length shall take 
into account the parallel corridor. 
 
 
Figure 3-5 – Vortex Vector for Arrivals 
 
• For departures : from the rotation point and along the initial climb (before first turn) 
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Figure 3-6 – Vortex Vector for Departures 
3.7 Description of new Concept, System and Situation 
The ATC-Wake operational concept introduced in today practices the following activities: 
• Determination of separation mode : use of WV behaviour prediction in approach or 
departure paths with a look ahead time of  20 - 40 minutes to determine the distance / 
time separation to be applied between aircraft in WV critical areas. 
• Approach tactical operations following the pre-determined separation mode : use 
of WV short term prediction and detection information by ATCO in order to monitor the 
safe separation between aircraft along the final approach path 
• Departure operations following the pre-determined separation mode : use of WV 
short term prediction and detection information by ATCO in order to monitor the safe 
separation between aircraft along the rotation and initial climb phase 
 
In the context of ATC-Wake, the following table introduces the runway configurations and the 
modes of operations that have been considered : 
 
Table 3-7 – Runway configurations and modes of operations considered 
Modes of Operations\ 
Runway Configuration 
Arrivals only Departures 
only 
Mixed Mode 
Single Runway 
Specialised for arrivals (i.e. 
used to define a single 
runway configuration used 
for landings only or 
departures only during a 
significant period of time 
(minimum of 10 successive 
movements). 
Specialised for 
departures 
Same concept as for 
arrival or departures 
only 
Closely Spaced Parallel 
Runways 
(separated by less than 
2500ft) 
Staggered approaches No Departures inserted between 2 arrivals 
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Modes of Operations\ 
Runway Configuration 
Arrivals only Departures 
only 
Mixed Mode 
Non-Closely Spaced 
Parallel Runways Simultaneous approaches No 
Equivalent to 2 single 
runways 
Crossing Runways No No No 
3.7.1 Determination of Separation Mode 
Depending on weather conditions influencing WV transport out of the arrival or departure WV 
critical areas, two modes of aircraft separation for arrivals and departures have been defined:  
• ICAO standard separation  
• ATC-WAKE separation. 
 
Based on meteorological conditions, ATC-WAKE will advise the ATC Supervisor about 
applicable separation mode and associated validity period (start / end). The ATC Supervisor 
has the responsibility to decide the minimum separation to be applied for approach or 
departure phases as well as the landing rate to be used for arrival sequencing (using AMAN 
or not). The time horizon to be considered for arrival sequencing is 40 min if an AMAN is 
used, 20 min otherwise. Based on planned traffic and meteorological conditions (wind 
profile), an assessment of WV transport and decay is performed in order to advise the ATC 
Supervisor about the applicable minimum separation for a fixed period of time (start / end of 
ATC-WAKE operations). ATC Supervisor decision is based on the proposal made by the 
ATC-WAKE system but also depends on multiple factors related to the airport situation 
(visibility conditions, runway(s) in use, ATC sectorisation). 
 
The ATCO in charge of tactical operations needs to be informed about which separation 
mode is to be applied at least 40 minutes in advance if an AMAN is used. This time is 
necessary to anticipate the necessary traffic increase in case ATC-Wake separation is to be 
applied. The update of inbound traffic planning is almost immediate but one has to consider a 
delay to implement the new planning during en-route phase (time to lose / gain). 
 
If sequencing and spacing is made manually by the Arrival Sequence Manager, then different 
working methods have to be considered, in particular if the arrival planning horizon is 
narrower (entries / exits from holding stacks), a 20 minutes notice is needed for changing the 
separation mode criteria.  
 
Not only the prediction of the Wake Vortex situation shall be known in advance (20 to 40 
min), but also the stability of prediction shall be high in order to avoid sudden changes of 
separation mode. It is assumed that the Wake Vortex situation will be monitored by 
comparing results of prediction and detection. From ATC supervisor or operator viewpoint a 
typical refresh rate of such information is 30 minutes.  
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Figure 3-7 – Example of a Planning of Separation Modes 
3.7.2 ATC-Wake Concept for Arrival Operations 
The section presents the general ATC-Wake operational concept for arrivals to be applied for 
a single runway configuration. Specific operations for closely spaced parallel runways have 
been considered and an example of procedure for such an operation is presented in section 
3.9.3. 
3.7.2.1 Planning of arrivals 
Based on landing rate, AMAN and/or the Arrival Sequence Manager establishes the aircraft 
arrival sequence and backward propagation is used to define entry times at IAFs. In order to 
realise such a sequence at the IAF, the amount of time to lose or to gain for each flight is 
determined by AMAN and displayed to the en-route Controllers for them to apply. The 
determination of the time to lose is currently implemented in a number of arrival manager 
tools, e.g. COMPAS (Frankfurt), OSYRIS (Zurich), MAESTRO (PARIS), CTAS (US). 
However, none of them integrates Wake Vortex prediction as yet. 
 
In the absence of an Arrival Manager, the sequence is established on a First In - First Out 
(FIFO) method on entering the holding stack. More accurate spacing is then achieved by the 
Initial Approach Controller by adjusting the holding time. 
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3.7.2.2 Initial Approach Controller 
At first contact, the initial approach controller (INI) informs the pilot about the separation 
mode in force (ATC-Wake or ICAO standard). The INI organises the holding stack exit times 
according to the separation to be applied. He is also responsible for allocating the flight 
levels.  
3.7.2.3 Intermediate Approach Controller 
The intermediate approach controller vectors aircraft up to the ILS interception point. When 
an aircraft has intercepted the ILS, the controller informs the pilot of the following aircraft 
about the type of the preceding aircraft. In the case where ATC-Wake separation mode is in 
operation, the pilot of the following aircraft must confirm that he has visual contact with the 
preceding aircraft. 
 
It is anticipated that an ATC-Wake system will be beneficial in all visibility conditions. It is 
noted that the current ICAO working methods require visual contact for reduced Wake vortex 
separation (PANS-ATM, PANS-OPS). Therefore, the application of ATC-WAKE separations 
in all visibility conditions requires an alternative way to inform or to transfer data about the 
position of a preceding aircraft to the pilot of a following aircraft. The pilot could then confirm 
sufficient awareness about the preceding aircraft before he/she is allowed to land in ATC-
WAKE separation mode. 
 
The controller receives a visual confirmation via a Wake Vortex Vector (WVV) of the 
suitability of the current applied separation in the final approach corridor behind the aircraft 
plots (see schematic view below), starting at alignment with ILS and ending at the runway 
threshold). The WVV information could be presented as an enhancement on a Plan View 
Display (PVD). The PVD shows the information received from the airport radar, combined 
with flight track data. The design and specification of a suitable Human Machine Interface 
(HMI) for the controllers is very important for ATC-Wake operations. An option is to use a so-
called "Variable Wake Vortex" option as HMI (for Approach and Tower) (see ATC-Wake 
D2_7 for the full details). The proposed ATC-Wake HMI is based on a Wake Vortex Vector 
(WVV), with a variable length beneath the vector (see Figure 3-8). New is the blue coloured 
vector behind each aircraft, representing the WVV and varying (using WV prediction 
information) along the glide slope. Also a micro-label with the distance to the preceding 
aircraft is proposed. 
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Figure 3-8 – ATC-Wake HMI for the approach controller 
 
The controller shall have the option to turn on or off the "distance to preceding aircraft" and 
the "Wake Vortex Vector". In case of an alarm this information shall always be turned on. 
The blue colour for the Wake vortex vector and the orange colour in case of an alarm were 
well received by the controllers in the AAS environment. The font, colours, symbology and 
position should be in line with the current PVD of the Approach controller. The Wake vortex 
vector and the "distance to preceding aircraft" shall be drawn when the aircraft is very close 
to intercepting the ILS until the speed is below 70 knots for approaches. This implies that a 
change for the intermediate Approach controller only. For departures it is the same only 
reverse. The Wake vortex Wake information shall be updated every radar sweep (roughly 
every 4 sec.). In case of an alarm, the colour of the WVV will change to orange and an audio 
alarm will be raised (Figure 3-9). 
3.7.2.4 Tower Controller 
The Tower Controller monitors the final approach and landing of the aircraft by ensuring safe 
separation between the preceding aircraft (vacating the runway) and the following aircraft. 
The controller HMI displays the vortex vector behind the aircraft plots in the final approach 
corridor and enables the detection and correction of any deviation from safe separation. For 
the Tower controller the same HMI is proposed as for the Approach controller. In the 
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (AAS) environment this will result in the HMI seen in Figure 3-9. 
The detection of Wake Vortices is performed in the final approach corridor. If a Wake Vortex 
encounter is predicted by the ground equipment, an alarm is raised to the controllers who 
then inform the pilot. If on-board equipment (such as I-Wake, when used) detects an 
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immediate risk of a Wake Vortex encounter, the pilot is informed immediately and decides 
about adequate evasive action (most probably a go around). 
 
Note: A deviation from the established arrival sequence (go around) is fed back to AMAN or 
other controllers in order to re-compute the sequence. 
 
 
Figure 3-9 – Tower controller HMI 
3.7.3 ATC-Wake Concept for Departure Operations 
Wake Vortex prediction information is used by the Ground Controller to determine the Wake 
Vortex position, transport and decay. Planning of departures is done on a relatively short 
term and taking into account ATFM slots. The Tower Controller uses WV detection 
information (now cast) to confirm safe separations between aircraft in the departure phase 
(up to the first turn) using a vortex vector. The detection is performed along the extension of 
runway axis and approximately up to a distance of 10 NM  from runway and using a 
reference corridor of +- 5 degrees. Wake Vortex detection information will serve to decrease 
further waiting time between consecutive departures if Wake vortex situation is more 
favourable at operation time than at planning time. 
3.8 Operational environment 
This section summarises the prerequisites and requirements on ATC operational 
environment that are associated to ATC-Wake operations. 
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Table 3-8 – Meteorological conditions for ATC-Wake operations 
Requirement Need (essential / option) 
Dry runway (max. braking efficiency) essential 
to reduce ROT 
Cloud ceiling : min 4500 ft essential 
for visual contact between pilots 
Visibility : min 5 km (RWY length or 2.5 NM) essential 
for visual contact between pilots 
 
In addition to visibility and braking efficiency prerequisites, initial analyses of favourable 
meteorological conditions for the application of ATC-Wake separation mode has been 
performed in the USA (using airfield trials data, as part of a FAA AVOSS experiment)) and in 
Europe (as part of the S-Wake project). The following Table 3-9 provides initial indications for 
envisaged separation mode depending on atmospheric conditions. 
 
Table 3-9 – Separation Mode depending on atmospheric conditions 
Atmospheric Conditions Separation Mode 
Cross Wind 
ATC-WAKE 
Cross wind potentially ensures a quick transport of the WV out of 
the approach corridor (minimum speed to be determined) and 
therefore enables a reduced Wake separation to be applied. 
Remark: the transport of the WV needs to be carefully assessed 
in case of CSPR operations 
Head Wind (strong) 
ICAO standard or ATC-WAKE 
Head winds (combined or not with cross wind) can increase or 
decrease the apparent descent speed of the Wake 
Calm Atmosphere ICAO standard or ATC-WAKE 
Wind Shear ICAO standard 
Turbulence 
ATC-WAKE 
As flying aircraft in such conditions is more difficult, pilots usually 
increase the aircraft approach speed. This will be reflected in the 
aircraft separation to be applied. 
Stratification ICAO standard or ATC-WAKE 
 
NB: The boundaries for atmospheric conditions (threshold values) described in the table are 
to be defined on the basis of system design and/or safety analysis studies. A study to 
determine (crosswind) threshold values is also performed as part of the ATC-Wake project 
(see Section 5 for the main results, and D3_9 for further details). 
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Table 3-10 –Ground and aircraft equipment for ATC-Wake operations 
Requirement Need (essential / option) 
Precision Approach Radar essential 
to support 2.5 NM separation 
Landing Aid : ILS / MLS / GNSS essential 
A-SMGCS (monitoring runway occupancy) option 
I – Wake option 
B-RNAV essential 
ATIS : Publish applicability and planning of ATC-WAKE 
separation 
essential 
 
Table 3-11 – Airport layout and infrastructure for ATC-Wake operations 
Requirement Need (essential / option) 
High speed runway exits essential 
to ensure expeditious flows of landings 
 
In addition adaptations of approach procedures will also imply to amend information provided 
in aeronautical information provider (AIP). 
3.9 System Components 
The ATC-WAKE system will include four main specific (functional) components and will also 
interface with several existing ATC system components. 
3.9.1 ATC-WAKE Specific Components 
The ATC-Wake Operational Concept is based on four new ATC-Wake components: 
• Separation Mode Planner 
• Predictor 
• Monitoring and Alerting 
• Detector 
The functionality of each of these components is described in the following Tables. 
 
Table 3-12 – ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner Functionality 
Function Determines the applicable separation mode (ICAO mode or ATC-WAKE 
mode)and advises about minimum aircraft separation distance 
Advisory includes expected time for future mode transitions, indication of aircraft 
separation minimum applicable 
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Function Determines the applicable separation mode (ICAO mode or ATC-WAKE 
mode)and advises about minimum aircraft separation distance 
Advisory includes expected time for future mode transitions, indication of aircraft 
separation minimum applicable 
Comment Determination of separation mode is based on met and “general” Wake vortex  
forecast (e.g. wind profile picture and expected “worst case” pairing), it also 
uses the currently observed WV situation. 
Changes of separation mode have to be decided with a minimum look ahead 
time of 40 min if AMAN is used, 20 if not, plus/minus a buffer determined at local 
implementation. 
Minimum aircraft separation distance is based on a worst-case scenario  (e.g. 
Heavy aircraft followed by a Light one) simulation taking into account traffic 
distribution. 
 
Table 3-13 – ATC-Wake Predictor Functionality 
Function Predicts for individual aircraft the Wake Vortex behaviour ( “Vortex Vector”) in 
the pre-defined arrival or departure area(s). 
The “Vortex Vector” is related to the part of the critical area (e.g. ILS Glide 
Slope) potentially affected by the Wake vortex 
Comment Prediction is performed using real-time available met data from the time the 
aircraft reaches the critical arrival area entry UNTIL it lands and from the take-off 
UNTIL it leaves the critical departure area. 
The quality of WV prediction is directly related to the quality of input data 
(meteorological data, radar data). A safety buffer has to be applied to satisfy the 
accuracy requirements of ATC users. 
These data consist of the most recent met now-cast data as well as  ground or  
down-linked airborne measurements (wind/ temperature profiler, 
wind/temperature aloft). The prediction is updated in short intervals (e.g., 1 min) 
and is vaulted/assessed  by  measurements of WV behaviour of preceding 
aircraft.  
 
Table 3-14 – ATC-Wake Detector Functionality 
Function Detects for individual aircraft the WV position, extent (“vortex vector”) and –if 
possible – also its strength in the pre-defined arrival or departure area(s). 
Comment Detection is performed using ground-based equipment (e.g. pulsed LIDAR) 
which scan pre-defined parts of the considered critical area (e.g. ILS glide path) 
in pre-defined windows (size is to be defined, see MFLAME and I-Wake). 
No connection to airborne equipment is assumed but detection may be 
complemented using airborne equipment (see I-WAKE project). 
 
Table 3-15 – ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting Functionality 
Function Alerts ATCO in case of : 
• significant deviation between WV detection and WV prediction information 
which raises the risk of WV encounter 
• failure of one or several WV components 
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Function Alerts ATCO in case of : 
• significant deviation between WV detection and WV prediction information 
which raises the risk of WV encounter 
• failure of one or several WV components 
Comment This component plays the role of a “safety net” for ATC-WAKE operations, its 
design must be kept simple : 
• No connection to airborne equipment is assumed 
• No use of aircraft behaviour model for WV encounter is assumed  
3.9.2 Re-use of Existing ATC Components 
ATCO HMI 
Function Provides the traffic situation picture and automated support for various ATCO 
tactical roles (Approach, Tower). 
Comment A generic component is used in the context of ATC-WAKE but specialisation 
exists depending on ATCO role. 
It is foreseen to integrate WV related information together with flight information 
(position, altitude, ground speed, aircraft type)  
AMAN 
Function Determines automatically optimum arrival sequence and provides advises for 
realising this sequence. 
Communicates forecast sequence upstream to en-route and / or approach 
ATSUs 
Comment It assists in scheduling traffic from TMA entry (Initial Approach Fix) to runway. 
Sequencing is based on the landing rate decided by ATC Supervisor ( ICAO or 
ATC-Wake separation mode). 
Flight Data Processing System 
Function Keeps track of every flight information and updates, in particular the flight plan, 
the trajectory prediction, ETA and ETD, aircraft type and equipment 
Surveillance System 
Function Provides and maintains the air traffic situation picture using all available 
detection means (radars, air-ground data links) 
3.9.3 Procedures involved 
The introduction of ATC-Wake operations does not require an important re-development of 
arrival or departure procedures but rather the application of new ATC working methods. The 
main adaptation to be performed on existing arrival procedures is the missed approach 
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procedure in case of ATC-Wake separation. Specific new procedures have been identified 
and analysed: 
• Transition between ICAO separation and ATC-WAKE separation modes 
• Staggered approaches to Closely Spaced Parallel Runways (CSPR) 
3.9.3.1 Closely Spaced Parallel Runways 
 
2.5 NM2.5 NM
RWY 02 L
RWY 02 R
Heavy
Light Or Medium
 
Figure 3-10 – Staggered Approaches 
 
The term “closely spaced” designates parallel runways separated by less than 2500 ft, ICAO 
considers such pair of runways as one unique with regard to Wake vortex turbulence. In the 
context of ATC-Wake both runways will be used for arrivals at traffic peak hours, typically to 
handle a sequence of at least 20 arrivals. 
 
The proposed concept of operations for CSPR involves the use of both runways for 
staggered approaches based on the segregation of traffic according to aircraft type (Heavy / 
Medium / Light). One runway is dedicated to Heavy landings whereas the other one will be 
used for Medium or Light landings only and landings of Heavy and Medium occur 
alternatively. 
 
Depending on weather conditions and in particular wind speed and direction, air traffic will be 
segregated between Heavy on the downwind runway and Medium and Light on the upwind 
runway. Heavy aircraft will be assigned to the downwind runway and perform initial – 
intermediate approach 1000 ft below Light and Medium aircraft so that WV generated by 
Heavy aircraft will be transported out of Light or Medium approach corridor. 
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Figure 3-11 – Example of a Staggered Approach Procedure – Horizontal Profile 
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Figure 3-12 – Example of a Staggered Approach Procedure – Vertical Profile 
3.9.4 Missed Approach Procedures 
When an aircraft is caused to abort a landing after it has already started its approach, the 
aircraft has to follow a pre-defined path to leave the airspace surrounding the terminal. The 
missed approach procedure to be followed in such case is an integral part of the published 
approach procedure. The issue of go-around movements while applying reduced separations 
is important for the ATC-Wake concept of operations.  
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Two main safety issues are to be addressed: 
Risk of Wake Vortex encounter for aircraft following a go-around aircraft 
The case of an aircraft aborting its final approach may occur occasionally if the runway is not 
vacated. Such aircraft starts to climb immediately and joins the missed approach point 
following a straight path, then the aircraft will resume the approach after following a pre-
defined go-around path. The follower aircraft could fly under the flight path of the preceding 
aircraft, which represents a risk for WV encounter. Two sub-cases exist: 
• Cross-wind: the WV of the climbing aircraft will be laterally displaced as well. 
• No cross wind (unpredicted change of wind conditions) : the presence or absence of WV 
in the landing zone will be continuously monitored using the ATC-Wake Detector. If the 
WV of the leader aircraft represents still a danger for the follower aircraft, this one will be 
instructed by the ATC Controller to abort landing as well. 
Risk of multiple go-arounds for aircraft in trail under reduced separation 
In case reduced separations are applied and in case a sudden fall in cross-wind speed is 
observed (not predicted), there may be a risk of having multiple aircraft going around 
simultaneously. Considering a typical situation where final approach path is 10NM long and 
2.5 NM separation is applied, potentially 5 aircraft are in trail along such path.  
The role of the ATC Controller will then be to take the measures to protect the aircraft from 
Wake Vortex encounter by issuing when appropriate go-around(s) and radar vectoring 
instructions and coordinating with the other approach controllers. No change to current ATC 
working methods for missed approaches is required but training sessions covering such 
situations have to be prepared. 
3.9.5 Transition between ICAO and ATC-Wake separation modes 
The ATC Supervisor is the decision-maker for the separation mode and minimum separation 
distance to be applied during tactical operations. Such decision is based on the proposal 
made by the ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner but also depends on multiple factors 
related to airport situation (visibility conditions, runway(s) in use, ATC sectorisation). In order 
to avoid holdings at the TMA entry point, such transitions shall be planned as early as 
possible. A time horizon of 20-40 min has been proposed but the availability of accurate 
(local) weather prediction data at this timeframe needs to be evaluated for the airport at 
which the ATC-Wake operation is planned to be introduced. 
 
The transition from ICAO to ATC-Wake separation mode will begin by considering the 
incoming aircraft that have a planned arrival time included in the start / end time period for 
ATC-WAKE operations. Such aircraft have not reached the TMA. The re-planning of arrivals 
(if necessary) will be performed by the Arrival Sequence Manager or by AMAN and transition 
information (start / end of separation mode to be applied) will be distributed to concerned 
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ATCOs. The time adjustments will be implemented by en-route controllers through speed 
modifications, radar monitoring or/and holding pattern. 
 
For departures, transition will not imply immediate actions but transition information will be 
distributed to concerned ATCOs. In case of an unexpected change of meteorological 
conditions or in case of ATC-Wake equipment failure, the application of larger separation on 
short term (less than 10 minutes) is required, a procedure to reverse back to ICAO 
separation has to be defined.  
3.10 Evaluation of the ATC-Wake concept and requirements 
As a first step towards use of an ATC-Wake system at airports, the WP1000 on System 
Requirements (D1_5) has established the ATC-Wake operational concept and requirements 
for the application of reduced aircraft separation under favourable weather conditions. A 
(high-level) overview of ATC-Wake operational requirements, users requirements, and 
system requirements is provided in Appendix A. During the development of the requirements, 
a number of key issues have been identified: 
 
• Transitions between ATC-Wake and ICAO separation modes 
Frequent transitions between ICAO and ATC-Wake separation modes may have a 
negative effect on capacity as such event potentially requires significant ATC resource for 
the re-planning of arrivals. Quantified values for the accuracy of WV predictions and the 
stability of the wind predictions will need to be established. 
 
• Aircraft separation and sector loading 
The definition of reduced aircraft separation (the ATC-Wake Mode of Operation) has 
been evaluated based on typical figures for individual runway occupancy time. In the 
case of large airports with three to four active runways, the effect of increased throughput 
on TMA traffic load needs to be further examined. An adequate strategy for the 
application of reduced wake vortex separation together with TMA sectorisation plan will 
need to be established.  
 
• Missed approaches when ATC-Wake is applied 
When an aircraft is caused to abort a landing, after it has already started its final 
approach,the aircraft has to follow a pre-defined path to leave the airspace surrounding 
the terminal. The missed approach procedure to be followed in such case is an integral 
part of the published approach procedure. The issue of go-around movements while 
applying reduced separations is important for the ATC-Wake concept of operations. This 
issue has been addressed further in the operational feasibility assessment and the 
validation through real-time simulations. 
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• Evaluation of safety requirements 
The safety assessment of the ATC-Wake system and corresponding operational concept 
shall demonstrate that, when implemented, tolerable safety levels are met. The 
Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs) provides a framework to be used 
for the setting of safety targets. The safety study might also lead to further enhancements 
of the operational concept through identification (and subsequent implementation) of risk 
mitigation measures (if deemed to be necessary). The safety assessment will need to 
quantify the wind condtions for which reduced separation (i.e. the ATC-Wake Mode of 
Operation) may be applied. 
 
• Evaluation of capacity benefits 
The application of reduced wake vortex separation has the potential to significantly 
increase the efficiency of arrival or departure movements by the reduction of 
(intermediate) delays as well as to increase runway throughput. The determination of 
capacity gains might be complex as ATC-Wake operations requires the combination of 
favourable meteorological conditions and efficient co-operation between ATC Controllers 
and Flight Crews to operate in dense traffic conditions.  
 
• Evaluation of operational feasibility 
Before the ATC-Wake system can be used at airports, it will be necessary to validate the 
operational concept and system requirements. A crucial step is the operational feasibility 
assessment, in which the interoperability with existing ATC systems and usability and 
acceptability for air traffic controllers will be evaluated.  
 
• Assessment of the ATC-Wake system performance requirements 
Four new ATC-Wake system components have been introduced: the ATC-Wake 
Separation Mode Planner, ATC-Wake Predictor, ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting and 
ATC-Wake Detector. Quantified values for the accuracy, integrity and reliability of these 
new ATC-Wake components will need to be established before the system can be 
installed and used at airports. In this respect, it is noted that EASA might introduce a 
certification process for new ATC systems around 2010. 
 
• Potential use of WV instrumentation on-board aircraft 
I-Wake equipment might be installed on-board aircraft to further enhance WV safety. 
Such instrumentation for on-board detection, warning and avoidance of atmospheric 
hazards (including WV) could be used as a "safety net", but not to monitor separation. An 
ATC-Wake safety study could take into account a "mixed fleet of aircraft" (although it will 
be difficult to require airlines to install e.g. I-Wake). 
 
The reduced WV separation, targeted under favourable conditions, is: 
• 2.5 Nm separation between all aircraft on the same final approach path 
• 90 seconds between all aircraft departing on the same runway. 
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4 Integrated System Design and Development 
4.1 ATC-Wake System Architecture 
The ATC-Wake Operational System includes four new functional ATC-Wake components 
which will interface with several existing and/or enhanced ATC system components [D1_4, 
D1_5]. The new system components are: 
• ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner 
• ATC-Wake Predictor 
• ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting 
• ATC-Wake Detector 
 
Existing ATC system components are: 
• AMAN 
• Flight Data Processing System 
• Surveillance Systems 
 
Enhanced ATC system components are: 
• Meteo Systems 
• Supervisor HMI 
• ATCO HMIs 
 
For the Meteo systems, enhancements in prediction and update rates are foreseen and the 
HMI's for supervisor and ATCO shall be extended with ATC-Wake symbology. Figure 1 
shows all relations between the different components. The new components are indicated in 
yellow, the existing ATC systems in blue and the enhanced systems in dashed blue/yellow. 
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The legend to Figure 1 is given below: 
 
Figure 4-1 – Functional flow of ATC-Wake Operational System 
 
Four use cases have been defined as part of the ATC-Wake operational concept and system 
requirements [D1_4]. These use cases, which are reflected in the functional description, are: 
• “Separation Mode Planning” Use Case: The ATC Supervisor is the decision-maker for 
the separation mode and minima to be applied during tactical operations. Such decision 
is based on the proposal made by the ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner but also 
depends on multiple factors related to airport situation (visibility conditions, runway(s) in 
use, ATC sectorisation). 
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• “Separation Mode Transition (between ICAO and ATC-Wake modes)” Use Case: 
This event takes place at least 40 min before the actual application of the separation 
mode to the arrival or departure traffic. Information to be provided by the ATC-Wake 
Separation Mode Planner are the separation mode, the separation minima, the time to 
start application and the (estimated) validity of the selected mode. 
• “Intermediate and Final Approach” Use Case: The Approach and Tower controllers 
are provided with WV prediction information when aircraft is in the "critical area". At this 
point the Approach Controller receives visual confirmation of the correct spacing between 
the aircraft. The Tower Controller is in charge of the final approach phase, i.e. has to 
monitor that separation is maintained along the entire glide path. Visual confirmation of 
the WV “danger area” is kept up to date using meteo information and short term 
predictions. Actual WV behaviour is determined by the ATC-Wake Detector and provided 
to the ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting, in order to detect potential discrepancies 
between detection and short term prediction and raise the appropriate alarm to the 
concerned ATCos. 
• “Departure” Use Case: The Ground Controller is in charge of preparing a departure 
sequence based on the aircraft separation mode information and the departure rate 
decision made by ATC Supervisor. The Tower Controller is provided with WV prediction 
information (visualisation of “danger area”) when aircraft start rotating and during the 
initial climb phase. Actual WV behaviour is determined by the ATC-Wake Detector and is 
provided to the ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting, in order to detect potential 
discrepancies between detection and short term prediction and to raise the appropriate 
alarm to Tower ATCO. 
4.2 ATC-Wake Integrated Platform overview 
The ATC-Wake Integrated Platform is an essential first system development step that will 
lead to installation of a new ATC decision support system at airports. It serves as a test-bed 
simulation environment for the future ATC-Wake Operational System. As such, the ATC-
Wake IP is used to: 
• evaluate the interoperability of the integrated system with existing ATC systems currently 
used at various European airports;  
• assess the safety and capacity improvements that can be obtained by local installation of 
the integrated system at various European airports;  
• evaluate the operational usability and acceptability of the integrated system;  
• make a plan and to assess cost elements for further development, implementation and 
exploitation of this platform (e.g. into the system that can be installed at European 
airports). 
Each of the ATC-Wake System components is represented in the IP by an existing or newly 
developed tool or data base. The functional overview of the ATC-Wake IP is depicted in 
Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-2 – ATC-WAKE Integrated Platform 
 
The ATC-Wake IP contains the following ATC-Wake tools implementing the corresponding 
elements in the ATC-Wake Operational System: 
• Meteo Systems: The required functionalities are simulated by NOWVIV & SKEWIND. 
• Surveillance Systems: The required functionalities are simulated by a Total Airport and 
Airspace Modeller (TAAM). 
• Flight Data Processing Systems: The required functionalities are simulated by TAAM and 
a Radar Emulator tool. 
• ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner: The required functionalities are represented by a 
newly designed tool that uses database / look-up tables filled with WAVIR assessment 
results 
• ATC-Wake Predictor: The required functionalities are simulated by mixing results 
provided by the Wake Vortex Predictors P2P and VFS. 
• ATC-Wake Monitoring & Alerting. The required functionalities are simulated by a new 
tool, which ingesting data from the ATC-Wake Predictor and Detector. 
• ATC-Wake Detector: The required functionalities are simulated by using Wake vortex and 
weather radar measurement data from LIDAR measurements, processed by the 
DOPVOR algorithm. 
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The relations between the various system components have been taken care of by defining 
an Interface Requirements Specification diagram (see Figure 4-3) and developing the 
required interfaces. The tools have been prepared by the consortium partners. The ATC-
Wake IP Working Environment supports the integrated and distributed use of the ATC-Wake 
tools by the partners and other users. 
 
 
Figure 4-3 – Interface Requirements Specification diagram for the Integrated Platform 
 
The ATC-Wake IP comprises a set of ATC-Wake tools integrated into an ATC-Wake IP 
Working Environment. Integrated use means that the individual ATC-Wake tools proper are 
wrapped and linked together in order to realise a single, coherent, and user-oriented test-bed 
of the ATC IP. Distributed use means that the tools may be operated remotely, from a single 
place, whereas they run on computers located with the various consortium partners’ 
premises. The Working Environment is realised using the SPINEware middleware which 
provides and combines the notions of metacomputing (i.e., means for presenting a 
distributed set of computing resources as a virtual single computer), tool wrapping (i.e., 
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means for integrating existing and legacy tools without modifying the tools proper) and 
workflow (i.e., means for chaining tools) to facilitate the required integrated and distributed 
use of tools. From the user’s perspective, the key element of, and at the same time main 
entry point for the ATC-Wake IP is the workflow depicted in Figure 4. This workflow 
represents the available tools (which may be grouped together and organised into 
subworkflows) and data sets, as well as the logical flow of data and control among the tools 
and data. Manipulation of data and activation of tools and subworkflows is done by drag-and-
drop and point-and-click mouse operations in the workflow. Whenever an interactive tool is 
activated, the tool may be operated through the tool’s own graphical user interface. 
 
In the workflow different icons are used for different elements. This includes icons for an 
Atomic Tool, (sub-)workflow, data container, workflow input, and workflow output : 
 
 
Figure 4-4 – Icons for atomic tool, (sub-)workflow, data container, workflow input/output 
 
The elements can be connected to each other to define the execution order of tools and the 
transfer of data from one tool or workflow to another one. The colours of the connections 
indicate the status and special settings of a connection. E.g. connections can be set to start 
the next tool automatically as soon as preceding tools have provided the required inputs to 
the tool. Such connection is coloured red. 
 
Each application that is integrated in the ATC-Wake IP is integrated as a SPINEware 'atomic 
tool' module. When integrating an application, the integrator takes care of specifying the 
correct settings of tool and data directories, tool-dependent variable settings, etc. In the ATC-
Wake project, a dedicated Virtual Private Network (VPN) solution has been chosen to enable 
the smooth execution of tools at host computers of each of the partners at their own 
premises. The user will experience a simulation session with the ATC-Wake IP workflow as if 
it runs on a single computer. The ATC-Wake tools are either integrated at the top level of the 
workflow or within one of the subworkflows. A User Guide to the IP workflow and the 
integrated tools is provided in D2_8. Tools at the top level are the HMI's for Supervisor 
(Supervisor_HMI) and ATCo (ATCo_HMI), the AMAN. The subworkflows, representing the 
interfaces between the ATC-Wake components, are described in more detail in ATC-Wake 
D2_8. All the individual subsystems are described and explained in more detail in the 
remainder of Section 4. 
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Figure 4-5 – SPINEware View of the Integrated Platform 
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4.3 ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner  
To support the ATC supervisor with planning of separation modes, an ATC-Wake Separation 
Mode Planner (SMP) has been developed and implemented. In the proposed methodology, 
NOWVIV wind forecast data is used to determine time frames suitable for reduced 
separation. Criteria on crosswind and/or head/tailwind and associated safe separation 
minima are derived from WAVIR safety assessment results. To enable an interfacing 
between the Separation Mode Planner and the WAVIR safety assessment results, a WAVIR 
database has been set up.  
This database also enables users to review WAVIR parameter settings and retrieve WAVIR 
results via interfaces. In the context of “safety monitoring”, such database might be used to 
evaluate Wake vortex safety performance indicators at an airport. Results from safety 
monitoring activities can also be fed back in the WAVIR database to tailor the database to 
specific airports, and to increase the performance and reliability of the Separation Mode 
Planner. In this first design of the Separation Mode Planner, relatively simple wind criteria 
have been proposed. Depending on the benefits that can be achieved with such criteria and 
the requirements of the users, further study may focus on elaborating these criteria.  
 
SMP methodology
NOWVIV wind forecast data in grid points in approach corridor
Composition of ‘compound’ profile by selection of relevant vertical areas per 
grid point
Determine minimum and maximum crosswind profile 
as function of time (including uncertainty bands)
Determine time frames for reduced separation by 
comparison with crosswind criterion (show only time 
frames longer than e.g. 45 minutes).
This logic can be extended with head/tailwind profiles 
and with a crosswind criterion that is height 
dependent.
1
2
3
 
Figure 4-6 – SMP methodology, example case for a single runway approach 
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Figure 4-7 – Separation Mode Planner Graphical User Interface 
 
The main input to the SMP is meteo forecast data from Meteo Systems. Besides, the SMP 
requires configuration to account for local conditions such as runway layout and operation 
modes. The SMP analyses the meteo forecast data to determine these time periods that 
enable a safe reduction of separation. The criteria on meteo conditions in relation to safe 
separation are established off-line in dedicated safety assessments. 
 
Implementation of a Separation Mode Planner is rather straightforward. The following issues 
have to be considered: 
• An interface will have to be developed in order to let the local weather forecast systems 
provide the meteo forecast data in the format as described above. 
• To further complete the database with safety assessment results, a safety assessment 
that focuses on local conditions needs to be performed. 
• In addition to the previous bullet, a safety monitoring system needs to be installed that 
assesses the actual situation and provides feed back on the advice of the SMP. This feed 
back is furthermore used to extend and improve the contents of the WAVIR safety 
database. 
• The SMP is a relatively simple tool that runs on a desktop computer. 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
53 
 
 
4.4 ATC-Wake Predictor 
The ATC-Wake Predictor is a new sub-system of the ATC-Wake system, which assesses the 
suitability of the separations, suggested by the SMP. It determines the part of the glide slope 
potentially affected by Wake vortices. This information is provided to the Monitoring & 
Alerting sub-system and the ATCo HMI through a Wake Vortex Vector (WVV). The two main 
inputs of the ATC-Wake Predictor are the Meteorological Now-cast data provided by the 
Meteorological Systems and the Traffic Situation provided by the Surveillance Systems. 
Furthermore the ATC-Wake Predictor requires databases describing the aircraft 
characteristics, radars accuracy, and runway layout. In ATC-Wake, the ATC-Wake Predictor 
is not just a “Wake vortex prediction” (using P-VFS and P2P); it is the sub-system used to 
assess, during the tactical phase, the suitability of the separations previously suggested by 
the SMP during the planning phase. 
 
Every 6 seconds, the ATC-Wake Predictor takes a snapshot of the entire traffic situation 
around the airport. For each aircraft, it computes, using the weather data at the aircraft 
position, the time evolution of the danger volume which contains the Wake vortices 
generated by this aircraft. Combining these information with the glide slope tolerance mode 
used the ATC-Wake Predictor computes the part of the glide slope potentially affected by 
Wake vortices resulting in the WVV of each aircraft. Before the Predictor can be used 
though, the following local data need to be available to:  
• Runway co-ordinates 
• Meteo measurement point co-ordinates 
• Radar accuracy 
 
Locally measured meteorological data are to be used as much as possible by the Wake 
Predictor. A Weather Data Analyser, from Weather Systems, provides best-guess 
meteorological fields combining data from the various measurement sensors (Weather Data, 
Radar Data Processing: Wind field estimated by “SKEWIND”) and Weather Forecasting. 
Weather forecast data is needed to fill in regions of sparse observational data. The Wake 
Predictor requires as input also airport data and actual aircraft data. The Predictor relies on 
the real-time prediction of wake vortex (WV) behaviour: transport and decay. Wake Vortex 
prediction models take into account the aircraft types (span, weight), the flight conditions 
(position, velocity and trajectory), the weather conditions along the glide slope (cross-wind 
and head wind profiles, thermal stratification profile, turbulence profile). The effects of wind 
shear (significant vertical variation of the wind profile) on transport and decay are also 
modelled.  
 
In ATC-Wake, two main European real-time models have been used: the “Probabilistic use of 
the Vortex Forecast System (P-VFS)” and the “Probabilistic Two-Phase Decay” model (P2P). 
The P2P and the P-VFS are wake vortex predictors based respectively on probabilistic and 
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deterministic approach. Both of them deal with input uncertainties to determine the ranges of 
possible Wake Vortex lateral, vertical and axial locations as well as the possible ranges of 
Wake Vortex strength and the range of core radius size. 
 
Integration of a Predictor module is rather straightforward but some interfaces will have to be 
developed in order to let the Meteo systems, Surveillance Systems, and local Flight Data 
Processing Systems provide the aircraft data in the required format. Also, an interface will 
have to be developed with the local Monitoring & Alerting module and an interface will have 
to be developed in order to let the local ATC-Wake Predictor provide the WV Prediction 
Individual AC at the ATCo HMI. One may note that the ATC-Wake Predictor itself is a 
relatively simple tool that may run on a desktop computer. 
 
 
Figure 4-8 – Comparison between P2P and P-VFS Wake Vortex Prediction 
 
The WV Predictor handles P2P and P-VFS probabilistic simulations and assessments for all 
gates corresponding to all aircraft in the airport area (the computation gates being created 
every 6 seconds). The time evolution of the “3D danger volume” in which the WV could be 
found is provided by a proper reconstruction of the complete WV Situation, using all dynamic 
gates and a 3D space-time reconstruction. 
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Figure 4-9 – Example of Danger Volume Evolution by Wake Vortex Predictor 
 
The output of the Wake Vortex Predictor is the “Wake Vortex Vector” (WVV) of an aircraft in 
the so-called critical area. The length of the Wake Vortex is defined as the distance between 
the generator aircraft and the first gate considered as “Vortex Free”. This information is 
presented as an enhancement on the Plan View Display (PVD) showing the information 
received from the airport radars, combined with flight track data (call sign, aircraft type 
height, speed, etc.). Because the WVV is only calculated in the critical area, only changes to 
the PVD of the Final Approach controller and Tower controller are foreseen. The 
representation of the WVV on the air traffic controllers has been realized after consultation of 
ATCos and is further discussed in Section 4.7. 
4.5 ATC-Wake Detector 
The ATC-Wake Detector is a new system. Purpose is to detect the WV behind an aircraft 
and gives this information to the ATC-Wake Monitoring & Alerting system. The Wake-Vortex 
Detector in ATC-Wake monitors the relevant airspace (cross-sections of the glide path) for 
the presence of Wake vortices and, if so, gives a warning to the Monitoring & Alerting 
system. The Detector serves as a safety net and, thus is a stand-alone technique, which only 
reports its monitoring result. The Detector in the ATC-Wake Operational System is necessary 
at least for an initial period of time after installation of the ATC-Wake at an airport. Once the 
prediction and monitoring system has proven to be safe, which may happen after some years 
of operational application, a LIDAR for detection could be obsolete.  
 
The Wake Vortex Detector measures the turbulence in real-time in the critical area with 
ground-based equipment. These systems are able by means of algorithms (e.g. Doppler) to 
detect and characterise Wake Vortices. The Monitoring & Alerting module use this data to 
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compare it with the predicted data. The Wake Vortex Detector detects for individual aircraft 
the WV position, extend (“vortex vector”) and – if possible – also its strength in the pre-
defined arrival or departure area(s). Detection is performed using ground-based equipment 
(pulsed LIDAR, and Doppler Radar processing called “DOPVOR”) which scan along the 
critical area (ILS glide path) in pre-defined windows. No connection to airborne equipment is 
assumed but detection may be complemented using airborne equipment.  
Wake vortex detection by LiDAR 
Lidars are able to detect and monitor Wake Vortices in real time. Since Lidar is a fair weather 
tool (it require a certain amount of visibility), it may be complemented by Radar techniques to 
detect Wake Vortices. Ideally the whole glide path should be monitored for Wakes while the 
focus should be on the Wake Vortex detection close to the surface where a Wake Vortex 
encounter may be most critical. During the two measurement campaigns WakeOP and 
WakeToul, Wake Vortices were scanned perpendicular to the flight path in order to 
characterize the strength and position of the Wake Vortex. The 2µm pulsed Lidar system 
also provides detailed information on the wind profile and, as a further product, the turbulent 
state of the atmosphere. Operationally, such a Lidar system is used at Hongkong airport to 
detect clear air turbulence along the glide path (however, not the whole glide path can be 
covered by this system; the range is approximately 8.5 km).  
 
 
 
Figure 4-10 – Example of Lidar scan result for Wake Vortex Monitoring 
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Figure 4-11 – WakeTOUL deployed instruments: SODAR/RASS, LIDAR, anemometer 
DOPVOR Turbulence Mapping by Radar 
DOPVOR processes Radar Wake Monitoring by Turbulence measurements from 
Regularized High Resolution Doppler Analysis of Spectrum Width based on Poincaré’s 
metric on reflection coefficients and Cepstrum metric. DOPVOR uses Doppler I&Q (In Phase 
& Quadrature) Data from a POLDIRAD Radar. In the following figure, we illustrate data from 
a POLDIRAD radar. DOPVOR provides air turbulences map inside a specific sector in 
azimuth for different elevations. These measurements will be put in the airport coordinates 
system to be correctly matched with the simulated flight corridor. We illustrate in the following 
figure the map of air turbulence strength as computed by DOPVOR. 
 
Figure 4-12 – Illustration of radar records of In Phase and Quadrature Data 
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Figure 4-13 – Illustration of air turbulence strength map 
4.6 ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting 
The ATCo's, in charge of approach, landing, and take-off phases, are responsible for safe 
and optimal separations. When an unsafe WV situation is detected, he/she instructs aircrew 
on any necessary evasive action. The Monitoring & Alerting module will monitor every aircraft 
in the critical area and raise appropriate alarms to ATCo's in case of significant deviation 
between WV detection and WV prediction information with a risk of WV encounter. The 
purpose of the Monitoring & Alerting module is to raise alarms. The controller HMI displays 
this alarm in combination with the vortex vector behind the aircraft plots in the final approach 
or departure corridor to enable the detection and correction of any deviation from safe 
separations. The ATC-Wake Monitoring & Alerting system will monitor the Wake vortex 
progress behind each aircraft and generate an alarm when something is not correct or not 
safe. Currently the following four types of alarm are discriminated: 
A. there is a system failure; 
B. the predicted Wake vortex (from ATC-Wake Predictor) is larger than the separation 
applied  (SMP), consequence ATC-Wake mode is not valid anymore; 
C. the detected Wake vortex length of an aircraft is larger than predicted (from ATC-Wake 
Predictor) and larger than the applied separation. 
D. when preceding aircraft is entering the Wake vortex of the leading aircraft. 
 
Integration of a Monitoring & Alerting module is rather straightforward but the following issues 
still have to be considered: 
• An interface will have to be developed in order to let the local ATC-Wake Predictor 
provide the WV Prediction Individual AC data in the required format . 
• An interface will have to be developed in order to let the local Detector provide the WV 
detection data in the format as described above. 
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• An interface will have to be developed in order to let the Monitoring & Alerting module 
provide to the ATCo HMI the Alarm in the format as described above. 
• The Monitoring & Alerting module is a relatively simple tool that runs on a desktop 
computer (even the same as for the ATC-Wake Predictor). 
4.7 ATC-Wake Human Machine interfaces 
 
4.7.1 ATC Supervisor HMI 
The ATC-Wake system will present the proposed separation mode (ICAO or ATC-Wake) and 
separation criteria on the Supervisor HMI. With this information and information from other 
sources the supervisor will determine the declared capacity and landing rate, and will enter 
his/her decision into the ATC system and inform the controllers. The Supervisor HMI is the 
interface of the supervisor with the ATC-Wake system. The HMI displays the proposed 
separation mode (ICAO or ATC-Wake) and the separation criteria for the ATC-Wake mode, 
see Figure 4-7 for an example. 
 
 
Figure 4-14 – Example Supervisor HMI with data of SMP 
Currently the equipment of the supervisor consists of several systems. Each system (in 
general) consists of display (monitor or panel) which gives an overview of the current 
situation and an input device (keyboard or switches) to take control or to enter the selection. 
More and more the systems are (from the supervisor point of view) integrated into one 
system. Some kind of "windowing" mechanism to display the information is used, where each 
"old" system is represented by one "page". A keyboard is used for input. The HMI itself is a 
very straightforward representation of the data coming from the SMP. The HMI shall use the 
same format as the other systems used by the supervisor. A standalone console (screen and 
keyboard) is not necessary because the update rate of the data is low, but can be used. In 
the newer system(s) the HMI can be displayed as a "page". 
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4.7.2 Approach and Tower ATCo HMIs 
The Human Machine Interface (HMI) of the controllers is very important. Information from the 
ATC-Wake Predictor and the ATC-Wake Monitoring & Alerting shall be displayed on the 
position of the ATCo's in such a way that he/she can use this information to make decisions. 
Each controller shall be informed about the separation mode (ICAO or ATC-Wake), 
separation criteria and when the different separation modes are active. On each airport there 
is some kind of an Information System available that informs controllers for example about 
the expected weather, operational runways etc. Anticipated is that this system will also be 
used to inform controllers about the above-mentioned ATC-Wake information.  
 
The most important task of an ATCo HMI is to inform the controller about the current 
situation, the changes in the near future and draw his/hers attention when something (seems 
to) go wrong. Very important is that the HMI will not add extra workload, is unambiguous and 
only used for which it is developed. In the case of the ATC-Wake project this means that the 
HMI shall not be used as separation tool. 
 
The ATC-Wake Predictor will determine for each aircraft in the so-called critical area the 
length of the vortex behind the aircraft, projected on the ILS. This information can be used to 
be displayed to the controller. Looking at the responsibilities of the controllers this information 
will be of interest of the (final) Approach controller and the Tower controller. For the Ground 
controller this information may be interesting but is not seen as necessary or useful. The 
information is displayed on a so-called PVD. This display shows information from the 
surveillance system and FDPS. Figure III is an example PVD display for the Tower controller. 
 
 
Figure 4-15 – Example PVD display Tower controller with Wake vortex info 
 
To maximise interoperability with existing systems all enhancements shall be an update of an 
already existing system. The proposed separation mode, separation criteria and time shall be 
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presented as an extension on the Information System already available to the ATCo for 
weather information and operational runways. For the Approach and Tower controller the 
Wake Vortex Vector and distance to preceding aircraft shall be displayed on their PVD 
according to the format in use. The Approach and Tower controller shall have the option to 
turn the WV vector on or off. The surveillance system delivers a track-id for each track. The 
ATC-Wake Predictor shall add the variable Wake vortex vector length to this track-id when it 
is in the critical area. The software that drives the PVD will use this information to draw the 
vector behind the aircraft. The same software shall calculate the slant range to the leading 
aircraft and present this information in the micro-label. Also the ATC-Wake Monitoring & 
Alerting system shall use the track-id to identify the aircraft involved and the corresponding 
alarm, and send this information to the PVD software. 
 
The system failure (alarm A) shall be handled according the common procedures at an 
airport in case of a system failure. Currently it is not clear how to handle alarm type B. The 
HMI shall use the same format as the other systems used by the ATCo. Only changes of the 
Approach and Tower controller are foreseen. 
4.8 Evaluation of Integrated System Design and Development 
Following the definition of the Operational Concept and System Requirements, WP2 on 
System Design and Evaluation has established an Integrated Platform as key intermediate 
step before the ATC-Wake system can be installed locally at an airport.  
 
The ATC-Wake Operational System comprises four new components, which interface with 
several existing and/or enhanced ATC systems. New ATC-Wake components, together 
constituting the Separation Advisory System (SAS), are: 
• ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner 
• ATC-Wake Predictor 
• ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting 
• ATC-Wake Detector. 
 
These components have been integrated successfully in the Integrated Platform, and it has 
been shown that the functional data flow defined in WP1 on System Requirements for all 
ATC-Wake Use Cases (Separation Mode Planning, Transition Phase, Approach Phase, and 
Departure Phase) can be realized in an Operational ATC System. 
 
The technical feasibility of the ATC-Wake system has been evaluated by experimental 
simulations with the Integrated Platform. It has been shown that the functional integration of 
the components is successful and it will be technically feasible to integrate wake vortex 
prediction/detection information into existing ATC systems.  
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Air Traffic Controller Human Machine Interfaces have been designed, specified, and 
tested successfully through two real-time simulation experiments with nine active controllers 
from five European countries. It has been shown that these HMIs are compliant with the 
HMIs currently used at key European airports (CdG and Schiphol). 
 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the Software Integration itself appeared to be 
much more difficult than anticipated. Furthermore, there are still some key issues that will 
need to be addressed in more detail before the ATC-Wake system can be installed 
locally at an airport: 
• The ATC-Wake Integrated Platform has been established using SPINEware middle-ware 
technology, enabling distributed use of the ATC-Wake components prepared by the 
consortium partners and running remotely at different sites. Next step will be to install all 
systems together at a single site, and to demonstrate its use in real-time. 
• The systems available for use as part of the ATC-Wake Detector (e.g. LiDAR and 
SODAR systems) meet certain performance requirements. It is not completely clear 
whether their accuracy, integrity, and reliability will be sufficient in all weather conditions. 
Their complementary use should be better understood (see Section 7). 
• The quality of the meteorological forecast (and now-casting) systems might need to be 
enhanced allowing frequent updates of the information provided to the ATC-Wake 
Separation Mode Planner and the ATC-Wake Predictor.  
 
Finally, it shall be mentioned that the proof of technical feasibility itself is not sufficient to 
draw a definite conclusion about the future use of ATC-Wake. Next steps will be to assess 
the potential safety and capacity improvements (in Section 5) and the operational feasibility 
(including interoperability with existing ATC-systems and usability and acceptability by the 
future users (air traffic controllers and pilots) (in Section 6). A technological implementation 
plan for IP exploitation is summarized in Section 7. 
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5 Safety and capacity analysis 
5.1 Objectives 
The overall objective of WP3 is to evaluate and quantify possible safety and capacity 
improvements when using the ATC-Wake system. Safe and appropriate separation minima 
are determined for single runways (approaches, departures, mixed mode operations) and 
closely spaced parallel runways. A variety of combinations of leader and follower aircraft, 
under different weather and operational conditions, will be evaluated. Such safety and 
capacity analysis will be executed for the situation when using this integrated system in 
combination with – and also without – instrumentation for on-board Wake vortex detection 
warning and avoidance system (from I-Wake). A comparison with S-Wake results for single 
runway approaches under current practice flight regulations shows the safety and capacity 
benefits of the integrated system (developed in ATC-Wake) and of the on-board 
instrumentation (developed in I-Wake).  
 
This work package comprises the following objectives / activities: 
• The definition of risk requirements and capacity aims; 
• The execution of a qualitative safety assessment of the ATC-Wake operational concept 
for different runway configurations; 
• The development of a mathematical model for the behaviour of humans (controllers, 
pilots) working with new Wake vortex avoidance systems; 
• The extension of an existing Wake vortex induced risk model and the associated safety 
and capacity analysis tool (evolving from S-Wake); 
• The development and implementation of a Separation Mode Planner; 
• The execution of a quantitative safety assessment (through fast-time simulations) of 
different aircraft operations on various runway configurations); 
• The validation of the safety assessment; 
• The evaluation of safe separation distances and capacity. 
5.2 Approach 
The overall approach taken is to start with the derivation of capacity aims, using a series of 
analytical tools and simulation platform developed by EUROCONTROL for providing 
performance predictions for the future ATM system. Introducing and/or planning changes to 
the ATM system cannot be done without showing that minimum safety requirements will be 
satisfied. In this respect, the wake vortex risk requirements used for the ATC-Wake safety 
assessments will be derived from (i.e. aim to satisfy) the ESARR 4 requirements posed by 
the EUROCONTROL’s SRC.  
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The ATC-Wake safety assessment will be performed in two steps. The first step consists of a 
qualitative safety assessment, so as to identify the hazards and safety bottlenecks 
associated with the proposed operation. This allows for an improvement of the ATC-Wake 
concept, which will then be analysed quantitatively through the use of the NLR Wake Vortex 
Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) methodology and toolset. This second step includes 
estimation of the newly proposed ATC-Wake (reduced) separation minima under favourable 
operational and weather conditions. Evaluation of Wake vortex separation distances have 
been conducted using 3 approaches:  
(1) Experimental flight test data,  
(2) Historic operational data, and  
(3) Analytical models.  
 
As the ATC-Wake system and operation is still in the design phase, this study follows the 
third approach. The intention is to build sufficient safety confidence, enabling the decision 
makers to decide on operational testing and implementation.  
5.3 Determining Wake vortex separation standards 
Prior to the introduction of large wide-body jets, Wake vortex upsets or turbulence 
encounters by a trailing aircraft were considered to be “prop-wash” or “jet wash” and not 
considered a flight hazard. The introduction of large wide-body turbojet aircraft with 
increased weight and wingspan in the late 1960’s changed this perception and initiated the 
detailed study of Wake vortices and their impact on trailing aircraft. In mid 1969 a series of 
flight test experiments were conducted by Boeing and the FAA to generate detailed 
information on the Wake vortex phenomenon. By using smoke towers and probing aircraft, 
the Wake vortices of a B747 and B707-320C were characterized.  
 
This data provided the basis for Wake vortex separation rules adopted by ICAO/FAA: 
• VFR rules – following aircraft remain above of the flight path of the leading aircraft 
• IFR rules – minimum radar-controlled Wake separation distances were established for 
the following aircraft based on the weight of the lead and follow aircraft 
 
Although under IFR rules aircraft were categorized by weight, the data from these studies 
identified that a more technically correct way to establish categories of aircraft is by wingspan 
of the trailing aircraft. This was considered impractical to implement and was dropped in 
favour of categorization by weight. With a few exceptions, weight exhibits relatively good 
correlation with wingspan. 
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A variety of methodologies for Determining Wake Vortex Separation Minima exist: 
• Experimental Flight Test 
The original separation distances for IFR were established based on the “worst case” 
Wake vortex turbulence measurements from the flight test described above, at high 
altitude with low ambient turbulence. Due to the expectation that the increased ambient 
turbulence would disrupt the Wake vortices, the actual distances were slightly reduced 
versions of these “worst case” distances. 
• Historic Operational (VFR) Data Analysis 
Historical data showing the fact that safe operations were consistently conducted 
between 1976 and 1994 by aircraft operating under “see-and-avoid” VFR separation 
rules at distances below the IFR separation regulations, was used as basis for reduction 
of the separation distance between aircraft lighter than the B757 to 2.5 Nm. 
• Safety Assessment based on Analytical Modelling 
An alternative procedure for determining safe separation distances uses a probabilistic 
approach to assess the Wake vortex induced risk between aircraft. Here, the approach is 
to account for statistical variations, taking into account stochastic models of Wake vortex 
generation, Wake vortex encounter, and aircraft/pilot and controller responses. 
Simulation data from all the models is combined to determine the probability and severity 
of a Wake encounter for a given separation time and under different operational and 
weather conditions. 
 
The third method uses probabilistic risk assessment techniques to establish safe separation 
distances on the basis of a predefined risk requirement (target level of safety). As such, this 
method can also be used to assess the safety of newly proposed Wake vortex avoidance 
concepts, systems, and procedures. The approach followed and the improvements made, 
are addressed and described in the following sub-sections. 
5.4 Capacity aims 
Capacity increase may impact the overall air transport network – using “delay” and “access” 
as the measures of performance impact. EUROCONTROL has developed a series of 
analytical tools and simulation platforms useful for providing performance predictions for the 
future ATM system. The aim of such tools is to provide a consolidated performance 
prediction in terms of delay at the European level given a number of potential scenarios 
concerning the evolution of both capacity and demand. The analytic environment is indicated 
in Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1 – EUROCONTROL simulation platform for ATM performance predictions 
 
At the heart of the analytic environment is an ATFM simulator that simulates the slot 
allocation process of the CFMU. The model therefore takes as input both ‘supply-side’ 
(capacity) and demand-side (individual flight plans) data and allocates departure slots in the 
same way as the CFMU. These tools represent the only such European-wide analytical 
environment capable of faithfully replicating the operations of the CFMU and resultant 
network interaction. Using the above framework, it is possible to assess the impact on ATFM 
delay and system access at a chosen time horizon resulting from changes in the “supply-
side” (airport capacity limits). As the time horizon for performance analysis becomes more 
protracted, the quality of the predictions concerning traffic growth and capacity provision 
necessarily decrease. More than ever-such performance predictions should be considered in 
the framework of a ‘what-if’ rather than as a prediction of the future state of the ATM network. 
Nevertheless, the principal aim is not to attempt to provide detailed performance predictions, 
but rather to provide indications of the potential sensitivity of the ATM network to changes in 
the balance between demand and supply (flight numbers, available capacity).  
 
The process is illustrated in Figure 5-2. Basically, the methodology consists of 7 steps: 
Step A Development of the Baseline Scenarios 
Step B Traffic Growth Forecasts (STATFOR) 
Step C Traffic Augmentation Methodology  
Step D Airport capacities and unaccommodated demand 
Step E En-route capacity evolution 
Step F Airport capacity scenarios study 
Step G Performance predictions 
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Figure 5-2 – EUROCONTROL methodology for determining airport capacity aims 
 
Several scenarios with 5%, 10% and 15% additional (over and above that of the “do-nothing” 
scenario) capacity increases in 10 targets airports in the ECAC region have been simulated. 
The following future traffic samples were built:  
• 2010 & 2015 samples with airport capacity increases corresponding to those known to 
EUROCONTROL (baseline case). 
• 2010 and 2015 with a 5% increase in capacity surplus for the target airports. 
• 2010 and 2015 with a 10% in capacity surplus for the target airports  
• 2010 and 2015 with a 15% incapacity surplus for the target airports  
 
The benefit of the capacity increases for each of 10 major European airports for 2010 is 
given in detail in D3_1. We observe that the capacity increases in those airports manifest 
themselves in two different ways: the delay reduction and more accommodated flights. The 
combination of these two effects depends on the characteristics of each airport, relating 
mainly to the daily traffic distribution and the significance of the lack of capacity. In general 
terms, we usually observe that the higher the number of new accommodated flights, the 
lower is the delay reduction. Figures 5-3 and 5-4 below gives the resulting reduction of the 
airport delays (red bars) and the en-route delays (yellow bars) for the whole ECAC region for 
2010 and 2015 respectively. At the ECAC level, for 2010 a significant reduction in airport 
delays at the global level can be observed: 8.5% for 5% and 26% for 15% compare to the 
“do nothing” scenario. We note that the En-Route delay remains almost constant. For 2015, 
an increase of 15% of the capacity in the 10 target airports implies a reduction of 32% of the 
airport delays on the ECAC zone. 
 
If we look more in detail, we can note that for a big part of the airports studied, the capacity 
increase implies essentially a reduction of delay with a very limited impact in terms of 
accommodated flights. For 9 of 10 airports (the exception being Madrid), the additional 
number of flights that can be accommodated is less then 3% and often close to 0. 
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Figure 5-3 – Airport delay change for 2010 
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Figure 5-4 – Airport delay change for 2015 
5.5 Risk requirements 
 
5.5.1 Overview of ATC-Wake approach 
Introducing and/or planning changes to the ATM system cannot be done without showing 
that minimum risk requirements will be satisfied. This can be done through a qualitative 
and/or quantitative safety assessment. The main issue is the choice of the safety criteria. 
The risk assessments in the ATC-Wake project intend to be compliant with the ESARR 4 
requirements posed by EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulation Commisssion (SRC).  
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Following the ESARR4, a safety assessment requires the following risk criteria aspects: 
• A severity classification, 
• A frequency classification, 
• A risk tolerability scheme. 
 
The ESARR 4 requirements also states that a combination of quantitative (e.g., mathematical 
model, statistical analysis) and qualitative (e.g. good working processes, professional 
judgement) arguments may be used to provide the required level of assurance that safety 
objectives and requirements have been met. To assess safe and appropriate separation 
minima, a quantitative assessment will need to be performed.  
 
In the ATC-Wake qualitative safety assessment, the ESARR 4 severity classification, will be 
used. Five severity classes are distinguished: accident, serious incident, major incident, 
significant incident, no safety effect. The definitions of occurrence, accident, and incident are 
specified in the ESARR2 (see also Section 6). 
 
For execution of the quantitative safety assessment, the Wake vortex risk management 
framework defined in the S-Wake project will be used. Here, incident/accident risk 
probabilities will be determined followed by a comparison with risk criteria. The following 
classification, which is based on ICAO Annex 13 for incident/ accident investigation and JAR 
25.1309 for aircraft system hazard categorisation, will be used: 
• Catastrophic accident: aircraft encountering Wake hits the ground, with loss of life; 
• Hazardous accident: the Wake vortex encounter results in one or more on-board fatalities 
or serious injuries (but no crash into the ground); 
• Major incident: the Wake vortex encounter results in one or more non-serious injuries, but 
no fatality, on-board the encountering aircraft; 
• Minor incident: the Wake encounter results in inconvenience to occupants or an increase 
in crew workload. 
 
The method proposes that all four risk requirements are to be satisfied, i.e. the most stringent 
requirement will determine the required separation minima (see Table 5-1).  
 
Table 5-1 – Risk requirements (per queued aircraft movement) 
             Risk event Proposed Target Levels of Safety 
             Catastrophic Accident 0.9 × 10-8 
             Hazardous Accident 3.0 × 10-7 
             Major Incident 1.0 × 10-5 
             Minor Incident 5.0 × 10-4 
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This approach supports two commonly accepted rationales for acceptance of a new system 
(or procedure) by showing that the number of Wake vortex induced risk events: 
• does not exceed some pre-defined, and agreed upon, safety requirement; 
• does not increase with the introduction of a new ATM procedure. 
Nevertheless, this approach still needs to be further harmonised with the ESARR4. 
5.5.2 Elaboration of ESARR4 requirements 
ESARR 4 documentation has been used to derive appropriate risk criteria for use in the ATC-
Wake qualitative safety assessment. In this respect, the results intend to be compliant with 
the ESARRs. The severity classification is taken directly from the ESARR4 (Table 5-2). The 
frequency classification has been derived from the ESARRs to judge the acceptability of a 
number of conflict scenarios that may occur. 
 
Table 5-2 – ESARR 4 severity classification scheme in ATM 
Severity class 
Number Term 
Examples of effects on operation 
1 ACCIDENT • One or more catastrophic accidents. 
• One or more mid-air collisions. 
• One or more collisions on the ground between two aircraft. 
• One or more Controlled Flight Into Terrain. 
• Total loss of flight control. 
No independent source of recovery mechanism, such as surveillance 
or ATC and/or flight crew procedures can reasonably be expected to 
prevent the accidents. 
2 SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
• Large reduction in separation (e.g., a separation of less than half 
the separation minima), without crew or ATC fully controlling the 
situation or able to recover from the situation. 
• One or more aircraft deviating from their intended clearance, so 
that abrupt manoeuvre is required to avoid collision with another 
aircraft or with terrain (or when an avoidance action would be 
appropriate). 
3 MAJOR 
INCIDENT 
• Large reduction (e.g., a separation of less than half the separation 
minima) in separation with crew or ATC controlling the situation 
and able to recover from the situation 
• Minor reduction (e.g., a separation of more than half the separation 
minima) in separation without crew or ATC fully controlling the 
situation (without the use of collision or terrain avoidance 
manoeuvres). 
4 SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
• Increasing workload of the air traffic controller or aircraft flight crew, 
or slightly degrading the functional capability of the enabling CNS 
system. 
• Minor reduction (e.g., a separation of more than half the separation 
minima) in separation with crew or ATC fully controlling the 
situation and fully able to recover from the situation. 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
71 
 
 
5 NO SAFETY 
EFFECT 
No hazardous condition, i.e., no immediate direct or indirect impact on 
the operations. 
Frequency classification 
In the ATC-Wake qualitative safety assessment, frequency classes need to be defined for 
severity outcomes of conflict scenarios. The severity and frequency classes together are 
used to define risk tolerability. The ESARR 4 requirements do not specify these frequency 
classes, but only provide the maximum tolerable probability of ATM directly contributing to an 
accident of a Commercial Air Transport aircraft. The ESARR 4 requirements currently leave 
freedom to define the details of risk criteria that are required to conduct a safety assessment, 
such as maximum tolerable probabilities of incidents and risk budgets of conflict scenarios.  
 
According to the ESARR 4 requirements, the maximum tolerable probability of ATM directly 
contributing to an accident of a Commercial Air Transport aircraft is 1.55×10-8 accidents per 
flight hour or 2.31×10-8 accidents per flight. These maximum tolerable probabilities are based 
on: 
• historical accident data in the ECAC region over the period 1988 to 1999, 
• a target for the maximum ATM direct contribution to the total number of accidents of 2%, 
which is based on historical data for accidents with at least one ATC primary cause and a 
factor that accounts for allowance of variations in the scope of source data (ATS, ASM 
and ATFM in addition to ATC), for statistical error, and for adopting a conservative 
approach to offer additional protection to the future, 
• requirement that the number of accidents in 2015 may not be higher than in 1999, 
• an annual traffic increase of 6.7% for the period 1999 to 2015. 
 
The scope of the current qualitative safety assessment is wider than accidents and incidents 
with a direct ATM contribution, such as used in the ESARR 4 requirements. It is not limited to 
occurrences where at least one ATM event or item was judged to be directly in the causal 
chain of events, but aims to cover ATM direct and indirect occurrences. However, a 
maximum tolerable accident probability of ATM indirectly contributing to an accident of a 
Commercial Air Transport aircraft has not been specified by the ESARR4 requirements. It is 
now proposed to use the target of 1.55×10-8 accidents per flight hour or 2.31x10-8 accidents 
per flight is for the maximum tolerable probability for accidents with direct and indirect ATM 
contributions. This is a conservative approach, which obviously implies that the ESARR4 
requirements are satisfied. 
 
The target levels of safety are expressed in occurrences per flight. The current qualitative 
safety assessment does not consider the risk of a whole flight, but considers the risk of the 
ATC-Wake operations. As such it is needed to determine what budget of the total ATM 
related risk of 2.31x10-8 accidents per flight can be provided to the presently assessed 
operations. In the ATC-Wake qualitative safety assessment the risk is evaluated per conflict 
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scenario. For this purpose, it is assumed that the ATM related risks of a whole flight can be 
represented by 25 conflict scenarios, and that each has an equal risk budget. Using these 
assumptions the maximum tolerable probability of an ATM related accident is about 1×10-9 
accidents per conflict scenario. In line with risk criteria of JAA, in the qualitative safety 
assessment it is assumed that the maximum tolerable probabilities of serious and major 
incidents are, respectively, a factor 1×102 and 1×104 higher than for accidents. The frequency 
terms and the associated probabilities as derived in this section are shown in Table 5-3. 
 
Table 5-3 – Frequency categories used in this study 
Frequency category Probability of occurrence 
PROBABLE Higher than 10-5
 
per conflict scenario 
REMOTE Between 10-7
 
and 10-5 per conflict scenario 
EXTREMELY REMOTE Between 10-9
 
and 10-7 per conflict scenario 
EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE Lower than 10-9 per conflict scenario 
5.6 Overview of qualitative risk assessment methodology 
The risks associated with the ATC-Wake operation will be assessed using NLR’s Qualitative 
Safety Assessment methodology. This methodology is based on structured use of 
operational experts' judgement, supplemented with historical data, if available. 
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Figure 5-5 – Stepwise overview of the qualitative safety assessment methodology 
 
In step 0 the objective of the study is determined, as well as the safety context, the scope 
and the level of detail of the assessment. The actual safety assessment starts by determining 
the operation that is assessed (step 1). Next, hazards associated with the operation are 
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identified (step 2), and clustered into conflict scenarios (step 3). Using severity and frequency 
assessments (steps 4 and 5), the risk associated with each conflict scenario is classified 
(step 6). For each conflict scenario with a (possibly) UNACCEPTABLE risk, safety 
bottlenecks are identified (step 7), which can help operational concept developers to find 
improvements for the operation. Should such an improvement be made, a new cycle of the 
safety assessment should be performed to investigate whether all risks have decreased to 
an acceptable level. A risk tolerability matrix specifies the acceptability of the risk of an 
occurrence for a conflict scenario, based on combination of its severity and frequency. The 
matrix in Table 5-4 is used. 
 
Table 5-4 – Risk tolerability matrix for accident and incidents 
Severity 
Frequency 
ACCIDENT SERIOUS INCIDENT MAJOR INCIDENT SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
PROBABLE UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE TOLERABLE 
REMOTE UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE TOLERABLE NEGLIGIBLE 
EXTREMELY 
REMOTE 
UNACCEPTABLE TOLERABLE NEGLIGIBLE NEGLIGIBLE 
EXTREMELY 
IMPROBABLE 
TOLERABLE NEGLIGIBLE NEGLIGIBLE NEGLIGIBLE 
 
In the assessment, any operational aspect fully satisfying requirements from for instance 
ICAO and EUROCONTROL are assumed to have no unacceptable risks associated with them. 
In particular, in some cases risks are assessed using comparisons to the current operations. 
In these cases, it is assumed that the current operation has a TOLERABLE risk at most, unless 
the operational expert interviews indicate that this is not the case 
5.7 Overview of quantitative risk assessment methodology 
 
5.7.1 Introduction 
For a quantitative assessment of the Wake vortex induced risk related to the ATC-Wake 
operation with reduced separation, there are three main issues to consider:  
• The controller working with the ATC-Wake system has to instruct the pilot to initiate a 
Wake vortex avoidance maneouvre, in case an ATC-Wake warning/alert is raised. 
• If one or more ATC-WAKE system components provides wrong or erroneous advice, 
there will be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) Wake vortices. The consequences 
might be CATASTROPHIC, because reduced separation is applied. 
• The separation distance/time will vary along the flight track, and will usually not be 
exactly the same as the separation minima advised by the Separation Mode Planner. 
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The 'classical' WAVIR methodology, which originates from S-Wake, is used to assess Wake 
vortex induced risk in case ATC-Wake is not working. In this case, no Wake vortex 
avoidance manoeuvre is performed by the aircraft/pilot., i.e. worst case conditions apply. 
To assess the risk related to the ATC-Wake operation, WAVIR is extended with a graph and 
decision theory based model structure. A variety mathematical models and techniques 
(including fault trees, discrete and continuous Bayesian Belief Nets and vines, and Petri 
Nets) are introduced to incorporate the role of humans working with ATC-Wake. The details 
of the mathematical model are described in ATC-Wake D3_5b. 
5.7.2 General description of the WAVIR Toolset 
WAVIR (Wake Vortex Induced Risk assessment) is a stand-alone risk assessment method, 
based on a modular approach (see the Figure below) in which vortex severity, Wake 
encounter severity, and incident/accident risk are being determined subsequently.  
 
Figure 5-6 – Wake Vortex Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) model 
Basically it is a three step approach. First evolution of the Wake vortex generated by a 
leading aircraft is calculated at a given number of gates along the approach or departure 
path. From this the relative position and strength of the Wake vortex can be determined at 
the time that a following aircraft passes the defined gates. Secondly, the effect of the Wake 
on the passing (i.e. follower) aircraft is determined. Depending on the aircraft model used this 
is expressed either in a single disturbance parameter (induced roll angle) or a combination of 
disturbances (in the lateral and vertical axes). Finally these disturbances are translated to a 
certain hazard category. The set-up of the model allows Monte Carlo simulations, with 
varying meteorological conditions, aircraft types, etc. to estimate the frequencies of certain 
risk events in a certain scenario. This can then be compared with a target level of safety in 
order to establish the anticipated acceptability of the operation. WAVIR has been used in S-
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Wake to assess the Wake vortex safety of current practice single runway operations. In ATC-
Wake, WAVIR has been extended to cover the whole airport environment (including 
departures). Here, the roles and reaction times of humans (pilots, controllers) working with 
Wake vortex concepts and procedures is explicitly modelled and analysed. 
5.8 Qualitative safety assessment 
 
5.8.1 Introduction 
A qualitative safety assessment has been performed to get a global overview of the risks 
associated with the proposed ATC-Wake operation for single runway arrivals, single runway 
departures and closely spaced parallel runway departures. Moreover, in this way safety 
bottlenecks are fed back to the operation designers at an early stage, and this enables 
further focussing in the safety modelling activities and quantitative safety assessment that 
are also planned within this work package. In line with the ATC-Wake operation, the 
assessment is restricted to the following sub-operations: 
• end of cruise to final approach; 
• arrivals to single runway; 
• arrivals to closely spaced parallel runways; and 
• departures from single runway. 
 
The assessment has been limited to the risks air traffic participants are running, and for 
which air traffic control bears responsibility. This for instance excludes risks experienced by 
people living on the ground, or risks not related to ATC. The assessment did not only 
concern Wake vortex risks; also other risks (as for instance collision risk) related to ATC-
Wake aspects of the operation were considered. 
5.8.2 Identification of hazards and conflict scenarios 
In various brainstorming sessions with operational experts, hazards have been identified that 
could occur in the considered operation. After the identification of hazards, these hazards 
have been structured into conflict scenarios, which describe all relevant ways how these 
hazards may lead to conflicts or worsen them. The conflict scenarios are: 
I.  Wake vortex encounter during departure 
II. Wake vortex encounter during single runway arrival 
III. Missed approach during single runway arrival 
IV. Wake vortex encounter before ILS interception 
V. Wake vortex encounter during arrivals on closely spaced parallel runway 
VI. Missed approach during arrivals on closely spaced parallel runways 
VII. Higher traffic rates in TMA, holding, sector, or on runway 
VIII. Turbulence 
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IX. More landings in crosswind 
X. Transitions between ICAO and ATC-Wake separation mode 
XI. Effects on ICAO separation mode 
 
Not all scenarios apply to each of the three operations: Single runway departure, single 
runway arrival, closely spaced parallel runway arrival. For single runway departures, only 
conflict scenario I does apply. Scenarios II, III, and IV specifically apply to the single runway 
arrival operation. Scenarios V and VI specifically apply to the closely spaced parallel runway 
operation. Each scenario is constructed from several events or clusters of events, where 
each event represents a set of identified hazards. 
5.8.3 Effect of failures of the ATC-Wake System Components 
Table 5-5 provides an assessment of the effect of the main system failures. The individual 
classifications are based on the assumption that other failure conditions do not occur. A 
simultaneous failure of two system components could aggravate the situation. 
 
Table 5-5 – Effect of main ATC-Wake DWA conditions 
Description Effect Classification Comment 
Pilot/aircraft not able to turn 
timely  
The pilot/aircraft is not able to 
timely perform the DWA 
maneouvre, after it is requested 
by the controller. This could occur 
in case of a warning when the 
aircraft is still in initial take off, ie 
limitations in bank angle  apply 
An unfavourable change of 
weather (not enough crosswind) 
is passed on by the controller to 
the pilot. The pilot is prepared for 
a potential severe Wake 
encounter, and may be able to 
control the situation. 
Nevertheless, control problems 
could still occur. 
MAJOR - 
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
A Wake is stronger 
closer to the generating 
aircraft. An encounter 
with reduced separation 
will result in more 
severe consequence 
than in ICAO Mode. The 
pilot is prepared for a 
WV. 
Controller does not provide a 
timely warning to the pilot 
The controller does not provide a 
timely warning to the pilot, for 
example because he does not 
hear an aural warning or misses a 
visual warning. ATC-Wake 
provides an alert, but ATCo is not 
aware of it and does not ask the 
pilot to initiate a turn 
An unfavourable change of 
weather (not enough crosswind) 
is not passed on to the pilot. The 
pilot will be unprepared for severe 
turbulence, i.e might experience 
control problems in close 
proximity to the ground. 
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
The Wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with reduced 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations.  
Faulty or Inaccurate Separation 
Mode Planner Advise 
The advise provided by a 
Separation Mode Planner is 
wrong or inaccurate. The ATC 
supervisor, not being aware of it, 
might decide to implement ATC-
Wake Mode, with reduced 
separation although the weather 
conditions are not favourable 
(e.g. no crosswind). 
There will be an alert for (nearly) 
every aircraft departing or 
arriving, resulting in a high rate of 
initiated Wake vortex avoidance 
instructions (e.g. missed 
approaches during arrivals). The 
ATC workload increases, and 
Most likely a transition will be 
made very quickly to the ICAO 
Separation Mode. 
SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
It could take a few 
minutes before the 
transition to ICAO Mode 
is made  
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Description Effect Classification Comment 
Loss of Wake Vortex DWA 
Tactical Function 
The ATC-Wake Monitoring and 
Alerting system is not operational 
and provides no function. The 
controllers, not being aware of it, 
are expecting the system to warn 
in case of a discrepancy between 
prediction & detection 
information. 
The controllers will not receive an 
alert in case ATC-Wake 
separation is no longer suitable. 
The aircraft may encounter 
severe turbulence which may 
lead to control problems in close 
proximity to the ground. 
 
 
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
The Wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with reduced 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations. 
Faulty or Inaccurate WV Model 
Estimation 
The predictions of Wake vortex 
locations and/or strengths made 
by the WV Model, on the basis of 
aircraft data and meteo data are 
inaccurate/wrong.  
Incorrect information is passed to 
the ATC-Wake Predictor, causing 
improper functioning. The 
predicted Wake Vortex Vector will 
be wrong, and an alert might be 
generated on the basis of false 
information. There will be an 
increase of workload. 
 
SIGNIFICANT - 
MAJOR INCIDENT 
Alert is generated 
because there is a 
discrepancy between 
prediction and detection 
information. This is 
unlikely to occur at low 
altitudes if Meteo 
Nowcast and Predictor 
are working. 
Faulty or Inaccurate Air Traffic 
Situation 
The air traffic situation provided 
by the surveillance systems is 
wrong or inaccurate. The 
controllers will most likely not be 
aware that the wrong leader or 
aircraft data is used in the ATC-
Wake Predictor and on the HMI. 
Incorrect information is passed to 
the ATC-Wake Predictor, causing 
improper functioning. The 
predicted Wake Vortex Vector will 
be wrong, and an alert might be 
generated on the basis of false 
information. Most likely a 
transition will be made to the 
ICAO Separation Mode. There 
will be an increase of workload of 
ATC. 
SIGNIFICANT  
INCIDENT 
The ATC-Wake 
separation Mode is 
based on a worst case 
combination of a Heavy 
leader aircraft and a 
Light follower aircraft.  
Faulty or Inaccurate Meteo 
Now-casting Information 
The nowcasted meteorological 
conditions are inaccurate or 
wrong. The controllers will most 
likely not be aware of a sudden 
unfavourable change of the wind.  
Incorrect information is passed to 
the ATC-Wake Predictor, causing 
improper functioning. The 
predicted Wake vortex transport 
is wrong. An unfavourable 
change of weather (not enough 
crosswind) is not detected. The 
aircraft may encounter severe 
turbulence, which may lead to 
control problems in close 
proximity to ground 
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
The Wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with reduced 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO separation. 
Wake Vortex outside Detection 
Range and/or Scanning Volume 
The Wake vortices generated by 
the leader aircraft are not 
detected, when they are outside 
the scanning volume of the ATC-
Wake Detector. As the WV 
detection information suddenly 
disappears, there is an indication 
and ATCos will be informed of the 
failure. 
No Wake vortex information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Detector, causing improper 
functioning. As the ATC 
supervisor and the air traffic 
controllers will likely become 
aware quickly that there will not 
be an alert, a transition will be 
made to the ICAO Separation 
Mode. There will be an increase 
of workload of ATC. 
 
SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
It could take a few 
minutes before the 
transition to ICAO Mode 
is made.  
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Description Effect Classification Comment 
Faulty or Inaccurate Detection 
of the Wake Vortices 
The Wake vortices generated by 
the leader aircraft are 
inaccurately or not detected, 
because of a failure of the ATC-
Wake Detector. 
Incorrect information is used by 
ATC-Wake Detector, causing 
improper functioning. Wake 
Vortices are not detected. There 
will be an alert if the Wake Vortex 
Vector generated by the ATC-
Wake Predictor indicates a 
potential Wake encounter. There 
will then be an increase of 
workload. 
SIGNICANT  - 
MAJOR INCIDENT 
Alert is generated 
because there is a 
discrepancy between 
prediction and detection 
information. This is 
unlikely to occur at low 
altitudes if Meteo 
Nowcast and Predictor 
are working. 
 
According to ESARR4, failure conditions with severe consequences must be extremely 
improbable, and minor failure conditions may be probable. It is noted that a simultaneous 
failure of two main system components may aggravate the situation. 
5.8.4  Risk assessment per conflict scenario 
Using operational experts’ judgement and knowledge from other studies, for each of the 
eleven conflict scenarios the severity and the frequency have been assessed. Using the risk 
criteria developed in Section 5.5, an evaluation of the acceptability of the risk of each 
scenario was given. Table 5-6 provides all identified conflict scenarios and indicates for 
which scenarios potential SAFETY BOTTLENECKS exist (i.e. safety objectives may need to 
be determined. For all conflict scenarios with potential UNACCEPTABLE risks, it could not 
be ruled out that the risk also potentially is TOLERABLE or NEGLIGIBLE. 
 
Table 5-6 – Overview of potential SAFETY BOTTLENECKS for the conflict scenarios  
Potential SAFETY BOTTLECK in the ATC-
Wake operation 
Conflict scenario 
Single 
runway 
departure 
Single 
runway 
arrival 
CSPR 
arrival 
Wake vortex encounter during departure Yes NA NA 
Wake vortex encounter during single runway arrival NA Yes NA 
Missed approach during single runway arrival NA No NA 
Wake vortex encounter before ILS interception NA No No 
Wake vortex encounter during arrivals on CSPRs NA NA Yes 
Missed approach during arrivals on CSPRs NA NA No 
Higher traffic rates in TMA, holding, sector, or on runway Yes Yes Yes 
Turbulence No No No 
More landings in crosswind NA Yes* Yes* 
Transitions between ICAO & ATC-Wake separation mode Yes* Yes* Yes* 
Effects on ICAO separation mode Yes* Yes* Yes* 
* The risk tolerability of these conflict scenarios could not be assessed in detail. 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
79 
 
 
5.8.5 Identification of safety bottlenecks 
The possibility of UNACCEPTABLE risk could not be ruled out in the conflict scenarios I, II, 
V, VII, IX, X and XI. This is potentially caused by so-called safety bottlenecks: hazards which 
cause the conflict scenario to have a risk that might be UNACCEPTABLE. The safety 
bottlenecks in the concerned conflict scenarios are discussed next. 
 
In conflict scenario I (Wake vortex encounter during departure), identified potential safety 
bottlenecks are: 
• Supervisors may not follow the advice of the ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner and 
tend to deviate to the unsafe side, for example for efficiency reasons; 
• Controllers may not comply with the prescribed separation and give a take-off clearance 
too early, for instance due to a timing error; 
• Controllers may not pay sufficient attention to the visualisation tool and react properly on 
an alert, because TWR controllers are used to work based on their outside view, 
specifically in VMC. 
In the departure operation the risk is mainly expected in the area just after lift-off, though also 
the area around the first turn may bear a significant risk. 
 
In conflict scenario II (Wake vortex encounter during single runway arrival), an identified 
potential safety bottleneck is: 
• Controllers may use the Wake vortex visualisation system as a separation tool (although 
this is not the objective of the tool), possibly leading to insufficient spacing. 
It is expected that the highest risk occurs on the final approach (from 4Nm to threshold) while 
the area where the ILS intercept takes place is also prone to Wake encounters. 
 
Conflict scenario V (Wake vortex encounter during arrivals on closely spaced parallel 
runway) is expected to be less safety critical than conflict scenario II. Identified potential 
safety bottlenecks are: 
• Controllers may use the Wake vortex visualisation system as a separation tool (although 
this is not the objective of the tool), possibly leading to insufficient spacing; 
• The use of a single controller for the two runways. 
 
In conflict scenario VII (Higher traffic rates in TMA), holding, sector or on runway, identified 
potential safety bottlenecks are:  
• Frequency congestion due to the expected increase in R/T load. This increase is 
expected firstly because of the additional information that needs to be given to the pilots, 
and secondly to the increase in traffic rates that is expected.  
• Collision risk on the runway, because of the application of reduced separation criteria to 
all pairs of aircraft, irrespective of the aircraft types. If the ATC-Wake mode separation 
distance does not sufficiently take into account the runway occupancy time of Heavy 
aircraft, this is expected to lead to an increased collision risk on the runway. If the ATC-
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Wake mode separation distance would safely account for the runway occupancy time of 
Heavy aircraft, then the use of this separation distance for all aircraft types is not 
expected to support the capacity increase envisioned by the ATC-Wake operation. 
 
In conflict scenario IX (More landings in crosswind) a potential safety bottleneck is: 
• Adapted runway selection criteria may favour landing in crosswinds of 10 to 15 knots and 
higher above landing in headwind. 
 
In conflict scenario X (Transitions between ICAO and ATC-Wake separation mode) potential 
safety bottlenecks are: 
• Too frequent or sudden mode transitions;  
• Too much information exchange in a transition.  
 
In conflict scenario XI (Effects on ICAO separation mode) a potential safety bottleneck is: 
• The possible use of the ATC-Wake visualisation system as a separation tool. This may 
be the case if the system is available to the controllers in the ICAO separation mode. 
 
For the other scenarios no UNACCEPTABLE risks were identified. These scenarios are: 
III. Missed approach during single runway arrival 
IV. Wake vortex encounter before ILS interception 
VI. Missed approach during arrivals on closely spaced parallel runways 
VIII. Turbulence 
5.8.6 Enhancements of the ATC-Wake operation 
Comments and recommendations on elements related to the ATC-Wake operation were 
given by some operational and safety experts in the review of this study. These may be 
valuable for the further design and implementation of the ATC-Wake operation as they may 
contribute to the resolution or mitigation of the potential safety bottlenecks. The hazard 
identification and the analysis of hazards and conflict scenarios have however been 
performed for an operation in which these aspects were not (yet) present. Since for these 
aspects it was not straightforward to identify whether they would introduce any new hazards 
to the operation, they have not been taken into account. These aspects are: 
• In addition to the assumption that airborne equipment for Wake vortex detection, as the I-
Wake system may in future function as a safety-net to the ATC-Wake system, it is 
remarked that such an I-Wake system would not be considered as a potential mitigation 
mean in a future safety assessment but would act as a last safety resort. 
• In view of the not stabilised description of atmospheric conditions for which one of the two 
envisaged separation modes (ICAO Mode or ATC-Wake Mode) must be used, it is 
strongly recommended to focus the further elaboration of weather classes on 
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atmospheric conditions that are relatively easy to forecast (prediction of wind climatology 
is easy, whereas atmospheric turbulence and stratification are difficult to forecast). 
• In view of the visual contact between two consecutive landing aircraft that has to be 
confirmed as soon as the second aircraft intercepts ILS, as proposed in the operation, it 
is noted that this may be more important on final approach such that the following aircraft 
can see if the preceding aircraft has vacated the runway or has initiated a go-around. 
• In addition to what is proposed with respect to ATIS in the operation, it is very important 
that ATIS information also includes information on the ATC Wake Procedure 
(meteorological and visuals conditions) and the possibility that there might be an alert 
due to low separation. 
• In addition to what is proposed with respect to SMGCS in the operation, A-SMGCS may 
be required as well for the ATC-Wake operation, to provide the controller with aircraft 
position and identification on a radar display. Such facility may be required as higher 
landing rates or departure rates may be expected in the ATC-Wake operation. 
• In order to safely support reduced separation, the detection information shall also have a 
high level of integrity and continuity of service in addition to accuracy. This substantiates 
the need for an ATC-Wake monitoring and alerting system. 
• In view of the information that "deviation from separation by the ATCo seems to be daily 
practice", in the training for new operations it should be explained that current practice 
operations were designed with large embedded safety buffers because of the 
uncertainties of the systems and about the raw information. Less additional buffer is 
expected on new operations that will be designed on more accurate raw data. 
• TCAS is used to estimate distances with an accuracy of about 1 NM. However, bearing 
information is only relative bearing and is very uncertain. Relative bearing must not be 
used to estimate the track of the other aircraft. This is normally part of the TCAS training 
but it should be emphasized for Wake vortex training. In fact, there could be a 
requirement to have an airborne system enabling to monitor the spacing distance with the 
preceding aircraft (see http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/WG4.htm). 
5.9 Quantitative safety assessment 
 
5.9.1 Overview of the simulation scenarios 
The set up and results of the quantitative risk assessment of the ATC-Wake operation are 
obtained using the quantitative risk assessment methodology described in Section 5.3. The 
assessments have been performed for the "current practice", i.e. without the use of an ATC-
Wake system, and also for the proposed ATC-Wake operation. Three studies have been 
carried out: 
• Single runway arrivals  
• Single runway departures 
• Closely spaced parallel runway arrivals 
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Basically, the scenarios that have been set up differ in: 
• Generator – follower aircraft combination; 
• Wind velocity (direction and strength); 
• Separation distance or time. 
 
These are called ‘assessment parameters’. A simulation scenario is defined by all the 
parameters and variables in the WAVIR tool-set. The main deterministic parameters and 
stochastic variables and their values in the different scenarios are presented below. 
Longitudinal positions along the flight track 
Analysis of wake induced risk is done in a number of longitudinal positions up to 10 Nm from 
the runway thresholds. From the qualitative analysis it appears that the following areas might 
be the most dangerous: the area close to the ground, the area encompassing the first turn in 
the climb phase, and the area near ILS interception. 
Wake vortex evolution model parameters 
The vortex pair behind the generator aircraft is modelled as two line vortices with a vortex 
spacing, a vortex strength, and a core-radius. These parameters do depend on the 
wingspan, weight and speed of the generator aircraft. Evolution of the vortex position is 
modelled according to Corjon&Poinsot. This includes image vortices and secondary vortices 
making the vortex pair to diverge and rebound near the ground respectively. Parameters 
concerning secondary vortices are:  
• strength of the secondary vortices as a fraction of the strength of the primary vortices; 
and the 
• rebound height 
 
A secondary vortex appears as soon as the primary vortex has decreased to a certain 
altitude: the rebound height. For the rebound height a fixed value of 0.6b0 will be used. The 
strength of the secondary vortex is a fraction of the strength of the primary vortex. This 
fraction is drawn from an uniform distribution between 0.3 and 0.7.  
Decay model 
The decay function as defined by Sarpkaya will be used. Input parameters are the Brunt-
Väisälä frequency N and the Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR).  
Meteorological input parameters 
• Brunt-Väisälä frequency (N) 
• Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR) 
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Simulations have been performed for a two-dimensional data set of Brunt-Väisälä 
frequencies and EDR values representing the climatology of London Heathrow at different 
height levels. Information on this climatology was provided by UKMO. 
 
 
Figure 5-7 – Frequency distributions of EDR and N2 for the Heathrow climatology 
Wind input parameters 
• Wind velocity   
• Altitude of measurement 
• Roughness coefficient  
 
Wind will be simulated assuming a logarithmic wind profile up to an altitude of 1000ft. Above 
this altitude the wind is constant. The surface roughness is 0.03m which is representative for 
an airport environment. The wind value is specified at 10m altitude. For determination of the 
minimum crosswind value, above which the separation distance (or time) for all aircraft 
combinations can be reduced safely, the focus will be on varying the crosswind velocity and 
analysing the impact on risk accordingly. To assess the wake vortex induced risk at a generic 
airport, a second assessment could be performed, where a total wind vector is specified by a 
cumulative distribution for the probability of exceeding a given wind speed (according to JAR-
AWO (ACJ AWO 131)). 
Wake encounter model parameters 
Two encounter models are available, the Extended Roll Control Ratio model (ERCR) and the 
Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model (RAPM). The aircraft dependent parameters that are required 
by the ERCR and RAPM model are determined for a number of generic aircraft types. In the 
current study, the ERCR has been applied to compute the roll control ratio and the maximum 
bank angle. The RAPM was used to verify and calibrate the ERCR model. An encounter 
severity classification scheme based on maximum bank angle and altitude of encounter is 
available from S-Wake.  
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Risk prediction model parameters 
To obtain incident/accident probabilities for a given time separation between leader and 
follower aircraft, the risk prediction model developed within S-Wake is used. This model 
includes a definition of risk events (Minor Incident, Major Incident, Hazardous Accident and 
Catastrophic Accident) a probability transition matrix from encounter severity classes to risk 
events, and the associated risk requirements (Target Level of Safety). 
5.9.2 Single runway arrivals 
Set up of the simulation scenarios 
The generic scenario considers the final approach of a leader and follower aircraft, both 
descending along the ILS path from final approach point (FAP) to runway threshold (THR). 
The calibrated air speed of the aircraft is independent of aircraft type between FAP and the 
outer marker (OM), and decelerates to the final approach speed between OM and 
deceleration point (DP). Aircraft considered are shown in Table 5-7. 
 
Table 5-7 – Aircraft types for single runway arrivals 
# Name 
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 C
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[kg]
 
W
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 [m]
 
FAS
 [kts]
 
1 Large jumbo jet H 245000 60.0 150 
2 Wide body jet H 130000 45.2 135 
3 Medium jet M 60000 36.0 138 
4 Regional jet M 34000 30.0 128 
5 Medium turbo prop M 20000 30.0 106 
6 Light turbo prop L 4000 14.0 100 
 
Depending on wind conditions, the approach operation can be performed in ATC-Wake 
mode, which implies that all aircraft are to be separated at a constant distance at the runway 
threshold. The aircraft are assumed to follow a 3 degrees glide path from ILS glide path 
intercept to touchdown. The lateral and vertical deviation from the nominal flight path is 
based on the ICAO-CRM. Nominal aircraft speed profiles are specified by: 
• the airport dependent speed at the Outer Marker (OM) that is prescribed by ATC; 
• from OM to the Deceleration Point (DP), the speed is linearly decreasing to the aircraft 
dependent Final Approach Speed (FAS); 
• from DP until touchdown, aircraft dependent speed is constant and equal to the FAS. 
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Figure 5-8 – Nominal approach speed profiles (stylized as used in S-wake) 
Overview of main results from the simulations 
The full details of the quantitative safety assessment are described in D3_6A. A Large jumbo 
jet and Medium jet as Leader AirCraft (LAC) were combined with Large jumbo jet, Medium 
jet, Regional jet, and Light turbo prop as Follower AirCraft (FAC). Crosswind was varied 
between 0, 1, 2, and 4 m/s at 10m altitude, assuming a logarithmic profile with height. 
Evaluated separation distances, controlled at the runway threshold were 3.0, 4.0, and 
5.0NM. The current practice risk results are presented in D3_9 and the assessed separation 
minima in Figure 5-9. 
 
 
Figure 5-9 – Overview of WAVIR assessed safe separation minima for SRA operation 
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Taking into consideration that ATC-Wake reduced separation should be applied to all aircraft 
combinations and that because of radar separation criteria 2.5NM is currently the minimum 
spacing, Table 5-8 indicates safe separation minima for the assessed operation for certain 
crosswind intervals. Please note that these are indicative numbers that do not take into 
account uncertainty in the crosswind conditions, safety margins and other factors that may 
influence safety. Also, it is assumed that these separations may only be applied in case the 
ATC-Wake system (and operation) is used, and the system components meet certain 
performance requirements which follow from further study. 
 
Table 5-8 – Indicative separation per crosswind interval for single runway arrivals 
 
Proposed separation (the largest value in a row applies) 
Crosswind 
interval 
Wake vortex induced 
separation minima 
Radar separation 
minima 
Runway Occupancy time 
(ROT) minima 
uc ≤ 2 m/s ICAO 2.5 NM aircraft/runway dependent 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 2.5 NM 2.5 NM aircraft/runway dependent  
4 m/s ≤ uc 2.0 NM 2.5 NM aircraft/runway dependent  
5.9.3  Single runway departures 
Set up of the simulation scenarios 
Table 5-9 gives an overview of how the assessment parameters have been changed over 
the simulations. See section 5.9.1 for the leading- and follower aircraft designators. In total, 
540 scenarios have been assessed. To determine the minimum crosswind value, above 
which the separation time for all aircraft combinations can be reduced safely to 90 s, the 
crosswind is varied between 0 and 5 m/s. 
 
Table 5-9 – Assessment parameters for the SRD operation 
1 through 96 97 through 192 193 through 288
Leading A/C LAC1 LAC3 LAC4
Follower A/C FAC1, 5, 6, 7 FAC1, 5, 6, 7 FAC1, 5, 6, 7
Lift Off Point LAC Early, Late Early, Late Early, Late
Lift Off Point FAC Early, Late Early, Late Early, Late
(Cross)wind [m/s] 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Separation [s] 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 60, 90, 120, 150, 180
Assessment Scenarios
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Eight generic aircraft types have been defined. Some of their characteristic parameters have 
been derived from the Eurocontrol Base of Aircraft Data (see Table 5-10). 
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Table 5-10 – Aircraft characteristics (derived from Eurocontrol BADA, Revision 3.6) 
# Name 
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1 Large jumbo jet H 372000 300000 60 186 140 149 
2 Wide body jet H 287000 208700 60 157 117 125 
3 Wide body jet H 181400 150000 45 164 122 136 
4 Medium jet M 68000 58000 36 168 125 131 
5 Regional jet  M 43090 38000 30 148 110 110 
6 Med turbo prop M 20820 18000 30 132 86 92 
7 Light Buss. Jet L 6025 6000 16 122 90 90 
8 Light Turbo Prop L 4700 4100 14 123 79 83 
 
Three different aircraft in the Heavy and Medium class will be simulated as generator aircraft: 
a Large jumbo jet, a Wide Body Jet and a Medium jet. Four different follower aircraft will be 
considered: a Large jumbo jet, a Regional jet, a Medium turbo prop, and a Light Business 
Jet. The aircraft speed profiles and climb rates are generated using the Eurocontrol Base of 
Aircraft Data (BADA), Revision 3.6. BADA provides the FAR Take Off Length, true airspeed 
(TAS) and rate of climb for a specified flightlevel. Combining these numbers, one can 
compute the height, and longitudinal position as a function of time for different kinds of 
aircraft performing a departure. Figure 5-10 shows the vertical profile for different types of 
aircraft (BADA 3.6), where the longitudinal axis specifies the distance of the climbing aircraft 
from lift off. It is assumed that the aircraft follow a 'nominal' climb profile, as specified in 
BADA 3.6, i.e. in reality the climb rate could be higher or lower than used. 
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Figure 5-10 – Vertical profiles of departing aircraft types based on the BADA database 
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The rotation points for the different aircraft types depend on several factors, including take off 
weight, engines, wind (speed and direction), air temperature and pressure, runway 
characteristics (length, gradient and humidity), and thrust settings. A derated take off, using 
the extra available length of a runway, is often applied by the pilot – at the request of airlines 
– to minimise the load on the engines (which increases their life time). In the simulation 
scenarios, the following is assumed (see also Table 5-11): 
• The Take Off Position (TOP) of the leader and follower are both equal to the Runway 
Threshold (i.e. the Runway Entry Point to be specified in WAVIR is equal to 0 (zero)). 
• The Minimum Lift Off Point of an aircraft is smaller than the Take Off Length (TOL) (from 
BADA, Revision 3.6) and estimated under the assumption of a non-derated take off. 
• The Maximum Lift Off Point of an aircraft departing at Schiphol runway 24 (with a runway 
length of 3500 m) is estimated from information given in ATC-Wake D3_6B. 
 
Table 5-11 – Estimated lift off points of different aircraft types (at Schiphol runway 24) 
# Name Cat Take Off 
Length   
Early Lift Off Point  
(non-derated take off) 
Late Lift Off Point (e.g. using  
intersection take off or derated) 
1 LJJ H 3320 2100 3000 
2 WBJ6     H 2925 2000 2700 
3 WBJ7 H 2700 1900 2500 
4 MJ M 2500 1500 2300 
5 RJ M 1715 1200 2200 
6 MTP M 940 700 1800 
7 LBJ L 727 600 1600 
8 LTP   L 506 400 1400 
Overview of main results from the simulations 
The full details of the quantitative safety assessment are described in ATC-Wake D3_6B. An 
important departure specific and aircraft dependent parameter is the lift-off point. In the 
assessment a distinction has been made between early and late lift-off of the aircraft. The 
variation of lift-off points results in a variation of departure tracks. When the follower aircraft 
lifts off early behind a leader aircraft that lifts off late, the departure path of the follower 
aircraft well exceeds that of the leader aircraft, and as a consequence the associated risks 
are low. To stay on the conservative side, the risk results have been maximised over the 
variation in lift-off point before deriving the safe separation minima presented in Figure 5-11. 
Associated risk results are given in D3_9. 
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Figure 5-11 – Overview of WAVIR assessed safe separation minima for SRD operation 
 
The variety of flight tracks in the departure operation, because of differences in aircraft climb 
performance and lift off points, results in a number of interesting observations. For example, 
it appears that a Light business jet behind a Large jumbo jet might be separated with just 
60s. Taking into consideration that ATC-Wake Mode should be applied to all aircraft 
combinations, Table 5-12 indicates safe separation minima for certain crosswind intervals. 
Note that these are indicative numbers that do not take into account uncertainty in the 
crosswind conditions, safety margins and other factors that may influence safety. It is 
assumed that these separations may only be applied in case the ATC-Wake system is used, 
and the system components meet their performance requirements. Reduced separation of 
90s may be applied when crosswind exceeds 3m/s, while 60s separation can be applied with 
crosswind above 5m/s. 
 
Table 5-12 – Indicative separation per crosswind interval for the SRD operation 
Crosswind interval Proposed wake vortex separation 
0 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 120s 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 90s 
5m/s ≤ uc 60s 
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5.9.4 Closely spaced parallel runways 
Set up of the simulation scenarios 
The assessment of the CSPR arrival operation has been performed for a runway lay-out with 
384m lateral spacing and no displaced threshold. Aircraft types that have been considered 
as leader are the Large jumbo jet, Wide body jet, and Medium jet while the Large jumbo jet, 
Wide body jet, Medium jet, Regional jet, Medium turbo prop, and Light turbo prop all have 
been evaluated as follower aircraft. In case of parallel runways, particularly dangerous wake 
vortex encounters may occur if the vortex is transported by the crosswind from the upwind to 
the downwind runway. To investigate those crosswind values that could be hazardous and 
those that safely allow reduced separation, crosswinds of 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9m/s have been 
evaluated. This relates to a crosswind speed at 10m altitude. A logarithmic profile with 
altitude is assumed. To analyse the wake vortex induced risk as a function of the reference 
separation distance, controlled at the runway threshold, separation has been varied between 
2.0, 2.5, 3.0, and 4.0NM. Table 5-13 summarises the assessment parameters. 
 
Table 5-13 – Assessment parameters for the CSPRA operation 
 Assessment scenarios 
Leading Aircraft LAC1 LAC2 LAC3 
Follower Aircraft FAC1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 FAC1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 FAC1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
Crosswind [m/s] 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 
A
ss
e
ss
m
en
t 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s 
Separation [NM] 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0 
 
The assessment of various aircraft combinations provides information for both the 
segregated CSPRA operation as proposed in the ATC-Wake concept and the more generic 
non-segregated operation.  
 
Figure 5-12 – Flight path corridors based on ICAO-CRM used in the CSPR assessment 
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5.9.5 Summary of main results from the simulations 
An overview of the safe separation distances is shown in Figure 5-13. Considering non-
segregated traffic, i.e. both Heavy and Medium aircraft may land on either runway, it appears 
that a crosswind of 1m/s is too weak to transport the vortices to the adjacent runway. A 
crosswind of 3m/s is most critical and for most aircraft combinations the risk at all considered 
separation distances was too high compared to the risk criteria. Only for combinations of a 
Medium jet leader aircraft followed by a Large jumbo or Wide body jet the risk appears to be 
such low that reduced separation is considered safe. 
 
In case of 5m/s crosswind, WAVIR assessed separation varies between 2.7NM behind a 
Medium jet and 3.6NM behind a Large jumbo jet. Crosswind of more than 7m/s does enable 
separation reduction to 3.0NM or even lower.  
 
 
Figure 5-13 – Overview of safe separation distances for the CSPR arrival operation. 
 
Taking into consideration that ATC-Wake reduced separation should be applied to all aircraft 
combinations and that because of radar separation criteria 2.5NM is minimum spacing, Table 
5-14 indicates safe separation minima for the assessed configuration for certain crosswind 
intervals (second column). Please note that these are indicative numbers that do not take 
into account uncertainty in the crosswind conditions, safety margins and other factors that 
may influence safety. 
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When considering segregated traffic, i.e. Heavy aircraft (like Large jumbo jet and Wide body 
jet) are only allowed on the downwind runway, the worst case situation is when the vortices 
of a Medium aircraft (like Medium jet) on the upwind runway are encountered by a Heavy 
aircraft (like Wide body jet) on the downwind runway. Following the results as presented in 
Figure 5-13, indicative separation minima then become as listed in the third column of Table 
5-14. A less strict segregation of traffic, indicated as 'semi-segregated', may allow Medium 
aircraft also on the downwind runway. Then, the worst case situation is when the vortices of 
a Medium aircraft (like Medium jet) on the upwind runway are encountered by a Medium 
aircraft (like Medium turbo prop) on the downwind runway and indicative separation minima 
become as listed in the fourth column of Table 5-14. 
 
Table 5-14 – Indicative separation per crosswind interval for the CSPRA operation 
 
Proposed separation 
Crosswind 
interval 
Non-segregated 
traffic 
Segregated traffic 
(Heavy only on 
downwind runway) 
Semi-segregated traffic 
(Heavy and Medium on 
downwind runway) 
0 ≤ uc ≤ 1m/s 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 4.0NM 3.0NM 3.5NM 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 3.0NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 
8m/s ≤ uc 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 
 
In all three considered cases, reduced separation may be applied for especially weak 
crosswinds (in between 0 and 1 m/s) and strong crosswinds (above 8m/s). Segregation of 
traffic enables reduced separation for all crosswinds while for semi-segregated traffic ICAO 
separation should be applied when the crosswind is in between 1 and 4m/s. Note that such 
calculated crosswind intervals strongly depend on the runway spacing. 
5.10 Overview of proposed ATC-Wake Mode separations 
Indicative separation minima have been derived for each of the 3 ATC-Wake operations, and 
indicative tables have been derived that link the prevailing crosswind speed to the separation 
to be applied in ATC-Wake Mode. The results are summarised in Table 5-15. The crosswind 
intervals have now been split up to bins of 1m/s width. A crosswind climatology based on 
400,000 observations at about 10 European airports has been used to determine the 
probabilities of occurrence of the crosswind interval. The data source itself is confidential. 
Crosswind from left and right appeared to be equally likely. The resulting crosswind 
probabilities listed in Table 5-15 give an indication about the likelihood of certain (wind) 
conditions. 
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Table 5-15 – Indicative separation per crosswind interval for the ATC-Wake operation 
 
Proposed separation Crosswind 
probability 
 
Crosswind 
interval 
SRD 
operation 
SRA  
operation 
CSPRA 
operation 
(non- 
segregated) 
CSPRA 
 operation 
(segregated
) 
CSPRA 
operation 
(semi- 
segregated) 
Crosswind 
probability 
per 
interval 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO ICAO 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.080 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO ICAO ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.208 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 120s 2.5NM ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.206 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 90s 2.5NM ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.164 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 90s 2.5NM ICAO 3.0NM 3.5NM 0.118 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 60s 2.5NM ICAO 3.0NM 3.5NM 0.081 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 60s 2.5NM 3.0NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.053 
8m/s ≤ uc 60s 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.090 
5.11 Evaluation of capacity improvements 
The potential for the sustainable growth of air transport is inherently linked to the extent to 
which the ATM network is able to support capacity increases whilst maintaining necessary 
safety levels. An increase of capacity can be achieved via the implementation of ATC-Wake 
allowing to reduce the standard ICAO separations. Nevertheless, this may be expensive and 
a cost-benefit analysis has to figure out what is the balance between an acceptable level of 
delay and some feasible airport equipment improvements. 
Runway throughput and delay in full ICAO and ATC-Wake Mode 
A first estimation of the potential capacity improvements has been established through the 
use of analytical models based on aircraft spacing, queing models, and sequencing 
approximation methods for the arrival and departure flows (D4_5). Table 5-16, 5-17, and 5-
18 respectively show departure throughput, arrival throughput, and arrival delay 
characteristic numbers in case of ICAO separation and in case of ATC-Wake separation. 
 
Table 5-16 – Departure throughput in case of ICAO or reduced separation (from D4_5) 
Configuration Departure Capacity (ac/h) % Change 
ICAO 37.8 0 % (reference) 
ATC-Wake mode (60s) 40.0 6.3 % 
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Table 5-17 – Arrival throughput in case of ICAO or reduced separation (from D4_5) 
Configuration Arrival Capacity (ac/h) % Change 
ICAO (2.5 Nm radar separation) 35.2 0 % (reference) 
ATC-Wake mode (3.0 Nm) 37.4 6.3 % 
ATC-Wake mode (2.5 Nm) 37.7 7.1 % 
 
Table 5-18 – Arrival delay in case of ICAO or reduced separation (from D4_5) 
Configuration Arrival delay (min) % Change 
ICAO (2.5 Nm radar separation) 3.0 0 % (reference) 
ATC-Wake mode (3.0 Nm) 2.0 -33 % 
ATC-Wake mode (2.5 Nm) 1.8 -40 % 
 
The comparison of ATC-Wake mode with ICAO operations has shown that (D4_5): 
• The arrival capacity increases significantly when changing from standard ICAO wake 
vortex separations to ATC-Wake mode separations. 
• The departure capacity increases significantly when changing from standard ICAO wake 
vortex separations to ATC-Wake mode separations. 
• The average arrival delay decreases significantly when changing from standard ICAO 
operations to ATC-Wake mode for the same demand level. 
Runway throughput and delay of the ATC-Wake SRA operation 
To derive the potential benefits of the ATC-Wake SRA operation at an airport with average 
(wind) conditions, the statistical data on the occurrence of crosswind at an airport, the ATC-
Wake SRA separation schemes as function of crosswind, and the results from the analytical 
study reported in D4_5 have been combined. The results are provided in Table 5-19 
(throughput) and Table 5-20 (expected delay). 
 
Table 5-19 – Expected throughput for the SRA operation 
 
SRA operation 
Crosswind 
interval 
Separation Throughput 
[ac/hr] 
Crosswind probability per 
interval 
Weighed 
throughput 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO 35.2 0.080 2.8 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO 35.2 0.208 7.3 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.206 7.8 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.164 6.2 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.118 4.4 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.081 3.1 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.053 2.0 
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8m/s ≤ uc 2.5NM 37.7 0.090 3.4 
Expected throughput [ac/hr] 37.0 
Change compared to reference situation (ICAO) 5.0% 
 
Table 5-20 – Expected delay for the SRA operation 
 
SRA operation 
Crosswind 
interval 
Separation Delay [min] Crosswind probability per 
interval 
Weighed delay 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO 3.0 0.080 0.24 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO 3.0 0.208 0.62 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.206 0.37 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.164 0.30 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.118 0.21 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.081 0.15 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.053 0.10 
8m/s ≤ uc 2.5NM 1.8 0.090 0.16 
Expected delay [min] 2.15 
Change compared to reference situation (ICAO) -28.5% 
 
Table 5-21 – Expected throughput for the SRD operation 
 
SRD operation 
Crosswind 
interval 
Separation Throughput 
[ac/hr] 
Crosswind probability per 
interval 
Weighed 
throughput 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO 37.8 0.080 3.0 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO 37.8 0.208 7.9 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s ICAO 37.8 0.206 7.8 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 90s 38.9 0.164 6.4 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 90s 38.9 0.118 4.6 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 60s 40.0 0.081 3.2 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 60s 40.0 0.053 2.1 
8m/s ≤ uc 60s 40.0 0.090 3.6 
Expected throughput [ac/hr] 38.6 
Change compared to reference situation (ICAO) 2.1% 
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Summary of the runway throughput and delay characteristics 
Table 5-22 provides a summary of the runway throughput and delay characteristics of the 
SRA, SRD, and CSPRA operations (note that for the latter a distinction is made between 
non-segregated, segregated, and semi-segregated traffic). 
 
Table 5-22 – Summary of runway throughput and delay characteristics 
 
Runway throughput [ac/hr] Delay [min] 
Operation ICAO ATC-Wake Change ICAO ATC-Wake Change 
SRD 37.8 38.6 +2.1% N/A N/A N/A 
SRA 35.2 37.0 +5.0% 3.0 2.15 -29% 
CSPRA (non-segr.) 35.2 35.7 +1.5% 3.0 2.74 -8.6% 
CSPRA (segregated) 35.2 37.6 +6.9% 3.0 1.84 -38.7% 
CSPRA (semi-segr.) 35.2 35.8 +1.6% 3.0 2.73 -8.9% 
 
All results are promising as already a 1 or 2% increase in runway throughput may lead to 
substantial economic benefits. The current study focused on crosswind only. Strong 
headwind conditions (as studied in Time Based Separation) is known to be beneficial as well. 
It is therefore recommended for future work to focus on elaboration of the current approach 
towards an evaluation of individual airports with their local weather conditions 
5.12 Evaluation of safety and capacity improvements 
As motivation for the use of ATC-Wake, the WP3 on Safety and Capacity Analysis has 
evaluated the potential safety and capacity improvements. It has been shown that runway 
throughput and delay improves noticeably when the ATC-Wake system is used. 
Depending on the occurrence of favourable crosswind conditions, the increase in runway 
throughput is about 2% for the ATC-Wake SRD operation and 5% for the ATC-Wake SRA 
operation (at a generic airport with average wind conditions). A further benefits study has 
been performed during the operational feasibility assessment. 
 
Introduction of a new ATC system cannot be done without showing that minimum safety 
requirements are met. ATC-Wake risk assessments will need to be verified by the 
EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulation Unit (SRU). Guidelines for the development of new 
wake vortex safety regulation have been given (using the ESARR4 regulations and a WV risk 
management framework developed in S-Wake). 
 
The safety assessment of the ATC-Wake operation has been performed in three steps. 
First, as part of the qualitative safety assessment, potential hazards and conflict scenarios 
related to use of ATC-Wake have been evaluated. Second, through use of the ‘classical’ 
WAVIR tool, indicative separation minima dependent on crosswind conditions have been 
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determined. As these indicative separation minima do not yet account for crosswind 
uncertainty, as part of the third step, the setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system 
components was further investigated. It appears that the especially the Monitoring and 
Alerting system and Meteorological Forecast and Now-casting systems are crucial and 
sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed. 
 
WAVIR simulations for the SRA operation indicate that reduced separation of 2.5 Nm 
might be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode provided that crosswind is forecasted to be 
above a certain limit. During ATC-Wake arrivals, the Monitoring and Alerting component will 
anticipate potential wake encounters in time (and generate an alert); nevertheless if the 
meteorological forecast information is not accurate and stable enough, this might be 
achieved at the cost of a relatively large number of missed approaches. The simulations 
indicate that, provided that certain requirements are met, about 30% of the approaches might 
be performed with 2.5 Nm aircraft separation in case ATC-Wake is used. 
 
WAVIR simulations for the SRD operation also indicate that reduced separation of 90 
seconds can be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode, provided that crosswind is forecasted 
to be above a certain limit. If the accuracy of the wind forecast information is too low, the 
Monitoring and Alerting component could provide a relatively large number of alerts. A 
potential issue is that immediately after take off, i.e. at relatively low altitude, it will not be 
feasible for the pilot to turn away from the wake vortex of a preceding aircraft. This implies 
that the provision and use of meteorological now-casting information by the controller will be 
very beneficial (and might even be needed), in order to support the pilot to prepare for a 
potential encounter in case of a sudden change of the wind conditions. 
 
Various activities have been performed to validate the safety assessment (including 
verification and validation of the wake evolution models, wake encounter models, and aircraft 
performance models). Nevertheless, it has become clear that the wake vortex phenomena 
during departures is still not fully understood, i.e. further research would be needed before 
the outcome of the departure safety assessment would be ready for approval by regulatory 
authorities. The full Safety Case will need to take into account local wind conditions of the 
airport envisaged for introduction of ATC-Wake as well.  
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6 Evaluation of Operational Feasibility 
6.1 Objectives 
The main objective of WP4 is to evaluate the operational feasibility of the proposed ATC-
Wake system for ATC operations, including the analysis of the interoperability with existing 
ATC systems and the usability and acceptability by ATC Controllers. The operational 
feasibility assessment of the operational concept and procedures consists of analysing 
qualitatively and quantitatively the expected benefits and anticipated constraints from the 
application in the current European airport operations environment and systems. The 
following steps have been performed: 
• Review of the operational concept and procedures, analysis of the issues raised by a 
group of ATC Controllers’ involved in the real-time simulations and other issues raised by 
the participants of the ATC-Wake project. Such assessment has covered the correctness, 
usability and acceptability from ATC Controllers’ perspective of the ATC-Wake concept. 
• Airport and airspace simulations: a series of fast-time simulations aiming at measuring 
the size of the operational benefits for ATC-Wake has been performed, the simulations 
have been prepared considering existing airport operations, a generic airport layout and 
existing traffic samples. 
• Evaluation of the necessary interoperability with existing ATC systems: the proposed 
user and system requirements for ATC-Wake have been evaluated against existing 
airport systems and the size of the required changes assessed. 
6.2 Analysis of ATC-Wake operational concept and procedures 
A number of potential key issues have been identified in Section 3.10, and further 
investigated during the operational feasibility assessment. Examples are : 
• Transitions between ATC-Wake and ICAO separation modes 
• Missed Approaches when ATC-Wake is applied 
• Prevention of Encounters by using the Wake Vortex Vector 
 
These issues have been addressed through questionnaires prepared for nine ATC 
controllers (coming from 5 different countries) involved in the real-time simulation 
experiments on the NLR Air Traffic Control research simulators (NARSIM). The main results 
of the responses to the questionnaire are summarised here below: 
• the ATC-Wake concept itself is relatively easy to understand; 
• the controllers like to have the system operational continuously; 
• the controllers like to have the ATC-Wake system as safety system; 
• it is suggested to eliminate the difference between ICAO and ATC-Wake; 
• it is suggested to keep weight category information available in ATC-Wake mode; 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
99 
 
 
• the ATC-Wake mode, with the same separation between all aircraft, is not useful when 
the separation advised by the Separation Mode Planner is larger than 3 NM; 
• the transition between ICAO and ATC-Wake modes and vice versa is no problem. 
These main results are further motivated and explained in the remainder of Section 6. 
 
But also some ATC Controllers had their doubts. The most important ones: 
• even as they understand the concept, they keep doubts about decline of the Wake 
vortex length along ILS when the aircraft comes closer to the runway 
• controllers also had doubts that the pilots will follow their instructions when they put a 
medium aircraft close (within the ATC-Wake separation) behind a heavy aircraft 
 
Such results confirm that there are no major concerns with respect to the proposed 
operational and user requirements. The ATC Controllers have recognised that the ATC-
Wake concept is an evolution from the current concept applied in Europe. The integration of 
information on Wake vortex detection and prediction both for planning and tactical operations 
has been positively received. The transition between ICAO standard separation and reduced 
separation has been compared with the current meteorological transitions (wind direction or 
visibility) that influence airport operations (change in runway directions, application of low 
visibility procedures).  
 
Two specific issues with respect to the missed approach procedure have emerged: 
• The determination of the reduced separation distance to be applied in ATC-Wake Mode 
shall consider Wake vortices generated by missed approaching aircraft (though it shall be 
noted that the application of ATC-Wake is dependent on the existence and persistence of 
crosswind and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the risk of a Wake vortex 
encounter is not increased). 
• The ATCo training shall be extended with cases where several missed approaches have 
to be executed for aircraft following in-trail. 
 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, no changes to the current ATC working methods for 
missed approaches are felt to be required. 
To be useful as a safety net, the ATC-Wake system shall warn ATC Controllers about: 
• WV information lack of integrity: provide alarms when there is a difference between 
actually observed WV behaviour and predicted WV behaviour (position or decay); 
• WV encounter prevention: provide the appropriate alarm to the ATC Controller when the 
risk of encounter is detected for an aircraft, by monitoring the position of aircraft with 
respect of the “danger area” of the preceding one. 
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6.3 Evaluation of acceptability of ATC-Wake 
A high-level analysis of the acceptability issue both for Airport Operator and ATC Controllers 
has been made by considering the main aspects for the application of the ATC-Wake 
concept and comparing these with the current practice operations. 
 
1) Responsibility for reduced separation: ATC-Wake assigns the responsibility of 
reduced separations to the ATCO with acknowledgement of the Pilot. No change 
compared to current operations, therefore most likely acceptable for all users. 
 
2) Separation Minimum: ATC-Wake proposes a fixed minimum separation distance or time 
covering all aircraft categories. This may imply that for air traffic rarely observed at the 
considered airport (light aircraft or super heavy) exceptions are foreseen. Currently for 
busy airports, homogeneous distributions of traffic are observed by periods (e.g. a peak 
of arrivals of heavy aircraft (long haul) early in the morning followed by a peak of medium 
aircraft (intra Europe). These traffic patterns facilitate the application of a common 
separation minimum (ATC-Wake mode of separation), therefore most likely acceptable 
for most airports and users. 
 
3) Closely Spaced Parallel Runways: currently one single Tower Controller is responsible 
for both runways. Therefore, the application of reduced separations and the introduction 
of staggered approaches increase significantly the Tower Controller workload (especially 
for the control of runway crossing and vacation). On each runway the separation between 
two consecutive flights is roughly 5 NM, this gives enough time to allow the aircraft on the 
other runway to cross the other runway and start taxiing. The workload is increased for 
the Tower Controller in charge of the runway where the landings and crossings occur. So 
two Tower Controllers should be established, no change being done to the rest of the 
control chain: 1 INI ATCo, 1 Intermediate ATCo, 1 Ground ATCo. Hand over between 
Tower Controllers (runway crossing) should be through a silent procedure. 
 
4) Airport Infrastructure: high-speed exit taxiways are needed in order to enable the 
increased runway throughput. In addition for parallel runways, the influence between 
arrival and departure traffic (e.g. arrival flights having to cross the departure runway) and 
between consecutive arrivals is a major concern and appropriate solutions such as 
central taxiways are also needed. The central taxiway linking the high speed taxiways 
must be built out of protected area of both taxiways to allow the landings to hold without 
interfering with the protected area of the other runway. The crossing taxiways should be 
built with an angle of 90° with the axis of the run way to shorten as much as possible the 
time needed to cross and give the best possible visibility of the traffic to the crossing 
flights. 
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6.4 Evaluation of usability through real-time simulations 
 
6.4.1 Overview of the experiments 
In May 2004 and March 2005 two real-time simulations took place at NLR. The simulations 
took place at the NARSIM Tower facility and were using the Amsterdam Airport Schiphol 
environment. The first simulation was to determine the preferred HMI by the Approach and 
Tower controller (see Section 3.7.3 and ATC-Wake D2_7), the second to verify this result by 
other controllers and showing them the ATC-Wake concept. There was a debriefing at the 
end of each day, discussing all ATC-Wake topics, and results have been used for analysis of 
the concept and procedures. 
 
The tower position was configured at the Tower Research Simulator (TRS) and the approach 
position at ATC Research Simulator (NARSIM). These simulators are using the same 
software and are fully integrated. The whole simulation is controlled from the TRS Control 
Room, where also the so-called pseudo-pilots, controlling all the aircraft's in the simulation, 
were positioned. The tower position (see Figure 6-1) consisted of 4 monitors, where 
successively the Surface Movement Radar (SMR), PVD, Electronic Flight Strips and CCIS 
was presented. The Tower controller was able to us RT for instructing the pilots and the 
mouse to make changes to the Electronic Flight Strips. 
 
The approach position consisted of a large screen as PVD and a monitor for CCIS. The 
Approach controller was able to use RT for instructing the pilots and a so-call Touch Input 
Device to make changes to the flight plans and for forwarding the flight to the Tower 
controller (see Figures 6-2). 
 
A total of 9 controllers from 5 different countries took part in the real-time simulations. The 
purpose of the second experiment was the evaluation of the selected ATC-Wake HMIs (see 
Section 4.7) and the ATC-Wake concept. Answers on the ATC-Wake System Usability 
questionnaires and the debriefing gave a good indication of the usability and acceptability of 
the ATC-Wake HMI and concept (see Section 6.4.3). 
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Figure 6-1 – Tower position 
 
 
Figure 6-2 – Approach position 
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6.4.2 The ATC-Wake HMI: A Variable Wake Vortex Vector 
The ACT-Wake system provides the predicted WV length projected for each aircraft in the 
critical area. This information should be integrated into the PVD of the Approach and Tower 
controller. Three different options have been evaluated (see Section 4.7): 
• Extended label; 
• Variable Wake Vortex Vector; 
• Fixed Wake Vortex Vector. 
 
The so-called "Variable Wake Vortex Vector" was selected by all the controllers as the best 
HMI candidate for the Approach and Tower position. The HMI is intuitive and unambiguous. 
It adds no additional workload and is not used by the controllers for separating the aircraft. 
The HMI is easy to use and a short introduction, without need for special training, is sufficient 
for acceptance by all the air traffic controllers. 
6.4.3 Results from the System Usability Analysis 
All controllers were asked to fill in NASA TLX and SART Scale questionnaires at the end of 
each scenario and a System Usability Scale questionnaire at the end of their participation. 
This questionnaire is of interest because it says something about the usability of the system. 
Table 6-1 contains the average of all 9 controllers.  
 
Table 6-1 – Results from ATC-Wake System Usability Questionnaires 
 1 (strongly disagree) to  
5 (strongly agree) 
Statement 1         2         3       4         5 
I think I would like to use this system frequently                                4,0 
I found the system unnecessarily complex      1,6 
I thought the system was easy to use                                   4,4 
I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be 
able to use this system 
1 
I found the various functions in this system were well integrated                            3,6 
I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system      1,7 
I would imagine that most people would learn to use the system 
very quickly 
                                      4,7 
I found the system very difficult to use      1,6 
I felt very confident using the system                                4,0 
I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with the 
system 
     1,6 
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6.4.4 Conclusions of Real Time Simulations 
The conclusions of the simulation are very promising. There is no contradiction between the 
debriefing, questionnaire and observations. The ATC-Wake concept and system is easy to 
understand and to work with. Controllers appreciate the Wake vortex vector behind an 
aircraft, because this is the first time that what they already "know" about the behaviour of 
Wake vortices is visualised. Further findings are: 
• Transition between ICAO-mode and ATC-Wake mode is not really an issue according to 
the controllers, because they are already used to such changes. A system displaying the 
Wake Vortex 24 hours a day would be very helpful and eliminate the transition between 
ICAO and ATC-Wake mode. The controller should be instructed at the beginning of its 
shift to look what the separation criteria are and when these will change. 
• Separation of aircraft at 2.5 NM on ILS is sometimes difficult; it seems that the "style" of 
the controller (especially the Approach controller), has influence on the performance. The 
"style" is a combination of how the controller has learned to control (this differs between 
airports) and the capacity demand he/she is used to handle. Some Approach controllers 
are not able to "deliver" the aircraft at 2.5 NM. 
• When an Approach controller is informed about the wind condition and 2.5 Nm 
separation, he/she generally makes the distance between a heavy and medium weight 
category aircraft somewhat larger, in anticipation of the fact that a heavy aircraft needs 
more time to leave the runway. When an Approach controller is instructed to apply 2.5 
Nm separation for all aircraft, the workload of controllers and the number of go-arounds 
increases noticeable. The increase of go arounds is related to the fact that the time 
between the heavy clearing the runway and the other waiting for landing clearance 
becomes smaller. Also, there appears to be a dependency on the location of the exits of 
the runway. The increase in workload is less expected, because the traffic load of both 
simulation runs is identical. It appears that controllers use the prescribed ATC-Wake 
separation as minimum. 
• To make optimal use of the ATC-Wake concept (2.5 Nm separation for arrivals), 
controllers should be trained to handle the shorter separation, and the somewhat higher 
traffic load (this applies especially to the Approach controller). 
• During introduction of the ATC-Wake concept, controllers and pilots need to be 
convinced that the smaller separation for arrivals and departures are safe to use. 
6.5 Airport and airspace simulations 
 
6.5.1 Aim of the fast-time simulations 
The aim of the ATC-WAKE fast-time simulations (with TAAM) has been to assess the 
potential benefits relating to capacity-efficiency of the considered airport as well as the 
potential cost-savings for airlines that have been identified during the project set-up and to 
provide indicators to size such benefits: 
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• Capacity – Efficiency: the application of reduced Wake vortex separation has the 
potential to significantly increase the efficiency of arrival or departure movements by the 
reduction of (intermediate) delays as well as to increase the maximum number of 
movements per runway. 
• Cost savings for Airlines: savings resulting from aircraft delay absorption or the 
increase of airport movements per hour impact significantly on airline costs. 
6.5.2 Simulation scenarios and assumptions 
The main assumptions made for the initial survey of potential simulations are: 
• the correct (pre-determined) separation minimum determined during the planning of 
operations is applicable for tactical operations (final approach or take-off); 
• requirements associated to ATC-Wake operations (in particular visibility conditions) and 
supporting systems are met,no technical failure is introduced during simulation. 
• pilots will always comply with the reduction of separation for arrivals or departures. 
• no operational error (human)  
• the aircraft actual performances are compatible with corresponding TAAM model 
 
The scenarios for fast-time simulations have been built using traffic samples from Paris – 
Charles de Gaulle for arrival and departure movements. Such traffic sample has been 
modified to introduce the reduced separations between aircraft (distance or time) following 
the application of the ATC-Wake operational concept. For arrivals, reduced separation 
between aircraft is simulated with three different values: 
• 2.5 NM for all traffic in a sequence 
• 3 NM for all traffic in a sequence 
• 4 NM only between: 
• Heavy followed by Medium/Light 
• Medium followed by Light.  
• ICAO standard separation otherwise 
 
For departures, reduced separation between aircraft, for all traffic in a sequence, was 
simulated with 3 different values: 
• 60 seconds; 
• 90 seconds; 
• 120 seconds. 
 
In addition 2 scenarios combining arrival and departure traffic have been identified, taking 
into account runway crossing, ground movements and a transition in ATC-WAKE separation 
mode (from reduced separations to ICAO standard separation and vice versa). The switch 
between these two modes of aircraft separation was enabled by a transition plan. The traffic 
sample used was collected from CFMU data, and included 1486 movements at the 26th of 
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June 2003 for Paris Charles de Gaulle (CdG) inbound and outbound traffic. In total 3 hours of 
traffic was simulated (from 5 am to 8 am UTC). A full description of the traffic samples used 
and adaptations made to facilitate assessment of the capacity benefits of ATC-Wake is given 
in [D4_7].  
6.5.3 Main results from the fast-time simulations 
The fast time simulations allowed measuring the impact of reduced separations applied for 
both departures and arrivals, in particular to measure the potential increase of number of 
movements per hour and the reduction of the average delay per aircraft for the approach 
phase or the taxi phase. The simulation results showed different results for arrivals and 
departures. The main results are summarised in the following. 
 
For arrivals, the reduction of separation leads indeed to an increase of the number of 
landings per hour of in between 1 and 16 extra landings. This potentially represents a 34% 
runway throughput increase. The application of reduced separations implied as well the 
reduction of arrival delays by 13 minutes over three hours (reduction of the time of the 
approach phase). It should be noted that the Runway Occupancy Time (ROT) was not 
considered as a limiting factor in the simulations. This should be compared with fuel 
consumption figures in order to draw the cost savings for airlines. 
 
For departures, the application of reduced separation modes also showed significant 
benefits in terms of run way throughput and delays. 120 seconds separation mode 
(equivalent to the current ICAO separation minimum for 2 Medium aircraft) could be 
considered valuable, either in terms of number of movements per hour with an increase of 
8%, or in terms of delays with a decrease of the average delay of 18%. However, it is noted 
that these values are directly related to the distribution of traffic in the sample used (20% of 
Heavy in the traffic sample). 
From the delay point of view the application of the same (reduced) separation time between 
aircraft, independently of the aircraft category, will have a positive effect on delays, i.e. an 
decrease of 30s of the separation time results in an increase of 13 minutes of the average 
delay per aircraft (per hour).  
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Figure 6-3 – Generic airport layout 
 
A transition scenario combining the reduction of separation minima for arrivals and 
departures on the pair of parallel runways of the generic airport has been evaluated. The 
transition between ICAO and ATC-Wake mode, with 2.5 Nm separation for arrivals and 60 
seconds separation for departures, was analysed by simulating three hours of traffic: starting 
with one hour ATC-Wake Mode, then one hour ICAO Mode, and finally one hour ATC-Wake 
Mode. It appeared that ATC-Wake significantly increases the efficiency of arrival or departure 
movements by the reduction of (intermediate) delays with 40%. Also, it increases the number 
of movements per runway, passing from 196 movements for the ICAO scenario to 240 
movements in the transition scenario (+22%). 
 
However a number of issues for the performance of the combined arrival and departure 
simulation scenarios have been raised: 
• Potential benefits of the application of reduced separations were highly dependent on the 
traffic distribution. 
• The general behaviour of departing and landing aircraft is highly related to the selected 
airport layout (e.g. existence of a central taxiway avoiding arrivals to cross the departure 
runway). 
A more precise assessment of such improvement is essential for the analysis of cost/ 
benefits associated to ATC-Wake system, since the determination of actual gains for an 
airport also needs to address the actual existence of favourable meteorological conditions (at 
the airport) (see e.g. Section 5.10). Also, efficient cooperation between ATCos and Flight 
Crews is a pre-requisite. Further analysis of the benefits for European airports is being 
performed in the EUROCONTROL Airport Benefits Study, in which different Wake Vortex 
Mitigation Concepts of Operations are studied. 
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6.6 Evaluation of interoperability with existing ATC systems 
 
6.6.1 Systems affected and introduced 
The ATC-Wake system requirements specify four new ATC-Wake components, to be 
integrated in the airport environment. It concerns the ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner, 
Predictor, Monitoring and Alert, and the Detector. The implementation effort needed for their 
introduction is addressed in Section 7. Existing systems necessary from ATC-Wake point of 
view, but for which no changes are needed are: flight data processing systems and 
surveillance systems. Some improvements of meteo systems and supervisor HMI are 
foreseen. Other ATC systems (meteorological forecast, flight planning and flight information, 
and ATCo HMI) to be adapted are described below.  
Meteorological Forecast 
Adequate meteorological forecast data has been identified as a major enabler for the 
introduction of ATC-Wake. Existing meteorological systems for the aerodrome environment 
offer a limited set of information concerning current wind, temperature, and visibility 
conditions as well as tendencies. ATC-Wake operations require a number of supplementary 
atmospheric sensing systems, such as wind profilers or temperature profilers, which provide 
more accurate meteorological information (possibly even complemented by a specific 
forecasting system).  
Flight Planning and Flight Information  
The application of reduced separation in aerodrome operations requires changes to existing 
systems used for the planning of arrivals. When a change of the Separation Mode (ICAO or 
ATC-Wake) is decided, this shall be communicated to an Arrival Manager (AMAN), which 
updates accordingly the timing of the approach phase (time over initial approach fix, landing 
time) for each individual flight. 
Human Machine Interface (HMI) 
The HMI of ATC Controllers needs to be updated for the introduction of Wake vortex 
separation mode, and Wake vortex prediction and detection information (displayed as Wake 
vortex vector and alerts). From a survey conducted by EUROCONTROL, it can be concluded 
that currently only one of the participating airports has an operational arrival manager and no 
airport has an automated tool for sequencing the take-off movements. The same survey also 
addressed the (current) organisation of ATC services for approach and aerodrome 
operations. The results show that the ATC-Wake actor/responsibility decomposition: 
• Matches with existing job descriptions for the following actors: ATC/Tower Supervisor, 
the Initial/Intermediate Approach Controller, the Tower and the Ground Controller. 
• Matches with the Arrival Sequence Manager (ASM) function at airports London - 
Heathrow, London – Gatwick, and Paris – Orly (at the other 7 investigated airports there 
is no ASM). 
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6.6.2 Impact on current CONOPS 
The main change implied by ATC-Wake (as compared with the current operational 
procedures) is the transition from the fixed Wake vortex separation minima defined by ICAO 
to the ATC-Wake separation minima, which is updated regularly (with at least a 40 minutes 
pre-notice). From the ATC controller perspective such transition can be compared with a 
runway configuration change (e.g. from west to east configuration) and therefore does not 
represent a revolution for aerodrome operations. 
Another significant change is the issue of Wake vortex related alerts (indicating the potential 
risk of a Wake vortex encounter) by the ATC-Wake system. Such alerts do not exist in the 
today operational procedures. Nevertheless, during the final approach operations, the main 
actions required for ATC controllers will be limited to informing the pilot and supporting 
his/her decision (i.e. to continue the approach or initiate a missed approach) by providing 
guidance and/or separation with other traffic. 
6.6.3 Impact of ATC-Wake on arrival and departure management 
To improve efficiency, airports are introducing arrival manager and departure manager tools 
(so called AMAN and DMAN). These tools use the ICAO separation criteria as basis to 
determine the optimal arrival and departure sequence. During ATC-Wake mode other 
separation criteria are applied and by means of an analytical study an indication about the 
impact of ATC-Wake mode on both tools has been assessed. The following has shown when 
the ATC-Wake mode is compared with the ICAO mode: 
• The arrival capacity increases significantly when changing from standard ICAO Wake 
vortex separations to ATC-Wake mode separations. 
• The departure capacity increases significantly when changing from standard ICAO Wake 
vortex separations to ATC-Wake mode separations. 
• The average arrival delay decreases significantly when changing from standard ICAO 
operations to ATC-Wake mode for the same demand level. 
6.7 Assessment of ATC-Wake Operational Feasibility 
The assessment of operational feasibility for the implementation of ATC-WAKE operational 
concept within Europe has been performed along several axis: 
• Correctness, usability and acceptability of the operational concept by ATC 
Controllers: the operational concept is not a ‘revolution’ for ATC, it represents a sound 
evolution from existing procedures (runway configuration and transition). 
The real-time simulations performed by NLR indicates that the ATC-WAKE concept of 
operations has been easily adopted by a team of ATC Controllers and positive feed-back 
for its use in operations has been received.  
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In addition the size of the changes from operational perspective (airport infrastructure, 
training) fits with the existing evolutions observed at European airports to cope with the 
increasing traffic demand. 
• Operational benefits: the fast-time simulations have allowed to assess the potential 
gains for runway throughput and flight times considering a number of potential scenarios 
for the reduction of minimum separation (distance or time) and the runway usage (arrivals 
only, departures only, mixed mode). The potential gains following the application of 
reduced separation are significant, varying between 10% and 30% increase of runway 
throughput and between 10% and 40% reduction of the average delay per flight. 
However the actual gains will be dependent on a number of factors: 
• Favourable meteorological conditions: the transport of Wake vortex out of the arrival 
or departure corridors is observed when a significant and persistent cross-wind exists 
and to take benefit out of such situation a minimum 20min reliable wind forecast is 
necessary to plan traffic. In addition good visibility conditions are required for reduced 
separation operations; 
• Traffic pressure: the application of reduced separation operations will deliver benefits 
only when a high level of traffic exists and sufficient notice is made to ATC to plan 
aircraft movements accordingly;  
• Traffic distribution: potential benefits of the application of reduced separations are 
highly dependent on the traffic distribution; 
• Airport layout: the general behaviour of departing and landing aircraft is highly related 
to the selected airport layout (e.g. existence of a central taxiway avoiding arrivals to 
cross the departure runway) 
• Impact on existing ATC systems: the analysis of interoperability issues has confirmed 
that the main changes to systems concern the implementation of specific atmospheric 
sensing systems (e.g. weather radar or LIDAR), the introduction of ATC-WAKE tools for 
ATC (separation mode planning, Wake vortex prediction, detection and monitoring tools). 
The impact on existing systems is low, mainly the arrival management tool (AMAN) 
requires modification to support the fluent transitioning between ATC-WAKE reduced 
separations and standard ICAO separations (depending on meteorological conditions). 
 
As a main conclusion the ATC-WAKE operational feasibility analysis has allowed to build 
confidence in the proposed operational concept for the application of reduced separations to 
represent a sound evolution from existing ATC procedures and working practices, to deliver 
significant benefits for runway throughput and average delay per flight without major rework 
to the current ATC systems. 
 
Nevertheless such positive conclusions on operational feasibility will need to be traded-off 
against the actual weather ‘windows’ to perform such operations and the costs for the 
acquisition and implementation of the new equipments or infrastructure required (Wake 
vortex sensors, new atmospheric sensing systems, enhanced weather forecast capabilities). 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
111 
 
 
7 Technological Implementation Plan 
7.1 Introduction 
The main exploitable project output is the ATC Wake Integrated Platform (IP), which contains 
as further new exploitable ATC-Wake results: 
• ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner 
• ATC-Wake Predictors 
• ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerts 
• ATC-Wake Detectors 
• Air Traffic Controller Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs). 
 
The ATC-Wake Integrated Platform (IP) has been built using SPINEware middleware 
technology, which provides an integrated view on an heterogeneous network of different 
computer platforms enabling access to the different subsystems and tools of the different 
partners. The IP is presented to users (research and development centres and industrial 
organisations) as a user-centred working environment, and comprises all the designed and 
implemented interfaces between the subsystems and tools of the individual partners. The 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) of these individual subsystems and tools are described in 
ATC-Wake D5_1 (Dissemination & Use Plan). The ATC-Wake Integrated Platform has been 
designed, specified, and implemented, and all four new components (Separation Mode 
Planner, Predictor, Monitoring and Alerts, and Detectors) and their interfaces have been built 
and tested. Already existing subsystems and tools have been upgraded following the 
definition of the operational requirements, operational concept, users requirements and 
system requirements.  
 
The ATC-Wake IP has been demonstrated at the ATC-Wake User Group Meeting and the 
EC Review Meeting on 7/8 April 2005 at the site of UCL, near Brussels. A further trial took 
place at the ATC-Wake Final Meeting, again with the ATC-Wake User Group. Participating 
air-traffic controllers were directly involved in selecting the best method for on-screen display 
of aircraft position and Wake vortex information.  
 
The ATC-Wake platform will enable European ATS providers, airport authorities, and ATM 
research and development centres to join their efforts (and plan their investments) to 
adequately adapt their airport systems and enhance the efficient use of airports restricted by 
the Wake vortex problem. In this sense ATC-WAKE is a key enabler of the European ATM 
strategy for the years 2000+ ; Wake Vortex is included in the Single European Sky ATM 
Masterplan activities (joint Eurocontrol/EC SESAME project). ATC-Wake is also included in 
the EUROCONTROL Wake Vortex Separations Management Plan and the 
FAA/EUROCONTROL Action Plan 14 on Wake Vortex. 
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Besides direct application of the ATC-Wake results and outputs, two follow-up European 
Research and Development projects are foreseen before actual capacity increase at airports 
can be realised: 
• CREDOS (or CROWS): elaboration & testing of an operational concept for crosswind 
departures through real-time ATC simulations, Wake vortex data collection and analysis, 
risk assessment, construction of a safety case and human factors case, and a WV safety 
management system. 
• ATC-Wake2: installation and testing of an ATC-Wake system at selected airport(s), 
through shadow-mode field trials and evaluation of the experiences with the new working 
methods. The EC/IST recommends that this will be done as an integrated project 
(together with I-Wake & TALIS). Therefore, results from I-Wake and their possible use 
will be discussed in some more detail in Section 7.2 
7.2 Broad dissemination and use 
The ATC-Wake Public Reports and associated technical publications will be placed on the 
ATC-Wake and WakeNet Europe public web-sites and will be distributed by e-mail to the 
WakeNet 2 Europe and WakeNet USA communities. Dissemination of project results has 
been achieved through presentations at conferences and publications (publications and 
presentations resulting fully or partly from the ATC-Wake project and listed in the reference 
list). The ATC-Wake Concept of Operations was presented by the European Wake Vortex 
Conops development team in parallel with the US team who work on a similar concept 
WakeVAS. A user group has been formally involved within ATC-Wake, and has been 
consulted throughout the project: two ATS providers (NATS and DFS), the European 
Association of Aerospace Industries (ASD), one aircraft manufacturer (Airbus), one ATM 
development center (NASA), the cooperative effort between the European and US ATM 
authorities (FAA/EUROCONTROL), and Canadian ATM organizations (Transport Canada 
and Nav Canada). The outcomes of the study have the following application areas: 
Installation and use of ATC-Wake system for reduced separation at airports 
For airports operating near their maximum throughput limits dynamic (weather dependent) 
Wake vortex separation rules may lead to a substantial decrease in average delay time and 
large potential economic savings. Potential gains will depend on the traffic mix, the prevailing 
weather climatology at the particular airport and the available run-way topology. Essential 
new elements for installation of an operational system with dynamic (weather dependent) 
separation rules at an airport are the four ATC-Wake components: Separation Mode Planner, 
Predictor, Monitoring and Alert, and Detector, as well as the new ATCo Human Machine 
Interfaces, which have been tested at the NLR ATC research simulators. Crosswinds and 
strong headwinds are candidates to be used in dynamic weather dependent Separation 
Mode Planning. It is noted that results from S-Wake have been used to assess appropriate 
reduced separation minima for a variety of aircraft operating at airports with ATC-Wake. 
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Possible harmonization and re-definition of Wake vortex separation rules 
The current arrival separation rules define separation minima depending on the MTOW of 
the paired aircraft. At present different countries apply somewhat different rules for the 
separation minima. ATC-Wake outcomes and tools can also be used for assessing the Wake 
vortex safety and capacity implications of new Wake vortex operational concepts, based on a 
different ruling (dynamic weather based separation instead of static separation rules). In this 
respect, it is noted that EUROCONTROL has recently completed an Airports Benefits Study, 
in which airport capacity enhancements of 3 new Wake Vortex Concepts of Operations 
(ATC-Wake, Crosswind Departures, and Time Based Separation) for major European 
airports have been estimated. 
Safety and capacity improvements with a Very Large Transport Aircraft (VLTA) 
The tools developed in ATC-Wake can also be used to compare the levels of safety of a 
future Very Large Transport Aircraft (VLTA) with current very heavy aircraft, when operating 
at an airport with an ATC-Wake system in use (provided the Wake characteristics of the 
VLTA are known, and also made available). The ATC-Wake tools used for analysis of the 
capacity aims and expected improvements can also be used to evaluate the capacity 
enhancements when a new VLTA operates at an airport with an ATC-Wake system. For all 
such safety and capacity assessments it is expected that local weather and Wake data will 
be needed to build the safety case. 
7.3 Ground based Wake prediction, monitoring, alerting capabilities 
Which meteorological parameters have to be measured and/or forecasted for Wake vortex 
warning systems and for (weather dependent) safety assessments? Mean wind (all three 
wind components) and wind variability, turbulence, virtual potential temperature and vertical 
wind shear are all known to influence the Wake development. However, some of these 
parameters are difficult or impossible to forecast or even to measure. Therefore, one might 
tailor specific solutions for specific applications. For example, a cross-wind now-casting 
system for aircraft departures requires to observe and to forecast only a minimum set of 
parameters, such as the horizontal wind components and associated temporal and spatial 
variability, for a short time horizon on the order of 10 minutes. For the arrival concept of 
operation, a longer time horizon of at least 40 minutes is required to enable arrival 
sequencing. 
 
Another approach relies on observation combined with statistics collected at the airfield 
where the quantity of the measured parameter is assumed to persist (or to vary slowly) in 
time with growing uncertainty allowances as the forecast lead time proceeds. The time 
horizon for that method is maximum one hour. As such it is of importance to enhance the 
quality of the forecasting algorithms. It is recommended to further develop test algorithms for 
an optimum fusion of observation and forecast data in order to obtain best-guess fields of 
ATC-WAKE D6_2, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
114 
 
 
meteorological parameters relevant for Wake vortex prediction and monitoring. Similarly, an 
assessment of the potential to integrate AMDAR/ACARS on-board data within a ground 
based Wake vortex monitoring and prediction system is recommended. In this respect, it will 
be very beneficial to exploit the use of new advanced data-link functionalities (as developed 
in TALIS) for real-time down-linking of aircraft Wake, weather, and/or wind data. 
 
A crucial issue with respect to weather monitoring, is the fact that at present there is no 
single system able to measure and provide all the meteorological parameters under all 
possible weather conditions to a real-time operational ATC-Wake system. A combination of 
sensors, which are typically weather dependent, might be needed. LiDARs will work well 
under most conditions, but may need to be complemented by a RADAR system under 
adverse weather conditions (such as rains and clouds). For detection of Wake vortices, the 
main methods are LiDAR, acoustic systems, and radar systems. Again, LiDAR is the best to 
quantify the vortex strength and position.  
 
The complementarity of radar, SODAR and LiDAR systems should be better understood. 
Figure 7-1 illustrates the complexity for different weather conditions. 
 
 
Figure 7-1 – RADAR / LiDAR complementarity for detection in all weather conditions 
7.4 On-board Wake detection, warning, and avoidance capabilities 
Whereas the ATC-Wake project focuses on the realisation of a ground based DWA system, 
the I-WAKE project focuses on the on-board detection, warning, and avoidance of Wake 
vortices. With respect to the future developments (needs and possibilities), the overall results 
of I-WAKE can be visualised in three groups: system related, operations related and 
technology related (see Figure 7-2 below). 
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Figure 7-2 – Dissemination of I-WAKE results. 
 
The available technology of IR 2µm 2mJ lidar has proven to satisfy the performance 
requirements for Wake vortex detection. The culprit lies in the volume and weight needed to 
host such a sensor: 2µm technology requires free space optics. Research needed in this 
area is twofolds: pursue the use of 2µm lidar improving weight and compactness, and 
investigate 1.5µm lidar for the potential of optical fibers. The 1.5µm is a less mature 
technology than the 2µm but carries the promise of easier aircraft installation since the lidar 
will be fibered. The 6th FP project FIDELIO will assemble such a demonstrator for ground 
testing of the 1.5µm technology, direct comparisons with the MFLAME results will be done. 
LiDAR technology is sensitive to the aircraft environment in terms of vibrations, temperature 
and pressure. So far, all lidar measurements from onboard aircraft have used systems 
installed in the cabin, not the final sensor installation spot: the non pressurized, non 
temperature controlled space between the nose wheel and the radome. FIDELIO will also 
investigate the real-time processing of Wake vortex signal data (in I-WAKE the algorithms 
were running off-line). 
 
For operational use, the onboard DWA system was mostly evaluated for approach and 
landing, other flight phases like cruise and departure have not yet been properly addressed. 
The validation of operational concepts for departure is one of the topics of the 6th FP project 
CREDOS; the validated concepts might then be used in an industrial system driven 7th FP 
Integrated Project for operational testing of detection performance in an actual airport 
environment. Cruise operation is investigated in the 6th FP project FLYSAFE with the task of 
Wake detection in RVSM focused on the model capability and not the sensor development.  
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7.5 ATC-Wake Implementation efforts and costs 
The conclusions of the simulations are very promising. There is common agreement between 
the debriefing, questionnaire and observations made by the nine air traffic controllers (from 
five separate countries). The ATC-Wake concept and system was easy to understand and to 
work with. Controllers appreciate the Wake vortex vector behind an aircraft, because this is 
the first time that what they already "knew" about the behaviour of Wake vortices was 
visualised. In general, it appears that the ATC-Wake concept is useable and easily accepted 
by controllers. Nevertheless, the new ATC-Wake system includes four new components 
which will need to interface with existing and/or enhanced ATC systems. Some effort will be 
needed before ATC-Wake can really be installed and used at a European airport. Table 7-1 
contains an overview of the operability issues of the ATC-Wake system. 
 
Table 7-1 – Overview implementation effort per system 
System Effort Risk Training Validation 
Surveillance system Low None None Low 
FDPS Low None None Low 
AMAN None None None None 
Meteo High Medium/High Low High 
Supervisor HMI Low Low Low Low 
ATCo HMI Low Low Low Low/Medium 
Separation Mode Planner Low Low Low Medium/High 
Predictor Low Low Low Medium/High 
Monitoring & Alerting Low Low Low Medium 
Detector High Medium/High Low High 
 
From this table it is clear that the main implementation efforts of ATC-Wake are 
concentrating around the Meteorological enhancement and the ATC-Wake detector. For 
ATC-Wake the Meteorological system shall deliver more accurate data with a higher update 
rate than the current Meteorological information used by ATC. These risks are lower for the 
ATC-Wake Detector. The current laser technology used by the LIDAR, one of the possible 
ATC-Wake Detector systems, has its limitations in range and detection capabilities. Also the 
radar technology used for detecting Wake vortices is still under development and it is 
currently not known how well it will perform. The validation effort needed for validation of the 
ATC-Wake system is relatively high. Before being able to use the full potential of the ATC-
Wake system a lot of data shall be collected. The more data is collected the better the 
prediction of the ATC-Wake system components (SMP, Predictor) will be. The installation 
can be compared in this way with an ILS system. At the beginning the system can not be 
used on the highest level, but after some time of measurements the confidence in prediction 
will improve. 
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The costs involved (see Table 7-2) show the same pattern. The largest investments concern 
the Meteorological system and the ATC-Wake Detector system. Especially the ATC-Wake 
Detector is expensive because at least two systems shall be needed if a runway is operated 
in both directions. Looking at the recurring costs it is clear that operating the ATC-Wake 
system is not so expensive. 
 
The recurring costs of the ATC-Wake Detector system are high because it is still under 
development. But the expectation is that these recurring costs will decrease and will be on 
the same level as for other airport systems, as soon as more experience is gained. The non-
recurring costs are the costs to validate the system, to collect data for the ATC-Wake system 
components (necessary for the Separation Mode Planner and the Predictor). After validation, 
system components will need to be acquired by air traffic control centres and airports, after 
which subsequent non-recurring costs will be low. 
 
Table 7-2 – Overview costs per system 
System Investment Recurring Non-Recurring 
Surveillance system Nil Nil Nil 
FDPS Nil Nil Nil 
AMAN Nil Nil Nil 
Meteo High Low Medium 
Supervisor HMI Low Low Low 
ATCo HMI Low Low Medium 
Separation Mode Planner Low Low Medium/High 
Predictor Low  Low Medium 
Monitoring & Alerting Low Low Medium 
Detector High High High 
 
For installation of the ATC-Wake system, the following recommendations are made: 
• Existing or otherwise planned systems shall be used as much as possible, and European 
wise standardisation of interfaces and tools for controllers will make installation of an 
ATC-Wake system easier and cheaper. 
• The benefit of an ATC-Wake system integrated in the ATM/ATC environment of an 
airport should significantly increase when combined with new flight control features. 
• Installation of the ATC-Wake SMP, Predictor and Monitoring & Alerting component on a 
single computer platform will decrease the investment and recurring costs. 
 
Installation (or operating) costs of a Meteo System may be shared by the national weather 
services since they profit from a high density of data in the terminal area of airports. The 
weather forecasting and now-casting capabilities shall be carefully analysed, and proof that 
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this will meet operational requirements shall be provided. Looking at the other systems, the 
following statements can be made: 
• No improvements of the existing systems are needed for use of ATC-Wake. All the 
functionality for the enhanced systems is mature enough to start field trials. 
• The ATC-Wake SMP and Predictor systems are mature enough and deliver the 
functionalities needed for ATC-Wake. The ATC-Wake Monitoring & Alerting system can 
be used as is, but fine-tuning and training of the alarm functionality might be needed 
(through shadow-mode field trails or real-time simulations). 
• The ATC-Wake Detector system needs improvement (see also Section 7.3) and is also 
relatively expensive. The performance of a LIDAR system as stand-alone Detector is too 
limited. The ATC-Wake detector system shall be able to assess strength/position of the 
Wake vortex behind an aircraft with sufficient accuracy. 
• The quality of weather forecasting and nowcasting can be enhanced by more frequent 
updates of the initial and boundary conditions provided as input. 
7.6 Economic development and further exploitation 
The work performed in ATC-Wake contributes directly to several objectives of the EC 
Information Society Technologies (IST) Programme for creating a User Friendly 
Information Society. For Key Action I – Systems and services for the Citizen, the project 
addresses objective I.5 Transport and Tourism by developing and building an integrated 
ATC Wake vortex safety and capacity platform with the aim to improve safety. This allows 
more efficient and comfortable transport, resulting in airport capacity increase. Research is 
focused on sub-task I.5.2 Integrated vehicle infrastructure systems which aims to improve 
safety, security, comfort and efficiency in all modes of passenger and freight transport and to 
improve mobility management, through more interaction between in-vehicle systems and 
infrastructure systems (transport, navigation, communication, etc.). In this sense, the ATC-
Wake platform might be used by ATS providers, airport authorities, ATM industry, and ATM 
research and development centres to facilitate their efforts in the search process to adequate 
solutions to the Wake vortex problem. From the industrial viewpoint the platform is a 
necessary building block to build up such a new ATC system at European airports. 
 
Each organisation has developed its own plans for exploitation of its results, because each 
organisation has its own exploitation objectives. The research institutes and ATM research 
and development centre will exploit results by transferring knowledge to industry, all players 
in the Air Traffic Management world (e.g. airports, ATS providers, policy makers, air traffic 
controllers, pilots) and enhancing their capabilities for competing for similar national and EU 
funded projects. The university will exploit the project along education (enhancing courses 
offered by them in subjects related to the project objectives, and research (enhancing the 
capabilities for competing for similar national and EU projects). Finally, industry will exploit 
the results by developing the designed platform further towards the integrated ATC system 
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operational at airports. The detailed plans for exploitation of the ATC-Wake main project 
results and the plans of the partners are described in ATC-Wake D5_3. 
 
The general scheme for exploitation of results can be synthesised as shown in Table 7-3. 
Although the ground based ATC-Wake system architecture will be at the heart of a Wake 
vortex prediction and monitoring system that facilitates reduced separation at airports under 
favourable wind conditions, it is anticipated that instrumentation for Wake detection on-board 
(such as I-Wake) will provide further safety benefits. The architecture of such ground/ 
airborne system is already under investigation in FLYSAFE; nevertheless operational testing 
and shadow mode field trials at an airport are not planned. The best would be an 7th FP 
Integrated Project where the newly developed Wake vortex concepts of operations will be 
tested through shadow mode field trials, i.e. with direct involvement of airports and Air Traffic 
Control centres.  
 
A crucial issue to consider before actual implementation will be possible, is the provision of 
sufficient proof that performance requirements will be met. In this respect, it is noted that, 
since 2005, the application of the European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-
OCVM) and the use of the Validation Data Repository (VDR) is required by all new ATM-
related projects, in particular within the collaboration between the EC and EUROCONTROL 
in the ATM Master Plan and also along the ACARE Strategic Research Agenda SRA-2. The 
E-OCVM aims to provide a common approach to all projects contributing to the validation of 
operational concepts from early identification to full pre-operational validation as a pre-
requisite for industrialisation and operational introduction. A Safety Case, Human Factors 
Case, Benefits Case, and a Technology Case will need to be produced before ATC-Wake 
can be implemented. 
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Expected results and exploitation 
Project 
output/results 
Range of 
applications 
Expected impact Timing Partner(s)  
Community added value: 
Integrated ATC 
Wake vortex 
safety & 
capacity 
platform 
Link with I-
Wake 
Air Transport; 
ATM Industry; 
ATM Research 
& Development 
Airlines 
• Tactical and strategic benefits for European airports. 
Tactical benefits in terms of temporary capacity and 
punctuality increases, i.e. reduction of delays. Strategic 
benefits in terms of long term runway capacity for airline 
schedule planning.  
• Improvements of safety through identification and 
alleviation of the safety bottlenecks imposed by the 
Wake vortex problem around the 20 most congested 
airports in Europe 
• Future industrialisation of global ground/airborne Wake 
vortex avoidance system 
2010 All 
 
 
 
Social/environmental impact 
Wake Vortex 
Prediction and 
Monitoring 
System 
2010 DLR 
Wake Vortex 
Safety and 
Capacity 
Predictor 
2010 NLR 
Newly proposed 
Wake vortex 
safety 
regulation  
Airport 
operators 
Airport 
authorities 
Regulatory 
Authorities 
 
• Reduction of delay suffered by passengers and airlines; 
• Increase punctuality of air traffic in different 
meteorological conditions; 
• Decrease of fuel consumption and, hence, alleviation of 
environmental impact of aircraft 
• Improved competitiveness of European airports, airlines 
and associated ATM industry 
2005 All 
Technical / economic impact 
Weather 
forecasting and, 
nowcasting and 
monitoring 
systems 
Airport 
operators 
ATM industry 
• Manufacturing of Wake and weathers sensors as part of 
full integrated system mock-up 
• Benefits for the airports and ATS providers through a 
more precise and accurate local weather prediction in 
the terminal area of airports 
2007  TAD, DLR 
Wake Vortex 
Predictors 
Research 
institutes 
• Improved and reliable real-time prediction of Wake 
vortices 
2006 DLR, UCL 
Fast-time ATC 
simulator  with 
WV  modules’ 
ATS providers • Validation and implementation of more efficient ATM 
procedures 
2010 EEC 
Human 
Machine 
Interface for 
Controllers 
ATS providers 
and controllers 
• Improved usability and acceptability of the integrated 
system; 
• Improved interoperability of the integrated system with 
existing ATC systems. 
2010 NLR 
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8 Conclusions and recommendations 
8.1 Conclusions 
The IST project ATC-Wake has developed an integrated platform for ATC (Air Traffic 
Control) that will allow variable aircraft separation distances, as opposed to the fixed 
distances presently applied at airports. A variety of existing subsystems have been 
integrated within the ATC-Wake Integrated Platform (IP), which was used to: 
• To evaluate the interoperability of the ATC-Wake system with existing ATC systems 
currently used at various European airports; 
• To assess the safety and capacity improvements that can be obtained by local 
installation of the integrated system at various European airports; 
• To evaluate operational usability and acceptability of the ATC-Wake system; 
• To make a plan and to assess cost elements for further development, implementation 
and exploitation of the ATC-Wake IP (and other results). 
 
This platform is an essential step that will lead to installation of an integrated ATC decision 
support system at airports, enabling air traffic controllers to apply new optimised weather 
based aircraft separation. The ATC-Wake system integrates weather and Wake sensors, 
weather forecasting and now-casting systems, Wake vortex prediction system, separation 
mode planner, and air traffic controller interfaces.  
WP1: ATC-WAKE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
As a first step towards use of an ATC-Wake system at airports, the operational concept and 
requirements for the application of reduced aircraft separation under favourable weather 
conditions have been established. During the development and evaluation of the 
requirements, a number of key issues have been identified for further analysis: 
• Transitions between ATC-Wake and ICAO separation modes; 
• Aircraft separation and sector loading; 
• Missed approaches when ATC-Wake is applied; 
• Evaluation of safety requirements; 
• Evaluation of capacity benefits; 
• Evaluation of operational feasibility; 
• Assessment of the ATC-Wake system performance requirements; 
• Potential use of WV instrumentation on-board aircraft (and down-linking of WV data). 
 
During the remainder of ATC-Wake, these issues have been further investigated, and it 
appears that there are no major show-stoppers for continuation. However, it has to be 
mentioned that sufficiently stable and reliable meteorological forecast/now-cast data and WV 
detection information is a prerequisite for safe implementation of ATC-Wake. 
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The reduced Wake Vortex separation, targeted under crosswind conditions, is: 
• 2.5 Nm separation between all aircraft on the same final approach path 
• 90 seconds between all aircraft departing on the same runway. 
WP2: ATC-WAKE SYSTEM DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 
Following the definition of the Operational Concept and System Requirements, WP2 on 
System Design and Evaluation has established an Integrated Platform as key intermediate 
step before the ATC-Wake system can be installed locally at an airport.  
 
The ATC-Wake Operational System comprises four new components, which interface with 
several existing and/or enhanced ATC systems. New ATC-Wake components, together 
constituting the Separation Advisory System (SAS), are: 
• ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner 
• ATC-Wake Predictor 
• ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting 
• ATC-Wake Detector. 
 
These components have been integrated successfully in the Integrated Platform, and it has 
been shown that the functional data flow defined in WP1 on System Requirements for all 
ATC-Wake Use Cases (Separation Mode Planning, Transition Phase, Approach Phase, and 
Departure Phase) can be realized in an Operational ATC System. 
 
The technical feasibility of the ATC-Wake system has been evaluated by experimental 
simulations with the Integrated Platform. It has been shown that the functional integration of 
the components is successful and it will be technically feasible to integrate wake vortex 
prediction/detection information into existing ATC systems.  
 
Air Traffic Controller Human Machine Interfaces have been designed, specified, and 
tested successfully through two real-time simulation experiments with nine active controllers 
from five European countries. It has been shown that these HMIs are compliant with the 
HMIs currently used at key European airports (CdG and Schiphol). 
 
Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the Software Integration itself appeared to be 
much more difficult than anticipated. Furthermore, there are still some key issues that will 
need to be addressed in more detail before the ATC-Wake system can be installed 
locally at an airport: 
• The ATC-Wake Integrated Platform has been established using SPINEware middle-ware 
technology, enabling distributed use of the ATC-Wake components prepared by the 
consortium partners and running remotely at different sites. Next step will be to install all 
systems together at a single site, and to demonstrate its use in real-time. 
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• The systems available for use as part of the ATC-Wake Detector (e.g. LiDAR and 
SODAR systems) meet certain performance requirements. It is not completely clear 
whether their accuracy, integrity, and reliability will be sufficient in all weather conditions. 
Their complementary use should be better understood (see Section 7). 
• The quality of the meteorological forecast (and now-casting) systems might need to be 
enhanced allowing frequent updates of the information provided to the ATC-Wake 
Separation Mode Planner and the ATC-Wake Predictor.  
WP3: POTENTIAL SAFETY AND CAPACITY IMPROVEMENTS 
As motivation for the use of ATC-Wake, the WP3 on Safety and Capacity Analysis has 
evaluated the potential safety and capacity improvements. It has been shown that runway 
throughput and delay improves noticeably when the ATC-Wake system is used. 
Depending on the occurrence of favorable crosswind conditions, the increase in runway 
throughput is about 2% for the ATC-Wake SRD operation and 5% for the ATC-Wake SRA 
operation (at a generic airport with average wind conditions).  
 
Introduction of a new ATC system cannot be done without showing that minimum safety 
requirements are met. ATC-Wake risk assessments intend to be compliant with ESARR4 
requirements posed by EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulation Unit (SRU). Guidelines for the 
development of new wake vortex safety regulation have been given (using a WV risk 
management framework developed in S-Wake). 
 
The safety assessment of the ATC-Wake operation has been performed in three steps. 
First, as part of the qualitative safety assessment, potential hazards and conflict scenarios 
related to use of ATC-Wake have been evaluated. Second, through use of the ‘classical’ 
WAVIR tool, indicative separation minima dependent on crosswind conditions have been 
determined. As these indicative separation minima do not yet account for crosswind 
uncertainty, as part of the third step, the setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system 
components was further investigated. It appears that especially the Monitoring and Alerting 
system and Meteorological Forecast and Now-casting systems are crucial and sufficient 
accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed.  
 
WAVIR simulations for the SRA operation indicate that reduced separation of 2.5 Nm 
can be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode provided that crosswind is forecasted to be 
above a certain limit. During ATC-Wake arrivals, the Monitoring and Alerting component will 
anticipate potential wake encounters in time (and generate an alert); nevertheless if the 
meteorological forecast information is not accurate and stable enough, this might be 
achieved at the cost of a relatively large number of missed approaches. The simulations 
indicate that, provided that certain requirements are met, about 30% of the approaches might 
be performed with 2.5 Nm aircraft separation in case ATC-Wake is used. 
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WAVIR simulations for the SRD operation also indicate that reduced separation of 90 
seconds can be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode, provided that crosswind is forecasted 
to be above a certain limit. If the accuracy of the wind forecast information is too low, the 
Monitoring and Alerting component could provide a relatively large number of alerts. A 
potential issue is that immediately after take off, i.e. at relatively low altitude, it will not be 
feasible for the pilot to turn away from the wake vortex of a preceding aircraft. Provision and 
use of meteorological now-casting information by the controller will be very beneficial during 
the second departure phase, in order to support the pilot to prepare for a potential encounter 
in case of a sudden change of the wind conditions. 
 
Various activities have been performed to validate the safety assessment (including 
verification and validation of the wake evolution models, wake encounter models, and aircraft 
performance models). Nevertheless, it has become clear that the wake vortex phenomena 
during departures is still not fully understood, i.e. further research would be needed before 
the outcome of the departure safety assessment will be ready for approval by regulatory 
authorities. The full Safety Case will need to take into account local wind conditions of the 
airport envisaged for introduction of ATC-Wake as well. 
WP4: ASSESSMENT OF OPERATIONAL FEASIBILITY 
The assessment of operational feasibility for the implementation of ATC-WAKE operational 
concept within Europe has been performed along several axis: 
• Correctness, usability and acceptability of the operational concept by ATC 
Controllers: the operational concept is not a ‘revolution’ for ATC, it represents a sound 
evolution from existing procedures (runway configuration and transition). The real-time 
simulations performed by NLR indicates that the ATC-WAKE concept of operations has 
been easily adopted by a team of ATC Controllers and positive feed-back for its use in 
operations has been received. In addition the size of the changes from operational 
perspective (airport infrastructure, training) fits with the existing evolutions observed at 
European airports to cope with the increasing traffic demand. 
• Operational benefits: the fast-time simulations have allowed to assess the potential 
gains for runway throughput and flight times considering a number of potential scenarios 
for the reduction of minimum separation (distance or time) and the runway usage (arrivals 
only, departures only, mixed mode). The potential gains following the application of 
reduced separation are significant, varying between 10% and 30% increase of runway 
throughput and between 10% and 40% reduction of the average delay per flight. 
However the actual gains will be dependent on a number of factors: 
– Favourable meteorological conditions: the transport of Wake vortex out of the arrival 
or departure corridors is observed when a significant and persistent cross-wind exists 
and to take benefit out of such situation a minimum 20min reliable wind forecast is 
necessary to plan traffic. In addition good visibility conditions are required for reduced 
separation operations; 
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– Traffic pressure: the application of reduced separation operations will deliver benefits 
only when a high level of traffic exists and sufficient notice is made to ATC to plan 
aircraft movements accordingly;  
– Traffic distribution: potential benefits of the application of reduced separations are 
highly dependent on the traffic distribution; 
– Airport layout: the general behaviour of departing and landing aircraft is highly related 
to the selected airport layout (e.g. existence of a central taxiway avoiding arrivals to 
cross the departure runway) 
• Impact on existing ATC systems: the analysis of interoperability issues has confirmed 
that the main changes to systems concern the implementation of specific atmospheric 
sensing systems (e.g. weather radar or LIDAR), the introduction of ATC-WAKE tools for 
ATC (separation mode planning, Wake vortex prediction, detection and monitoring tools). 
The impact on existing systems is low, mainly the arrival management tool (AMAN) 
requires modification to support the fluent transitioning between ATC-WAKE reduced 
separations and standard ICAO separations (depending on meteorological conditions). 
 
As main conclusion the ATC-Wake technical and operational feasibility analyses and the 
safety and capacity studies have build sufficient confidence in the operational concept and 
system design for the application of reduced separations to represent a sound evolution from 
existing ATC procedures & working practices, to deliver significant benefits for runway 
throughput and average delay per flight without major rework to the current ATC systems, 
while maintaining safety. Next step will be to complete the validation through production of a 
Safety Case, Human Factors Case, Benefits Case, and a Technology Case towards 
installation of the ATC-Wake at one or more European airports. The best would be to 
continue with airport shadow mode field trials, i.e. with direct involvement of airports and Air 
Traffic Control centres. 
8.2 Recommendations 
The positive conclusions on technical and operational feasibility as well as potential safety 
and capacity improvements will need to be traded-off against the actual weather ‘windows’ to 
perform such operations and costs for the acquisition and implementation of the new 
equipments or infrastructure required (Wake vortex sensors, new atmospheric sensing 
systems, enhanced weather forecast capabilities). In this context, a number of 
recommendations for complete validation of ATC-Wake have been identified.  
 
First the requirements for the validation of the use of wake vortex detection and monitoring 
systems at the targeted airport have to be specified: 
• Perform a year long measurement campaign that allows gathering a significant 
sample of correlated weather (wind and temperature profiles), wake vortex and aircraft 
data that will serve as a basis for performance and safety assessment. 
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• Assess the performance of Wake Vortex sensors in the critical areas in particular in 
the landing and take-off areas 
– Are systems requirements and quality of service achievable? 
– Focus on hazardous situations: Are alert cases always detected? What is the rate of 
false alerts?  
– Confirm the sensor specification from manufacturers. 
• Assess the performance of Wake Vortex predictors in the critical areas 
– Are systems requirements and quality of service achievable? 
– What is the level of accuracy of the predicted "Danger Areas" position and extent? 
– What is the level of integrity that needed for ATC-Wake operations? 
– What are the best options for the collection of required input to WV Short-Term 
Prediction? 
 
Second, for the application of reduced aircraft separations, based on collected data, the 
following analysis shall be performed in the context of a local Safety Case: 
• Characterise conditions for reduced WV separation (at the targeted airport): 
– Are the proposed aircraft separations and decision criteria applicable to the targeted 
airport? What are the limitations? What are the uncertainties? 
– What is the risk of WV encounters in comparison with current operations? 
 
Third, the assessment of operational benefits shall be refined using a repository of 
information for the main external factors influencing ATC-Wake operations: 
• Weather conditions (visibility and wind) and their fluctuations, weather forecast limitations 
(at the targeted airport). 
• Traffic demand: what are the limitations of traffic tactical re-planning to best use the non-
permanent reduction of separation? 
 
Fourth, the transition towards the ATC-Wake operational concept shall be assessed, 
intermediate steps of the application of reduced separations in well defined conditions, 
delivering less benefits but available on a shorter time frame and supported by a subset only 
of ATC-Wake systems, may represent significant incentives for Airport Operators and pave 
the way for a complete ATC-Wake implementation. 
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Appendix A ATC-Wake Requirements Matrix 
This section contains the ATC-WAKE operational user and systems requirements that have 
been devised during WP1000 and has been updated following the results from the validation 
trials. The following attributes have been assigned to the requirements: 
– ID : Unique identification X – nn, X denoting the specific category (OR for operational 
requirement, UR for user requirement, SR for system requirement) and nn the reference 
number 
– Description : title of the requirement, followed by the requirement text 
– Status :  
– P - Proposed: requirement has been requested by a source; 
– A - Approved: requirement has been analysed and has been allocated; 
– IA - In analysis: proposed requirement is analysed for possible approval or rejection; 
– D - Designed: requirement has been incorporated in design; 
– IM - Implemented: requirement has been implemented; 
– V - Verified: requirement has been verified; 
– E- dEleted: requirement has been deleted (including an explanation); 
– R- Rejected: proposed requirement has been rejected; 
– Stalled: in case of unforeseen problems during the implementation, 
– Priority : a classification of the requirement: essential (Ess), desirable (Des) or nice-
to-have (Nth) 
 
Supplementary information are provided as notes :  
– Source : a reference to the source of the requirement in WP1000 deliverables 
– Traced to : dependency between requirements (especially system requirements) 
– Verification method: the method for verifying that the requirement has been met: 
inspection, analysis, feasibility test (operational or technical) 
 
Operational Requirements 
 
ID Description Status Priority 
 
OP - 01 Hazard Prediction Capability IA Ess 
The ATC-WAKE system shall predict Wake Vortex behaviour : 
• for planned arrival and departure traffic 
• in pre-defined (critical) areas 
Note : Prediction – Detection Areas see Section 3 : in these areas,  follower aircraft may be 
potentially hit by WV from leader ( arriving or departure) aircraft. 
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ID Description Status Priority 
OP - 02 Hazard Detection Capability IA Ess 
The ATC-WAKE system shall continuously monitor the behaviour of Wake Vortices : 
• for landing and taking-off aircraft 
• in pre-defined critical areas (e.g. ILS Glide Slope) 
Note : Prediction – Detection Areas see Section 3 : in these areas,  follower aircraft may be potentially 
hit by WV from leader ( arriving or departure) aircraft 
 
OP - 03 Quality of Prediction Information IA Ess 
The prediction information shall have a high level of quality in order to : 
– guarantee safety of operations based on such information 
– support the application of reduced aircraft separation and reversion to standard separations 
Note : Performances of Prediction see Section 3 : Performances attached to prediction information 
concern :  
 the accuracy of the prediction, 
 the stability of the prediction 
 the time horizon for such prediction (look-ahead time) and 
 the refreshment rate 
 
 
OP - 04 Quality of Detection Information IA Ess 
The detection information shall have a high level of accuracy in order to avoid false alarms. 
Quantification of detection quality requirements has been performed through WP1 - WP2 collaboration 
Note : typical delay at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport induced following a go around procedure is 35 
mintues 
 
OP - 05 Wake Vortex Information to ATC Controllers IA Ess 
ATC-WAKE shall support ATC Controller decision making process related to Wake vortex hazard 
prevention. 
Note : Operational use see Section 3. 
 
OP - 06 Integration to ATC Environment IA Ess 
ATC-WAKE prediction and detection system shall : 
– adapt to ATC environment, in particular to arrival / departure procedures, to runway configuration 
and to ATC decision support tools 
– use relevant information from existing ATC systems 
– provide relevant VW information to ATC Controllers and automated systems involved in arrival 
and departure management in order to achieve the minimum safe spacing between aircraft 
according to vortices transport and decay 
– not add workload to ATC Controllers 
Note : Operational use see Section 3. 
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User Requirements 
 
ID Description Status Priority 
 
UR - 01 WV Separation Mode IA Ess 
The ATC Supervisor shall receive information on applicable separation mode (ICAO or ATC WAKE) 
and separation minimum distance associated to their validity period (predicted). 
Note : the applicable separation minima will take into account: 
– the applicable approach and departure procedures, including the missed approache procedure(s)  
– potential worst case scenarios with respect to the traffic distribution and planning, meteorological 
conditions 
 
UR - 02 WV Separation Mode Transitions IA Ess 
The ATC Supervisor and ATCOs shall receive information about transition between separation modes 
at least 40 min in advance with AMAN, 20 min otherwise. 
 
UR – 03 WV Prediction IA Ess 
On request, the ATCO shall be provided with a visualisation of WV (named vortex vector) on the radar 
display for each individual landing aircraft from start to end of arrival / departure critical area.  
The vortex vector shall be updated using actual meteorological information (e.g. wind profile).  
Note : arrival critical area is relatively well-defined (from localiser interception until touch-down, ILS 
axis) whereas for departure the dimensioning of departure area has to be investigated further 
 
UR – 04 WV Alerting IA Ess 
The ATCO shall receive an appropriate warning when the actual behaviour the detected WV for 
individual aircraft differs significantly from its predicted behaviour  (slower WV transport) 
Note : ATC-WAKE alarm are transmitted to pilot using voice communication 
 
 
UR – 05 WV Monitoring IA Ess 
The ATCO shall be continuously informed about the presence or absence of WV in pre-defined critical 
areas for landings or take-off (close to the ground). 
 
 
UR – 06 Information to Flight Crews IA Ess 
The application of reduced separations for take-off and landings shall be notified to Flight Crews using 
ATIS (Air Traffic Information Service). 
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System Requirements 
 
ID Description Status Priority 
SR - 01 Separation Mode Planner IA Ess 
The ATC-WAKE system shall determine the applicable separation mode (ICAO mode or ATC-
WAKE mode) and its validity, support the planning and implementation of mode transitions and 
advise ATCO about minimum aircraft separation distance 
Traced to :  
Operational Requirements : OP-01, OP-03, OP-05, OP-06. 
User Requirements : UR-01, UR-02. 
ATC – WAKE Component : see Section 3. 
ATC-WAKE Use Cases : see Sections 3 and 4. 
 
SR - 02 WV Predictor IA Ess 
The ATC-WAKE system shall predict for individual aircraft the WV behaviour ( “vortex vector”)  in 
the pre-defined arrival or departure area(s) and within a pre-defined timeframe. 
Traced to :  
Operational Requirements : OP-01, OP-03, OP-05, OP-06 
User Requirements : UR-03 
ATC – WAKE Component : see Section 3. 
ATC-WAKE Use Cases : see Sections 3 and 4. 
 
SR - 03 WV Detector IA Ess 
The ATC-WAKE system shall detect in real-time for individual aircraft the WV behaviour ( “vortex 
vector”) in the pre-defined arrival or departure area(s). 
Traced to :  
Operational Requirements : OP-2, OP-4, OP-5, OP-6 
User Requirements : no direct link to user requirements 
ATC – WAKE Component : see Section 3. 
ATC-WAKE Use Cases : see Sections 3 and 4. 
Verification method : analysis 
 
SR - 04 WV Monitoring and Alerting IA Ess 
The ATC-WAKE system shall monitor the WV situation with respect to critical areas and raise 
appropriate alarms to ATCOs in case of : 
• significant deviation between WV detection and WV prediction information with a risk of WV 
encounter 
• failure of one WV component   
Traced to :  
Operational Requirements : OP-2, OP-5, OP-6 
User Requirements : UR-04 
ATC – WAKE Component : see Section 3. 
ATC-WAKE Use Cases : see Sections 3 and 4. 
Verification method : analysis 
 
